Big Man Patrimonial Politics
It has been argued that in contexts where state institutions are weak, individuals must seek security and opportunities for socioeconomic mobility through alternate means, mainly by entering into reciprocal, clientelist relationships with “Big Men” patrons (Boas 2010).
Whether politicians, prominent religious figures, military commanders, chiefs, or wealthy businessmen, these Big Men do not necessarily rely on their access to formal political structures to acquire power and wealth. Instead, they garner power through the creation of expansive political and economic networks (Christensen 2012). Through these networks, Big Men tactically distribute resources to and extract resources from their less privileged clients (Utas 2012). While “clients” are often conscious of the unequal nature of this exchange and the ways in which it is deliberately organized to bolster the prominence of the Big Men, without support from formal state institutions in times of insecurity and need, clients are left with little choice but to ensure their connection to one or several Big Men. The Big Men's legitimacy is heavily contingent on their ability to gauge the amount of resources required to satisfy their clients. If a Big Man fails to offer the support he has promised, clients may leave him for another Big Man, thereby weakening his power base. In this respect, the power of the Big Man is not fixed, but dynamic, and intrinsically connected to his capacity to secure a large foundational network of clients (Utas 2012). In other words, in such contexts, “wealth” is located “in the people” and not necessarily within formal political and social apparatuses and institutions (Guyer 1993).In times of conflict and violent upheaval, Big Men, and the general populace, are provided with new opportunities for innovation and creation. In such contexts, fresh spaces materialize as a result of the deterioration and outright destruction of formal state institutions (Murphy 2010; Vigh 2006).
Such a void can be taken advantage of by those seeking to nurture new or older structures, with the intent of creating avenues for economic, social, and political mobility. While this sometimes takes the form of emerging, industrious grassroots economic endeavors, such as Okada riding, this can also take the form of widened opportunities for creating expansive networks of patronage in areas where the state has retreated (Lindell and Utas 2012).It is also important to note that Big Men are best understood to be nodes in an expansive and interconnected network of clients (i.e., “small men” or “followers”) and other Big Men. In fact, Big Men collaborate and rely on one another to enhance their access to wealth, resources, and security as well as opportunities for network expansion (Utas 2012). It is this peer element that distinguishes Big Man webs from our traditional understanding of patron-client relationships, which are conceptualized as being inherently hierarchical and organizationally vertical (Kaihko 2012). By drawing support from other Big Men, Big Men are able to broaden their network base, thereby bolstering their capacity to amass wealth. As Kaihko (2012) elucidates:
As patron-client networks have commonly been described as hierarchical and vertical, these networks must be understood as constituting a wider concept as they also include the horizontal dimension in the form of peers. Additionally, unlike what is expected in patronclient relationships, clients in these networks belong to different networks and therefore have several Big Men, who in their turn have their own Big Men. (p. 188)
While the notion of the Big Man, along with his networks, stems from Sahlins (1963) exploration of politicosocial structures in Melanesia and Polynesia, this analytic lens is increasingly being adopted in studying similar modes of relations in the African context (Christensen and Utas 2008; Utas 2012). Bigmanity, as a conceptual framework, has the potential to enrich our understanding of how non-state actors, and informal networks, accumulate and distribute wealth, particularly within post-conflict settings.
It can further shed light on how these networks provide opportunities for security but, simultaneously, risk fostering climates of profound social injustice through the entrapment and marginalization of large segments of society.The realities of “Bigmanity” and Big Man politics have characterized the prewar, wartime, and postwar contexts of Sierra Leone. The structural antecedents of Sierra Leone's decade-long civil war (1991-2002) are complex and multifaceted and are intimately connected to the legacy of colonialism, a weakened state, institutional collapse, structural violence, growing mass disillusionment, and small arms proliferation (Denov 2010). Like much of sub-Saharan Africa, Sierra Leone was integrated into the world system in a way that marginalized its traditional social systems and left its economy colonized by international enterprises and a kleptocratic governing elite. Over time, the institutionalization of what Reno (1995) has referred to as the “shadow state” characterized government conduct and activities. Through a patrimonial system of rationed favors, theft of public funds, illicit payments, as well as bribes, state corruption became institutionalized and is regarded as an important antecedent to the war. Murphy (2010) argues that patrimonial politics - represented by discretionary, autocratic power of Big Men - not only formed the prewar conditions triggering violent conflict in Sierra Leone but also shaped the organizational structure of the military regimes during the civil war. Perhaps not surprisingly, such patrimonial Big Man relations continue to be deeply entrenched in everyday informal relations in the post-conflict period, whereby a variety of non-state actors enjoy privileged power over the accumulation and distribution of wealth and resources (Chabal and Daloz 1999; Boas 2010; Utas 2012; Kaihko 2012; Christensen 2012). While these networks offer individuals and communities important opportunities for accessing scarce resources and finding security in an often tumultuous postwar climate, they may simultaneously limit chances for meaningful economic and social mobility.
4