NOTES
1 There is still debate in the international conflict resolution community about the centrality of impartiality to mediator effectiveness. See Zartman and Touval, 1996.
2 Retributive justice "...follows the principle: 'For your hurt [that you caused], we [the state] hurt [you] in return, but not necessarily in kind.” (Shriver, quoted in Estrada-Hollenbeck, 2001: 68).
3 The view of restorative justice is that "The overarching aim of the criminal justice process should be to reconcile parties while repairing the injuries caused by crime. The criminal justice process should facilitate active participation by victims, offenders, and their communities. The government to the exclusion of others should not dominate it.(I)f there is no restoration of the social relationships that the conflict affected, true justice does not occur.” Estrada- Hollenbeck, 2001:74.
4 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), each ratified in 1976. In addition to these foundational documents, the human rights "corpus” includes many other documents: the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948); the International Convention on the Elimination of All Formsof Racial Discrimination (1965); the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979); the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989); the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953); the American Convention on Human Rights (1978); and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1986). Finally, there are several treaties that pertain to the humanitarian laws of war (i.e. the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols that expanded their reach), and various conventions adopted under the auspices of the International Labor Organization.
5 Distributive bargaining views all gains to the adversary as losses to oneself, and therefore the goal is not only to get as much as you can, but to do so at the other's expense. Hence the term "zero sum.”
6 Coercive mediation, or mediation with muscle, is only possible if the third party has leverage it can use to change the calculation of disputing parties as to the costs and benefits of agreement. See Babbitt (1993) and Zartmen and Touval (2001).
7 Center for Human Rights and Conflict Resolution, Inaugural Conference, December 1, 2000. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.
8 As of May 3, 2004. See Human Rights Watch ([http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/)] Accessed 4/2/2005.
9 For an interesting study on the impact of ratifying human rights treaties on state behavior, see Hathaway, 2002. A critique of Hathaway's findings can be found in Goodman and Jinks, 2003.
10 See Center for Development Action, Reflecting on Peace Practice Project http://www.cdainc.com/ rpp/.
11 An early article by Susskind [Vermont Law Review] addressed the point in a slightly different way, arguing that mediators have the responsibility to raise the concerns of parties who are not represented at the negotiating table, often because they are not well organized or resourced enough to be "players.” Mayer also acknowledges the important work of William Ury, in Ury's latest book The Third Side. Ury refers to the third-side role of "equalizer” as one in which a third-party intervener helps to mitigate a severe power imbalance by, for example, insisting that a high-power leader listen to a low-power groups' grievances. However, Mayer is going beyond even this role, exploring why and how conflict resolution specialists might work on the side of one party to a conflict.
12 785. Steiner refers to this as "progressive realization.”
13 This section is taken from Babbitt (2006).
14 See OSCE Helsinki Final Act.
15 For information about CDA, see http://www.
cdainc.com.16 http://Seewww.cdainc.com/rpp/.
17 See "Balance and Tradeoffs between Working for Reduction of Violence or for Social Justice”, available at www.cdainc.com/rpp/publications.php.
18 A concrete example of how the Track 1 and Track 2 actors might collaborate is provided by a meeting I attended in October 2001, held at the Rockefeller Foundation Conference Center in Bellagio, Italy. Sponsored by the Harvard Law School Human Rights Program and the International Centre for Ethnic Studies in Sri Lanka, it was designed as a discussion between professionals and scholars in human rights and conflict resolution about approaches to ethnic conflict and minority protection that could marry the two disciplines. Coming literally weeks after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in the United States, the discussion took more than an academic view of how to address intergroup tensions and the grievances expressed by minority groups in relation to their governments. As part of the conversation, we created a possible set of principles to guide conflict resolution work in situations where human rights grievances are an issue. See Harvard Law School Human Rights Program (2004).