The Chinese Tradition16

The Chinese accepted warfare as necessary to control and punish barbarians, criminals, and troublemakers. This eliminated moral constraint on conduct, although commanders in the field frequently found restraint tactically useful.

Sun Tzu is both the title (usually translated as The Art of War) and the purported author of the earliest classic of military theory and political realism. Dated to the early Warring States period (481–221 BC), it assumes that security and power rather than ideals or ethics motivate states. It is a comprehensive manual for commanding armies taking up not just tactics and strategy but problems such as logistics and espionage. It asserts that, “all warfare is based on deception,” and where it does speak of “moral influence” as one of five fundamental factors in war, it really means morale, “that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril.” There is little in Sun Tzu that is concerned with just as opposed to unjust war.

Perhaps in response, Mencius (372–289 BC) asserted that moral authority obviated the need for war and that those who advocated it were criminals. About the same time, Mozi permitted defensive but not offensive wars. He challenged the inevitably and nobility of war, viewing it instead as destructive and advocating curbing it if it could not be eliminated.

Rejecting the Mohist doctrine that only defensive warfare is permissible, the Lu shi chun qiu (roughly, Mr. Lu’s Annals) (Qin Dynasty, 221–207 BC) argued that punitive war to insure order required offensive campaigns. They were proper (as opposed to just) only if declared by a legitimate ruler, and only to punish wrongdoing, defend smaller states from aggressors, or preserve order. Wars to annex territory or for material gain were improper. Furthermore, “righteous troops” should only attack the enemy ruler and soldiers, and avoid pillage and harm to civilians to win them over and prevent their active intervention. To the same end, the campaign should employ propaganda, punish malefactors, and reward joining the rightful ruler.

Overall, the Chinese justified war as the responsibility of the ruler as lawgiver, judge, and protector of social order. In general, Chinese doctrine focuses on jus ad bellum. Having justified violence to secure order, little attention was paid to restraints, and then only for strategic advantage. The idea that the right to rule derived from victory, and that ability to maintain order justified war, combined to justify rebellion, and makes Chinese rulers to this day almost obsessed with maintaining order. This “Mandate of Heaven” originated with the Zhou Dynasty (1046–256 BC), and became the basis for violent overthrow of dynasties throughout Chinese history.