Managing Moral Conflicts

Frequent if not particularly admirable methods for handling moral conflicts are blame shifting and hypocrisy. In January 2007, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi proposed reforms to reduce unethical behavior of members of Congress.

A common suggestion for managing moral conflicts is a hierarchy in which the “higher” moral principle trumps the “lower” one. Even if it were possible to identify all such principles, it is unlikely that a universally or even widely agreed hierarchy is possible.⁸ Nor could one eliminate situations in which a single principle is insufficient to choose between possible actions. If moral theory could provide clear guidance in every circumstance, then moral conflicts would not exist. One reason that an absolute hierarchy is impossible is that moral truths change with personal beliefs and cultures. Most cultures forbid murder but vary the penalty with circumstances and permit some forms of killing including execution, self-defense, and war. “Fair” means different things to different people in different circumstances (Chapter 2).

This insight leads some to moral relativism—that is, avoiding judgment of others based on differences in moral codes. In fact, moral relativists do tend to judge, often excusing foreign cultures while condemning their own. For example, some tell us to judge Aztec human sacrifices in its cultural context, but condemn the Spanish conquistadors for having acted according to theirs.

The third approach, “celebrating diversity,” aims to reduce conflicts by changing values through social pressure assumed elsewhere to resist change. It advocates not mere “acceptance” but “embracing” differences in personal qualities such as age, ethnicity, physical abilities, race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, and socioeconomic status with comprehensive requirements for “inclusion” (Pearce and Littlejohn 1997). In practice, proponents of this approach tend to promote diversity of appearance rather than diversity of ideas or values.

The fourth approach goes under names such as appreciative inquiry, non-judgmental dialogue, Track II or Citizen Diplomacy (Chapter 16), and Search for Common Ground.⁹ It often involves small groups led by a facilitator. It is process- rather than outcome-oriented with little agreement as to what counts as a good argument or even good evidence (Pearce & Littlejohn 1997). It rests on empathic listening and rules of civil discourse, and assumes that conflict will disappear if opponents just learn to see one another as fellow human beings with similar hopes and fears. It often results in ambiguous statements all can agree to but that do little more than paper over differences without finding actual solutions. This actually may be enough if nobody actually has to do anything. Participation is voluntary so often draws idealists while failing to attract the ones who sustain the conflict.

Fifth, negotiation may work among people who “share standards of discourse,” such as belief in democratic solutions or agreement as to what constitutes good evidence and are motivated to find a resolution.

In [Foch’s] modern war—absolute war he called it—two nations professing incompatible philosophies put them to the test of force. Philosophically, it was idiotic, for while opinions were arguable, convictions needed shooting to be cured; and the struggle could end only when the supporters of the one immaterial principle had no more means of resistance against the supporters of the other. It sounded like a twentieth-century restatement of the wars of religion, whose logical end was utter destruction of one creed, and whose protagonists believed that God’s judgment would prevail.

The sixth possibility lies in “reframing,” which is to say changing the way a problem is viewed to make the issues negotiable. This requires enough knowledge of all parties’ values to find a new way to look at the dispute that all can accept. Often, it requires mediation by a third-party neutral. In a TV comedy western¹⁰, Smith and Jones round up, break, and plan to sell 20 unbranded horses. A rancher claims that the horses are his by the “rule of the range” and that Smith and Jones will have to kill him to keep the horses. At this point, a woman intervenes, convincing the rancher to pay Smith and Jones about half what they would get selling the horses in exchange for the work of breaking them but avoiding a two-week drive to market that some horses might not survive. That is, the issue was “reframed” as an easily solved dispute over payment for services rather than one involving contradictory rights. In real world examples, the Haitian dictator Cedras refused to “quit” under international pressure, but agreed to “early retirement” (Churchman 1995) and Australia enacted civil unions as an alternative to marriage for gay couples, who thereby gained the recognition and legal rights desired without offending traditionalists.