Big Men Extortion, Small Men Frustration: The Perils of Bike Riding
Although former child soldiers reap benefits from the industry, the infiltration and growing power of Big Men within the motorbike riding network risk re-marginalizing these youth.
Significantly, the extractionary and gerontocratic nature of social arrangements characteristic of the industry continue to effectively impose limits on riders' social mobility and overall socioeconomic status. Numerous participants in the study highlighted the constraining and debilitating impacts of Big Men extortion. The following statements reveal participants' struggles in accumulating the required finances for their masters (i.e., bike owner's/“bosses”) along with the consequences they suffered when unable to do so. The related strains on their personal lives and constraining effects on their aspirations for mobility are also emphasized:But two things can't go together - being in school and as well figuring out my survival from the bike and again to provide the daily boss man fee. So I decided to drop out of school and concentrate on business. (Makeni rider)
One rider underscored the precarious nature of the relationship with his boss, his dependence upon him, and the uncertainty of his economic situation as a whole:
My present trouble is that I don't have a bike of my own and am just making money for someone else...My boss owns the bike. He can ask me to leave at any time because there is really no guarantee in the relationship - there is no blood relation to keep us together...My relationship with my boss is not 100 percent okay. Sometimes when I'm unable to raise 25,000 Leones from the bike, he abuses me verbally and insults me...He threatens that he will take the bike from me, as if our relationship is just tied around the bike...[When this happens] I try to talk to him and beg him to return the bike to me, as I can't survive without it for now...When his anger subsides, he usually returns the bike to me...but he doesn't care about me or my situation.
All he cares about is the money...He is arrogant and disrespectful. (Kenema rider)When this participant was asked if his boss ever beats him, he replied:
Well he pushes my head all the time like this [motions to his head]. I consider that even more humiliating than beating. It makes me feel very bad...Sometimes when this happens, I argue with him or think about physically attacking him...The war had a big impact on me in that I am now very hot-tempered and I just act [impulsively]...But people around always talk to me to calm down. What makes me cool off is when I think about my future, which is partly in his hands now. (Kenema rider)
Participants also reflected on the immobilizing and adverse impacts stemming from Big Men police extraction.
My worries remain about fear of traffic police and revenue collectors who often disturb us and take money from us. (Makeni rider)
They used to [harass] us for [not having] driving mirrors. We removed them because the light from another bike reflects on us [and we can't see]. So if we are held because of this, we have to give them Le 5,000 if they do not accept Le 2,000 or even more than that to avoid problems. To ride without a helmet and improper footwear brings an additional fine which we must pay for. (Bo rider)
The above testimonies reveal the intricate web of fees, fines, and abusive power relationships former child soldiers turned riders must negotiate. While the industry is considered by many to have been integral in building rewarding livelihoods, it simultaneously exposes them to structures and social arrangements that undermine their capacity to accumulate wealth and shift to more secure and self-sustaining social positions.
Riders now find themselves integrated as “small men” within a highly hierarchical socioeconomic structure through their membership to the BRA. The BRA, and the social relationships riders have forged through the network, has effectively served the varying needs of former combatants in urban Sierra Leone.
However, the emergence of an expansive social and economic base within this network has created lucrative opportunities for extraction, specifically for those at the top. Many participants described the ways their marginal position as “regular” members within the BRA have exposed them to the extractionary powers of members occupying higher rungs of the association’s social ladder.There are people referred to as taskforce who give us tickets of Le 1, 000 every day which some for my friends are not happy but I’m ok with it (...) But again this same group raids and coerces riders to pay tickets or give money to attend social functions which I’m really against. [This costs] Le 5, 000 (...)[My friend’s] bike was taken from him [for not attending a social function] until he paid a fine of Le 10, 000. (Bo rider)
We do sometimes fight those taskforce members for the tickets but they outnumber us and they have the right, so we can’t succeed. [Bo rider in reference to how regular members of the BRA must buy tickets from the association’s taskforce members]
One’s bike will be seized and the taskforce members put up road blocks to collect these monies. One must buy [the daily ticket]. (Bo rider)
Other participants explained the benefits they reap on account of their privileged status within the BRA:
Yes, now I am a member of the association’s executive as one of the task force members. I am not riding at present but engage in selling tickets occupying the sixth position in the task force membership. At 6:00am, I am out to sell tickets and in fact my respect has increased. I can board any bike at any time without paying a dime. (Makeni rider)
Many of the above quotes shed light onto the very hierarchical and unequal nature of participation in the association. While some members greatly benefit from their involvement in the association, namely, executive and task force members, the majority of riders, also referred to as “regular” members, are unfairly and disproportionately impacted by the extractionary nature of the system.
Based on the analysis thus far, it would appear that riders under the BRAs are complacent or passively accepting of the extractionary environment they negotiate. However, as Voldby's (2011) research reveals, riders assert that this is the best position to be in given the prevailing context of insecurity and uncertainty in the country. The conceptualization of riding as the best possible alternative was alluded to by some of the participants:
Well if I can see any opportunity for me to make money than what I get from the bike, I'll leave the bike. (Kenema rider)
I didn't learn any skill job though I can trade in pepper, palm oil and such other cooking condiments. But I'm satisfied with bike riding for now. (Makeni rider)
Instead of viewing former child soldiers as “buying into” the unjust network they are a part of, it is important to situate these young men's continued connection to these Big Men networks in light of the wider context. As previously noted, confronted with a post-conflict urban terrain marked by rampant poverty, few employment opportunities, and weak state institutions, former child soldiers' attachment to Bigmanity networks, however oppressive such arrangements are, can in fact be understood as an active and tactical decision. Failing to do so, in many cases, could render former child soldiers' realities more precarious and insecure.
Nonetheless, many participants expressed their frustration with the industry, in general, and the BRA, specifically, in light of failed promises, the unjust allocation of resources, and a growing recognition of regular members' static, marginal position within the network:
They have a loan facility from a Bank which they use to buy bikes for members (...) But, the beneficiaries in the first scheme were the same in the second scheme. So there is an outcry within the BRA membership that beneficiaries should be changed in the pending scheme. (Makeni rider)
For me, it is not helping. They have never helped me and I have never involved in an accident (...) It bothers me so much, because they are not doing much with [the membership fees].
I expected them to have completed the office structure by now [which is what they said they were using the membership dues to construct]. (Bo Rider)The executive always...determines the beneficiaries of the loans. But we as ordinary riders pay Le 1,000.00 every day as ticket fee which is altogether accumulated to secure the loan which they buy these bikes with. The executive members themselves have been the only beneficiaries of this scheme. (Makeni rider)
These passages reveal how riders acknowledge not only the unequal power dynamics within the BRA but also the executive's failure in honoring their side of the patron-client moral contract. By co-opting funds that are theoretically meant to benefit riders, the executive is insidiously undermining the reciprocal social arrangement upon which riders' decision to join the BRA rested on. In so doing, the executive is effectively delegitimizing their exclusive claim to power, status, extraction, and control over the network. Such circumstances risk engendering mounting frustration and disillusionment among former child soldiers, potentially leading to mass defection or rebellion. In this respect, instead of offering viable opportunities for social and economic mobility, Bigmanity networks are working to threaten former child soldiers' capacity to survive and grow in the postwar era.
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