NEGOTiATiONZMEDiATiON DURING IMPLEMENTATION
Implementing peace agreements also requires an ongoing process of negotiation and mediation during the peacekeeping phase. RSGs who head up these missions (with the help of the various mission components) carry out constant negotiations - with the parties themselves, with the local population and with the international community - in order to move towards realization of the objectives of the peace agreement.
As Hampson notes: ‘The demand for mediators does not end once a deal is reached because negotiations between the parties typically do not end. The terms of a settlement are constantly being renegotiated during its implementation and new problems can emerge that have the potential, if left unresolved, to jeopardize the peace process' (1996:227). Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens (2002) highlight the dangers of failing to satisfactorily implement peace agreements. They note that the breakdown of the Bicesse agreement in Angola in 1993 led to 350,000 deaths and the failure of the Arusha agreement in Rwanda in 1994 to 800,000 deaths.Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to describe the multitude of mediation efforts undertaken by RSGs during implementation, Steiner's experience on arrival in Kosovo offers a good example. When he arrived in February, 2002, the elections had been held the previous November but it had been impossible to form a coalition government because of disputes over the distribution of power among the parties. After bilateral discussions with the party leaders, he invited all of the players to a dinner at his residence in Pristina where he presented them with a draft text based on his previous discussions. Rooms were available for bilateral talks between the parties and between the RSG and the parties, and UN staff were positioned in the neighboring rooms for immediate translation into English, Albanian and Serbian.
After hours of talks, at three o'clock in the morning, Steiner was able to give a press conference to the reporters who were camped outside his residence, announcing an agreement on the formation of a new government. After further negotiations on who would get what ministry, a couple of days later, the agreement went to parliament for confirmation. Although the constitution foresaw consecutive steps for voting on the president, the prime minister and the rest of the government, there was insufficienttrust among the parties to proceed in this sequential manner. To overcome this, Steiner suggested that there should be just one vote to simultaneously elect the president, the prime minister and to confirm who would head each ministry. In the end, he notes, ‘the Serbs got their minority posts. The biggest party got what it wanted, the post of president; the second biggest party got the post of prime minister and the various ministries were distributed. There was the normal political bickering but, in the end, people could live with the arrangement' (2003).
Ajello (2001) reminds implementers that understanding the interests of the parties is as important in implementation as it is in mediating the peace agreement. ‘If you analyze all the elements, you should be able to say, ‘These are the vital interests of these people. If we address these, we have a good chance of being able to solve the problems.' Finally, Hampson notes that:
Peacemaking and peace-building are a nurturing process... negotiated settlements are unlikely to endure if left unattended; they must be cultivated by skilful, committed people able to manage the problems that inevitably arise as the terms of a settlement negotiated at a given point in time are translated over time into action. By entrenching their roles and remaining fully engaged, third parties can help settlements take root (1996: 217).
Indeed, the capacity of the United Nations to follow through its peacemaking efforts with the deployment of peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions to assist in implementation of a peace agreement is one of the comparative advantages the organization has over other entities. Further, RSGs are able to harness assistance and leverage from UN agencies, program and funds, as well as from member states to provide help and incentives for parties to follow through on their commitments. The UN mediator, however, differs from other mediators, as he/she must operate entirely within the framework of the UN Charter and the body of human rights laws and general principles and practices that emanate from it. As de Soto (2001) explains, the parties need to know that the United Nations has behind it ‘a certain institutional backing, but also that a certain threshold has to be passed and certain standards must be met.'