PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACHES IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: NEGOTIATIONS
Conflict management has long been a topic in the study of international relations, arguably going back at least as far as the Greeks (Thucydides, 500 ÂÑ). Bercovitch (1996) traces mediation at least as far back as the Bible, Homer's Illiad, and Sophocles' Ajax.
To trace the exploration of problem solving in international conflict, Hopmann (1995) argues one should begin with the first systematic theorizing about international negotiations reflected in Thomas Schelling's (1960) Strategy of Conflict, Anatol Rapaport's (1960) Fights, Games, and Debates, and Fred Charles Ikle's (1964) How NationsNegotiate. These authors all shared a grounding in mixed motive, or non zero sum, games, where both cooperative and competitive options are available to parties. Their work was in turn influenced by game theory as developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern, Nash, and Luce and Raiffa. Though the mixed-motive games described in the works of these authors revealed the choice of cooperative or competitive options, Hopmann (1995) maintains that these authors diverged in their emphasis, with some highlighting competitive aspects, including the need to protect oneself from exploitation (as in the prisoner's dilemma game), and others highlighting cooperative efforts where value is created through enlarging joint interests.
Hopmann (1995) notes that Rapaport went beyond game theory to point out that game theory, while encouraging new thinking about conflict, also leads to impasses where it is theoretically insufficient to deal with certain types of conflict situations. “These impasses set up tensions in the minds of people who care. They must therefore look around for other frameworks into which conflict situations can be cast” (Rapaport, 1960, p. 242). Rapaport thus added a concept he called “debate,” to capture when parties aim for understanding and attempt to identify possible mutual gains.
Rapaport's expansion of game theory to include “debate” contributed to the development of an alternative paradigm of problem solving in international negotiations (Hopmann, 1995). Though parallel developments in labor negotiations such as the aforementioned work of Walton and McKersie were noted, “integrative” bargaining and problem solving did not become a distinctive area of study in international negotiations until about 1980. Hopmann credits the development of this paradigm within international negotiations to the influence of Fisher and Ury (1981) (interests rather than positions), Zartman and Berman (1982) (diagnosis, formula, detail), and the work of Burton (1987) and Kelman (Rouhana & Kelman, 1994) (who address basic needs and identity through informal interactions; discussed in more detail later).
Hopmann argues that the contrast between the bargaining and problem-solving paradigms of international negotiations parallels the contrast between realism and liberalism, the two primary paradigms of international relations (Hopmann, 1995). In particular, realism's emphasis on the importance of relative gains over adversaries contrasts with liberalism's emphasis on absolute gains even if others benefit as well or even more, and the accompanying search for joint gains and positive sum solutions.
When is problem solving used in international negotiations? When do absolute gains become the focus more than relative advantage? Hopmann indicates that, besides “purely rational calculation,” negotiation behavior will depend on two factors: (1) the “orientation” and larger world view of the individual decision maker, and (2) the dynamic of the interaction process operating to produce mutual cooperation, exploitation of one by the other, or mutual competition.
Regarding decision maker's orientation, Hopmann argues that some individuals are intolerant of ambiguity, see the world as competitive, and are thus motivated to win in most contexts.
Such individuals may pursue a competitive strategy even in contexts where an equally competitive opponent may mean they both fall, as in the dilemma encapsulated in the Prisoner's Dilemma game (Luce & Raiffa, 1957). To these individuals, it matters less what is gained or lost, as long as they come out ahead of their opponent. Social psychological research supports the prevalence of this behavior (Tajfel, 1978) although finding it to be produced as much or more by the situation than by individual proclivities. By contrast, other individuals may view the world differently. “They may be more tolerant of ambiguity, more cognitively complex, and more willing to cooperate with others to achieve collective benefits” (p. 36) over time. Their strategy may be to forego short-term gains in favor of long-term gains through a cooperative relationship.How might its use be made more likely? How might dynamics be shaped to be most likely to produce stable cooperation? Can even the decision maker's initial orientations and assumptions about human nature (or at least about the other party) be altered?