DYNAMICS OF RELIGION AS A source Ofviolence

It is important to note, however, that religious traditions are not unified but virtually all religious traditions contain a variety of inter­pretations in regards to war and peace.

Multiple interpretations within a single religious tradition are facilitated by the fact that religious traditions are recorded in sacred texts, such as the Bible, Torah, Quran, Mishna and so on which are written down in a distant time, usually in a language that is different from the ones used by the current communities. These texts are often filled with ambiguities and contradicting statements, posing a major challenge for interpretation. Although sacred texts, as the direct word of God, are considered by the believers to be universal, timeless truths, they still have to go though human interpreta­tion because religious experience is filtered through human perception and is interpreted within the symbolic frames of myth and ritual (Appleby 2000: 29). Furthermore, life is dynamic and conditions, problems, needs and questions change constantly over time. As living traditions, religious traditions adapt to their environments in order to address contemporary needs and they can do that without eroding continuity with the sacred because the past is capacious (Appleby 2000: 33).

There are a variety of possible reasons as to why people choose one religious response to a conflict over another. Some of these explanations are related to cognitive and emotional needs that may be met by particular religious imagery, symbolism and text. Complexity of the process is aptly captured by Gopin (2000: 11) who states that the way sacred texts are used to foster peace or promote violence and destruction seems to depend on the complex ways in which the psychological and sociological circumstances and the economic and cultural constructs of a particular group interact with the ceaseless human drive to hermeneutically develop religious meaning systems, texts, rituals, symbols and laws. Especially under extreme conditions, such as at times of war, religious texts are interpreted through deep fears and concerns. At such times, various verses, ideas or spiritual images may meet the cognitive and emotional needs of the individual (Gopin 2000: 11).

Accordingly, the turbulent relations with the enemy impact on the way texts are understood. Various tales, sagas and myths are selected to support interpretation of the religious tradition that legitimizes war, and constructs negative enemy images. In this process, religious actors simplify religious myths, dehistoricize religious texts, and construct a story in which all time, place and difference are represented as meaningful parts of a divine project (Kadayifci-Orellana 2003: 28). With the aid of religious imagery and vocabulary, various sagas, myths and tales, with which the population is familiar, past, present and future are linked in the minds of the population (Kadayifci-Orellana 2002: 357).

For instance, in Sri Lanka, Sinhalese Buddhists have justified the use of violence against the Hindu Tamils by reinterpreting the Buddhist chronicles of Ashoka that date back 2300 years (see Bartholomeusz 2002). Buddhist monks interpreted the conversation that took place between eight Buddhist monks and King Arjuna, who, after bloody war, had doubts about the moral value of his actions. According to the records, eight Buddhist monks reassure Arjuna that he, in fact, killed only one and a half souls (a monk and a novice), and that the rest do not count as souls since they were not Buddhists, and that it was all right to kill the unbelievers. This conversation is used in the modern day conflict to justify killing thousands of Tamils in the name of Buddhism. By reinterpretation of these chronicles, Buddhist monks represent the other, the Hindu Tamils, as unworthy souls as they do not belong to the group, the Buddhist. Various monks in Sri Lanka today interpret the Buddhist texts through the lenses of turbulent relations with the Hindu Tamils and employ this particular conversation, which is not part of Buddhist texts in Buddhist countries other than Sri Lanka, as a key to construct the theology of the other in their understanding of Buddhism.

Political, social, economic and cultural factors also shape the way individuals view their conflict, perceive their enemies and their options regarding the conflict as they form their understanding in search of religious/ cultural values and texts to make sense of their lives, sufferings and ways to deal with them.

77-92; Klandermans 1988: 185). Significant events (e.g. invasions, wars, upheavals, peace agreements etc.) disrupt the operative systems of ideas, beliefs, values, roles and institutional practices in a given society (Sahlins 1991: 44). In return, these events change the way in which social actors think about the meaning and importance they assign to modes of actions and the rules that govern interaction, groups and their discourses, symbols and rituals (Ellingson 1997). Social motivations and personal experiences also play a critical role in determining affiliations with a group that espouses a certain interpretation of religious texts.

In the process of legitimization of an interpretation, various religious myths are interpreted and reinterpreted to justify vio­lence and construct negative enemy images. Past wars and victories are interpreted from the perspective of the religious tradition, and are employed to recreate the history of the people. By locating these victories and wars in the collective memory of the population, religious and political actors engage the population into the politics of interpretation (Kadayifci-Orellana forthcoming: 180). By retelling these religious myths, sagas and stories, they rewrite the history and shape the spaces (e.g. national homeland) and events (e.g. wars, victories, massacres etc.) that constitute the basis of religious identity. Such stories create the imaginative boundaries that contain the identity of the people and influence self-interpretations and modes of exclusion and inclusion (see Kadayifci- Orellana forthcoming), of self-other.

For example, in the West Bank and Gaza, suicide attacks are made possible through Hamas's interpretation of the martyrdom myth (see Kadayifci-Orellana forthcoming). The myth of martyrdom and the symbol of 'the martyr' represent the utmost act of devotion to God in the Islamic tradition. As a powerful mythic construct, it gives meaning not only to one's existence, but more importantly, to one's death (Gopin 2002: 31-32). Suicide, on the other hand, is one of the gravest sins according to Islam. Nevertheless, by reinterpreting the myth of martyrdom to include suicide attacks, Hamas leadership invokes the myth of the ultimate form of sacrifice for God, for justice, and for one's own people (see Kadayifci- Orellana forthcoming). From the perspective of the Palestinians, Israel is one of the world's strongest armies which is also supported by the world's only super power, whereas they lack a legitimate state and have no army. In this unequal war, suicide bombs become the ultimate weapons as each individual turns himself into a weapon (Kadayifci-Orellana forthcoming). Furthermore, this weapon is easier to hide or transport and is much cheaper. These factors facilitate the reinterpretation of the Islamic martyrdom myth and make suicide attacks acceptable to various groups. Such an interpretation endows Palestinians with the sense that they are not powerless or subservient, but can do something about the situation, and sap the Israeli morale, thus obliterate their psychology. Besides, by lend­ing meaning and dignity to these actions in their minds, the myth of martyrdom provides comfort and paramount means of coping with suffering and loss, especially to the families of these individuals who undertake suicide actions (Kadayifci-Orellana 2003: 30).

Again, in ex-Yugoslavia, Bosnian genicide was religiously motivated and justified on religious grounds by the Orthadox Serb nationalists by identifying Bosnians with the Ottoman army that killed the Serbian King in the 14th century and captured Serbia.

Religious symbols...myths of origin (pure Serb race), symbols of passion (Lazar [the Serbian King who died during the war against the Ottomans]), escha­tological longings (resurrection of Lazar) were used by religious nationalists to create a reduplicating Milos Obilic (the assassin of Sultan Murat [the Ottoman Sultan that was killed during the war]), avenging himself on the Christ killer, the race traitor, the alien, and ironically, the falsely accused “fundamentalist” next door.

Additionally, in many conflict situations, one can observe multiple groups attempting to mobilize the population towards their political and strategic narratives. For example, offensive religious interpretations might be competing with nonviolent religious interpre­tations that aim to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. Again, secular/nationalist narratives might compete with these religious narratives as well. Particularly, when there is no official army but clandestine military groups, guerillas and so on every individual becomes a potential soldier in the path of “liberation.” In this case, different leaderships try to recruit the population into their camp. Who is more successful is then measured in terms of their ability to mobilize the population towards their objectives. This process becomes especially important in legitimization of their leadership policies. As Kelman states, “[l]eaders need assurance that the public is prepared to accept the costs and risks that their policies will inevitably entail” (Kelman 1997: 215). In this process, the critical factor is the population (Shapiro 1989: 74; see also Kadayifci-Orellana forth­coming: 30).

Population as a political and economic resource is a fairly novel idea. In this aspect, population implies that people of acommunity become a major actor in an economic and political problem. Population also implies that people become conscious of their abilities and roles in the political and economic spheres of social life, and not simply subjects of a government (Shapiro 1989: 74). As Foucault wrote, “[t]his privileging of the population as a major actor and identity in the modern nation-state provides much of impetus and legitimization for conflict and war” (Foucault 1978: 25). In other words, “citizens have to be encouraged to support the strategic understanding among competing states and be willing to mobilize for war (offer their bodies) and support that mobilization (offer their political acquiescence)” (Foucault 1978: 25).

When that is the case, each of these groups need to provide overall frames of meaning within the historical, cultural and religious context of their society. In order to get the support of their population, leaders use symbols that can evoke strong emotional reaction, and according to Kelman, the use of these symbols—which are developed in the early and continuing socialization process— “translates into automatic endorsement of the policies and actions that the leadership defines as necessary” (Kelman 1997: 215). Especially when there is not a single well- defined leadership but a number of groups that are competing for that position, this process becomes more complicated. All of these groups attempt to use various national or religious resources for symbols to evoke the emotions of their populations.

At times, violent or politically coercive aspects of a particular religious response may not be as important as other benefits received from a particular institution. For instance, research in the West Bank observes that most Hamas supporters in the West Bank, including non-Muslims, emphasize the effectiveness and the quality of the services provided by the institutions (such as medical centers, educational and charity institutions) that were affiliated with Hamas rather than the violent and coercive aspects of the organization (see Kadayifci-Orellana forthcoming). These individuals stated that Hamas was the only group that was doing work to alleviate the suffering of the Palestinian people (Kadayifci- Orellana forthcoming). Therefore, the strug­gle for legitimacy is often carried to these institutional sites, where their arguments and interpretations are introduced to and disseminated among the population. It is at these institutional sites that different perspectives and interpretations compete for legitimacy, and insert themselves as the Truth. Again, at these sites, manifold relations of power permeate, characterize and constitute the social body (see Kadayifci-Orellana forthcoming: 41).

Individuals, such as religious or political leaders, who are recognized as having legiti­macy to craft new arguments and adopt pre­existing ones, then arrange these arguments in various combinations to pursue their goals. These goals or expected outcomes might include alternative conceptions of what the debate is about (e.g. liberation and struggle against an enemy), what the potential consequences are, contesting ideologies (e.g. religious states, nationalism, secularism or Marxism) or the meaning of categories that underline different interpretations (e.g. jihad, martyrdom etc.), challenging or reinforc­ing collective beliefs and discrediting rival speakers' arguments by aligning them with illegitimate ideologies or social groups or constructing rivals as public enemies. These narrators might reject solutions (e.g. peace agreement or cease-fire), change goals or rework their arguments when they contradict or fail to resonate with their audiences. Failure to do so may undermine the legitimacy of their position or impair their capacity to mobilize their audiences (Ellingson 1997: 272).

The meaning-making process is not a static but a dynamic one in which the narrators compete with other narrators in the same discursive field for legitimacy. As stated by Ellingson, “[m]eaning is thus constructed through the ongoing process of contestation within a discursive field as speakers jockey to gain legitimacy for their position, the support of targeted audiences, and the opportunity to implement their solutions” (1997). In this process, when the expected outcomes are not reached, and new events occur, and when the solutions fail, the audiences may alter their interests and beliefs, change the meaning of various actions and identify new ways to achieve their goals and look for ways to achieve them. As Ellingson states, under these conditions (1997: 272-273):

[a]s the horizons change, some solutions may be rejected and some diagnoses judged incorrect, while others are accorded greater authority. Speak­ers respond to the event and altered horizons by reworking their discourses, jettisoning arguments that are untenable, adopting those of their rivals, or crafting new ones that incorporate the event...as the ground from which to asses the viability and legitimacy of old and new arguments to make them more resonant with their audiences' new horizons of expectations and to help speakers compete more effectively within the field of debate.

Religious interpretations do not emerge in a void but develop from pre-existing fields of possibilities, which new interpretations can realign and reconfigure.A field of possibilities is constituted by various historical, social, political and cultural contexts in which the past, the present and an image of a future is constructed. These interpretations operate in a material world, against and in relation to prior and contemporary interpretations, and social, political and economic material forces. Within their religio-cultural structure, religious interpretations that incite violence or peace become effective and they constitute and reproduce systems of power and authority in which they coordinate the actions of the individuals. Within this context, the constellation of power relations and leaders enables a certain narrative to emerge as the dominant one at a particular period.

Power is not static but mobile and flows from one place to another very quickly. Relations of power are immanent in all types of relationships such as economic process, knowledge relationships and so on (Foucault 1978: 86-87). Power is first found and constituted at micro-levels (such as work places, prisons, churches, mosques, schools, hospitals etc.) and later incorporated and developed into larger institutional structures. In this process, power moves around and through different groups (e.g. the government, religious groups etc.), events, institutions and individuals. Furthermore, the way people understand the world, develop values and aspirations and the way they react to events are constituted out of various technologies of power. Hence, individuals are strongly influencedby thepower ofinstitutions, such as universities, mosques, churches, synagogues or medical agencies.

At a time when access to nuclear technology and weapons of mass destruction is easier than ever, ethno-religious conflicts present a gruesome challenge to the scholars and practitioners of conflict resolution. As a starting point, understanding the dynamics of religiously motivated conflicts requires an in­depth study of the sources of legitimacy, insti­tutional sites and relevant religious objects (texts, myths, symbols etc) ofthe communities involved. A second step would be to identify ways in which these religious traditions can be employed to transform the conflictual relations into peaceful ones. The next section will discuss how religious traditions can be part of the solution to the problem of ethno­religious conflicts.

RELIGIOUS SOURCES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE BUILDING

Aptly recognized by Scott Appleby, “the dreadful record of religiously inspired vio­lence and intolerance withstanding, history paints a more complicated picture of religious identity” (Appleby 2000: 5). Indeed, virtually all religious traditions incorporate ideals of peace and promise peace as the outcome of their application. They all embody a rich variety of cultural and moral resources, which configure the basis of personal and communal values that prevent conflicts. For instance, Christianity has been an inspiration for the civil rights movement of Martin Luther King, Gandhi's nonviolent resistance was influenced by Hinduism and Ghaffar Khan of Pathans constructed a nonviolent army based on the Islamic principles of peacebuilding, forgiveness, patience, and compassion (see Johansen 1997; Kadayifci- Orellana 2006), whereas the Dalai Lama's nonviolent resistance is strongly based on his understanding of Buddhism and the Buddhist values such as compassion.

As noted before, because religious tradi­tions form the basis of legitimacy of these conflicts, transforming ethno-religious con­flicts into peaceful relations requires replacing the cultural violence with a cultural peace by tapping into religio-cultural symbols, values, myths and images that promote reconciliation, coexistence and peace. Transforming the cul­ture of violence and resolving ethno-religious conflicts and building peace demands first an understanding of how religious traditions and identities contribute to a culture of violence. Second, it requires transforming the conflictual relationship based on violence and hatred by engaging religious leaders and other faith-based actors in peace building efforts, and highlighting religious values, traditions, texts and myths that focus on justice, tolerance, coexistence and peace.

Defined “as a range of activities performed by religious actors for the purpose of resolving and transforming deadly conflict with the goal of building social, religious and political institutions characterized by an ethos of tolerance and nonviolence” (Little andAppleby 2004:5), religious peacebuilding can contribute and has contributed to effective resolution of ethno-religious conflicts. Bring­ing in religious resources may bring social, moral and spiritual resources to the peace­building process, and can inspire a sense of engagement and commitment both to peace and to the transformation of a conflictual relationship into a peaceful one (Abu Nimer 2001: 686). Religious rituals (e.g. cleansing ceremonies) and values and principles (for­giveness, patience, mercy, accountability or predestination, etc.) may facilitate managing and healing deep injuries and traumas, which is essential to the transformation of relation­ships between opponents. They can bring in legitimacy to the reconciliation process and encourage engaging with the ‘opponent.' Religious involvement in peacemaking ini­tiatives can also prepare and equip conflict resolution practitioners and diplomats for much more proactive roles in transforming the conflict. Also, as Abu-Nimer notes, “framing the interventions within a religious context and deriving tools from a religious narrative have made it possible for interveners to gain access and increase their potential impact on the parties” (Abu-Nimer 2001: 686). Thus, engaging in religious peace-building can provide a spiritual basis for transformation and compensate for the mechanistic and instrumental conflict resolution models.

Indeed, religious traditions incorporate a vast and established repertoires of values, principles and mechanisms that emphasize harmony, reconciliation and peaceful coex­istence. These values and principles include, but are not limited to, love for God's creation, compassion, mercy, patience, forgiveness and justice. These values and principles can pro­vide a moral framework, inform attitudes and guide action towards resolving conflicts. For example, emphasizing the belief that every one is created in the image of God may be a useful tool for rehumanizing the opponent, and the religious call for attonement may encourage self-criticism, leading to accep­tance of responsibility and asking forgiveness, which is key to any reconciliation process. Values of compassion and mercy connote that a true believer cannot be insensitive to suffering of other beings (physical, economic, psychological or emotional), nor can s/he be cruel to any creature. Thus, they may discourage torture, inflicting suffering or willfully hurting another human being.

In addition to these values, religious traditions provide vocabulary, images and myths —exemplars to serve as positive sym­bols and examples of peace. Many religious traditions incorporate rituals of healing of trauma and injuries, forgiveness, reconcilia­tion and peace making. For example, Enemy Way rituals in Africa, which emphasize purifi­cation and atonement after being involved in violence, and symbolize rebirth, have facili­tated reintegration of child soldiers, and others who have been captured and/or raped by rebels into their communities (Baines 2005; Ross 2004). Again, after the Bali bombings, the Hindu community in Bali performed religious rituals to purify the stained earth (“Pemerayasita Durmanggala") in accordance with the Balinese Hindu belief. According to this belief, the actual place of bloodshed must be restored with blessings and many Hindus offered prayer, fruit, holy water and flower petals to restore harmony (Head 2002).

Additionally, religious traditions incorpo­rate historical examples and myths that emphasize reconciliation, tolerance, com­passion and forgiveness among others. For instance, three Abrahamic Faiths— Judaism, Christianity and Islam—share the family myth ofAbraham, who is recognized as the father of these traditions. These religious traditions, via myths and stories, emphasize the importance of reconciliation among the children of Abraham (Gopin 2002). Another example is the myth of Able and Cain in the Islamic tradition. According to this myth, when his brother attempted to kill him, Able responds, “if you stretch your hand to slay me, it is not me to stretch my hand against you to slay you for I fear Allah (...)" (Quran 2: 28). This myth has been emphasized by various Islamic nonviolent activists such as Jawdat Said to argue that Islam calls for a nonviolent response even when one is faced with violence (Kadayifci-Orellana 2002).

Constructive myths such as these can be powerful sources of inspiration to engage in conflict resolution and reconciliation pro­cesses for the community of the faithful. Therefore, identifying these myths as well as values and also rituals of reconciliation and peace making can become effective conflict resolution strategies for practitioners in the field. Gopin supports this argument by stating that “a close study of the sacred texts, traditions, symbols and myths that emerge in conflict situations may contribute to theoretical approaches to conflict analysis by providing a useful frame of reference for conflict resolution workshops and interfaith dialogue groups, and by creating a bridge to the unique cultural expression of a particular conflict" (Gopin 2000: 15). Religious peace building, then, could become a major tool for training, empowering and motivating religiously oriented people towards peace.