EXERCISES: BI-, MINI- AND MULTILATERALS

The small set of exercises that follows can be used to deliver training sessions with a duration of two to three days, depending on the level of the instructor, his/her ability to interlace the ‘course' through short lectures, introductions and—most important of all— thorough debriefings.

The sequence of the set of exercises offered here is probably the best chronological order in which they can be used. The bilateral discloses some of the intricate drives in integrative bargaining, the minilateral deals with managing complexity and the full multilateral is ideal for teaching drafting, as well as confronting theory with practice. It should be stressed that there is no problem at all in changing the sequence if the reader feels that this suits her or his purposes in a better way. In some cases, the order is not important at all. For example, the minilateral exercise has been written in order to help participants to prepare better for the full fledged simulation exercises. It is therefore sequenced before the more substantial games. However, the author of this chapter nowadays uses this game after the more far reaching simex. This is because participants will get to better insights if they first muddle through and then structure their behavior through the minilateral.

Either way, it will work, and it is up to the reader to chose and ponder on it and use the system to create a tailor-made tool that suits his purposes better.

Program

A regular program might start with a lecture by the trainer. The author of this chapter nor­mally starts with a short introduction, sketch­ing the evolution of the negotiation process as a tool in conflict resolution over the centuries, and stressing the interrelationship between

warfare and negotiation (if war is politics by other means, then negotiation might be war by other means...), as well as the importance of building institutions around the processes in order to compensate for lack of trust.

But others, like the Swiss trainer Robert Weibel, prefer to throw the group in the pond right away. This can be a helpful method, especially with groups who are not used to working alone and are thereby forced to wake up immediately. The author will normally take an hour for a warming-up lecture, before he splashes participants into the process by asking them individually to define international negotiation as a tool in conflict resolution. In a second step, they are asked to form small groups which have to negotiate a common definition of the subject. In a third step, the trainer will debrief the negotiation process they just experienced. In a fourth step, he then analyses their outcomes with them. This procedure might take a full morning but can be abridged substantially.

The second half of the morning can be used to apply exercises on strategy and tactics, skills and styles. It can sometimes be more convenient, however, to use these short exercises as instruments to create voids between the more substantial games. This is again up to the reader. It is also up to her or him to add other dimensions to the seminar, like politics (Ikle 1987), procedure (Kaufmann 1996), culture (Hofstede 1980), and/or non­verbal behavior and leaks (Goodfield 1999).

The minilateral (a Clingendael pentagame being remolded by Nato Defence College), being an internal negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on an external crisis, will take the full first afternoon. The net playing time is 90 to 120 minutes, but again with introduction­preparation-debriefing being added, three hours will be needed. It very much depends on the size of the group. At Nato Defence College, some 80 people take part in the game. With eight parallel negotiations in teams of ten, time is quickly running out. But as said before, it is also possible to start right away with the full multilateral text exercise and use the minilateral on the third and last day as a means to take a closer look at managing multilateral complexity.

The full fledged simulation game in the United Nations (UNDRO) context will take a full day. This will consist of a three-hour morning session for introduction, preparation, plenary and a first round of exploration, and then three hours in the afternoon for a second round of exploration, drafting and debriefing. This can easily be stretched into the next morning, especially if the process is supplemented by a BBC videotape of the real negotiation process (1971), on which basis this simulation has been created (2004). The tape takes one hour net, but with analysis it might be two or three.

Bilateral exercise (see Annex Part I)

The bilateral exercise is about a conflict of interest between the European Union and the Central European State of Quarania, which have their own needs that might, or might not be, appeased. The question is not about enlargement of the EU, but the idea is to conclude a so-called ‘Europe Agreement' on twelve (or less) issues between both actors.

Through barter trade, both parties try to come to an agreement, thereby overcoming their conflicting positions. The European Union wants Quarania to release profits of EU investments in that country, to enlarge the landing rights for EU carriers in the Quaranian capital, to close the dangerous (in the eyes of the EU at least) Chernobyl type nuclear plant in the Quaranian city of Chozno, to have better access to the Quaranian market for EU industrial products and services, and to start a political dialogue on democracy and human rights. Quarania needs better access to the EU for its citizens, rural products and textiles, as well as technical, financial and managerial assistance (to help it in restructuring its bureaucracy). They cannot settle their conflicting interests through compromise—they have to do it through compensation, and package dealing.

Of course, different packages stand for different values. One package deal is maybe not as effective as another one. The problem is that the moment one deal has been concluded, another more valuable one might be blocked by this agreement. In other words, participants will learn that they have to be patient. They should not start to bargain right away, but explore extensively. And only if they have enough information (but participants should never show each other their value points) about the most effective combinations, then they might go into the bargaining phase.

It is easier for Quarania to do better, as the combinations are more transparent to them. They only need to deal on a few issues, while the EU has smaller margins on more issues.

Minilateral exercise

(see Annex Part II)

The minilateral is a negotiation between six NATOcountries (represented by one person or by delegations of two or three) having to draft a common document on a crisis in the non­existing Mediterranean Muslim country of Janubia. Member states have different views on the developments over there, depending on their interests. The bigger these interests, the more careful they are in criticizing the Janubian government and the more willing they are to support it. NATO members far away from the scene are far more critical and others take an in-between position. The UK might be a fair chair here, but why not rotate the presidency every 15 minutes? This is a good exercise in combining fairness and the defense of interests! Participants then learn how to balance national and collective interests, maximizing and optimizing needs.

This short-track multilateral exercise (pen­tagame or in this example a hexagame, as septagame is also a possibility but more involved as countries create too much of a mess) teaches inter alia the management of multilateral complexity. Participants will learn that they will again have to explore extensively and intensively. It is vital to work in rounds. Rounds for exploring (opening game), for parking, so not deciding on issues but putting them aside on a waiting list (mid game), and rounds for agreements (end game). The construction is such that there will always be a country that has a problem with an issue. Therefore, a solution is impossible if packages are not seen and used. And in principle: the more decisions, the better the outcome.

As more actors are involved, the complexity is difficult to handle. Where is common ground? Common ground is nowhere, unless negotiators are creative enough to construct it by combining issues. As in the bilateral, sentences and value points cannot be changed. The exercise is unique in the sense of linking a diplomatic text to priorities (value points). The issues are bracketed parts of a draft text, those elements where parties have conflicting interests. Participants deal with four baskets of issues here. In another exercise, in EU context instead of NATO grid, less countries deal with more issues. Trainers can use the idea of the exercise to create any matrix on any situation. Another minilateral is between the five permanent members of the Security Council on a crisis in the Mediterranean, while Clingendael also created an exercise in which the littoral states of the Caspian negotiate on the status of the Sea, demarcations, security, exploration, min­eral resources, pipelines, maritime transport, fisheries, pollution, population, etc.

Participants might believe their only options are to choose one topic out of every basket, but if they think outside the box, they will see that more decisions can be taken within each basket. In the exercise shown below, in a meeting of six NATO countries, six decisions can be taken (at least, according to the game master). However, participants might perceive more decisions. They could perhaps state that immediate evacuation is the same thing as within two weeks and therefore both agreements can be concluded at the same time. Or they might defend the position that one can condemn the government on its human rights behavior, while still supporting it as the legitimate state structure of the country. And why not decide to mediate and ask France to do this on behalf of the North Atlantic Council? If the participants feel that these are defendable outcomes, why not? Negotiation is about situation is about perception. But in the end, your interests and the arguments you use are just tools you need in order to implement your mandate—not nice, but realistic.

Multilateral Exercise

(see Annex Part III)

The full fledged multilateral exercise shows participants the creative ‘chaos’ of multiparty/multi-issue negotiation. This game has been based on a negotiation in Ecosoc, the United Nations Council for Economic and Social Issues. This negotiation took place in Geneva in 1971 and has been taped by the BBC. Clingendael staff bracketed the real final outcome on the basis of this tape. The game master can compare the final outcome of the simulated game with the real text by noting that all words included in the final text are marked by a plus, and all skipped parts by a minus. In two cases, only part of the text between brackets has been accepted, while other parts have been left out. In note 14, only the central part between brackets has been adopted in reality; in note 17, adequate is out and permanent is in. Of course, the game master should take out the + and - if she/he uses the draft text for training purposes.

The conflict in this exercise is between France and the United States. The USA at the time was much more multilaterally motivated than 30 years later. They wanted to interfere with the prerogatives of non-state actors like the Red Cross (‘The League’) and Unicef. These organizations played a dominant role in disaster relief and the USA, through the mouth of ambassador George Bush Sr. in his opening statement for Ecosoc, wanted to have more grip on the efforts of these and other non-governmental organizations. The USA promoted the role of the UN in this. They proposed to establish a strong UN organization called UNDRO: the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization. Its High Commissioner should have the power to mobilize, direct and coordinate relief actions in natural disasters.

The French, however, did not think that states should interfere too much in the autonomous policies of organizations like the Red Cross, Unicef, WHO, FAO, etc. One of their motives had been that they already had a lot of influence on these international organizations while they feared US pressure in relief activities. Knowing that they could not stop the USA, they tried to undermine the power of the organization that had to be created. France did not want the High Commissioner to direct Cdiriger'), but to guide (‘orienter’). They did not want UNDRO to be in New York but in Geneva, not with an independent director, not with a substantial staff, not with its own budget and not firmly within the UN. In the end, the word ‘directed’ was accepted in the official English text but it was agreed that the official French translation would be ‘orienter’(sic!). The Americans won, but it was a Pyrrhus victory and UNDRO never flourished: a clear-cut example of a backward-looking outcome.

In this simulation, a working group is formed that has to draft a text on behalf of Ecosoc. Ambassador Bush is back in New York and Bernie Segorin, US ambassador in Geneva, has to fulfil his mandate. Stuck as he is by the policy word ‘direct’, he tries to explain its content as coordination without changing the word direct: ‘a traffic cop directs traffic, he does not drive all the vehicles’. The Brits do not like a strong UNDRO but they have to cosponsor the US proposals, as do the Peruvians and Indonesians, who would like to go even further (‘instruct’). The French are supported by the Soviet representatives as well as the Red Cross and Unicef. The chair (UN Assistant Secretary-General Kitani (Kurdish Iraqi) takes a neutral position while Tunisia acts as friend-of-the chair. Decisions are taken by unanimity between the seven states, and the other actors can only try to influence these decisions, not block them. Delegations consist of more than one person. After a plenary session, the negotiations might take place in parallel sessions. The advantage is that the results of several groups can be compared with each other.