Integrative Negotiation
Integrative negotiation is the theoretical alternative to “distributive bargaining.” Much of the literature is less analysis than advocacy of its assumed superiority (e.g., Fisher 1980).
Balanced views recognize the need to be prepared for both approaches (Churchman 1995, Lewicki 1997, Raiffa, 1982). Win-win advocates often make dubious distinctions, claiming for example that distributive bargainers assume fixed resources despite their frequent use of linkage to increase them. The criticisms explain everything except why distributive bargaining has survived for five thousand or so years.Integrative bargaining becomes more likely when the parties have high regard for one another and high concern for the issues at stake. The combination requires the parties to work together, sharing real needs and objectives honestly and completely, and to be experienced at problem solving. The small number of times all these conditions are met at least partially explains why the approach is so prominent in classrooms and so unusual in the real world.
Despite its rarity, integrative bargaining has been successful in bringing hostile opponents to successful agreements in a significant number of situations, particularly labor-management disputes mediated by the US government’s Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service [FMCS]. FMCS begins with joint training of the parties. The training reduces tensions, improves relationships, and accustoms members of the opposing teams to working together. While nobody can argue with the success achieved, the approach raises the question of whether it is the integrative bargaining, the training, or the combination that explains the success. Mnookin (2010) demonstrates anecdotally that without continued training, negotiators soon revert to distributive practices.
Integrative bargaining as taught by FMCS progresses in five stages.
The first defines the problem clearly. The goal is a mutually acceptable definition, so the parties complete this stage jointly. The model calls for depersonalizing issues and focusing on “the primary problems” while identifying and keeping “less-important” issues out of the picture.The second stage focuses on identifying and exploring interests. Disputes can involve more than one interest and parties can differ as to the interests at stake (Lax & Sebenius 1986). The model demands that parties avoid positions (possible solutions to a problem) at this stage of the process.
The third stage focuses on finding as many options as possible that might meet the needs identified in stage two. The major technique is collective brainstorming involving all parties to the dispute. Neale and Bazerman (1991) suggest linkage and Lewicki (1997) suggests increasing resources, “nonspecific compensation,” and cutting the costs of compliance, but none is unique to integrative bargaining.
The fourth stage requires the parties to develop criteria such as cost, legality, and technical feasibility for assessing options. There are likely to be additional criteria specific to each situation. For example, in labor negotiations, likelihood of approval by union members, company directors, or stockholders may be important, as might be impact on competitiveness or retention of workforce.
The fifth stage applies the criteria developed in stage four to the options developed in stage three to select the option with the best payoffs for all parties. Usually, the negotiators vote as to whether each option meets each criterion or not. Sometimes there is a third choice, referral to committee for evaluation. The result of the survey presented in a simple grid often makes the best resolution of the issue obvious. Even when this does not happen, the process usually narrows the choices sufficiently to make agreement easier and quicker.