The Muslim Tradition12

Like the Hebrew Bible, the Muslim Qur’an often justifies, even advocates, war. Muhammad is the only founder of a major religion who led troops in battle. But, as in the Bible, there also is a theme of peace and tolerance throughout the Qur’an.

Eighty percent or more of the world’s 1.5 billion Muslims are Sunni (meaning true path), their beliefs resting on the Qur’an and hadith (the reported words and actions of Muhammad, although there are differing collections). Sufis, most but not all regarded as Sunni, seek direct personal experience of God through asceticism and mysticism, trends that also can be found in Christianity. Salafis (including Wahhabis) are ultra-conservative Sunni Muslims whose doctrine al-Qaeda follows. There is no central authority, no empowered clerical class.

Shia Muslims believe in the leadership of infallible imams descended from Ali (the fourth caliph) who rule by divine appointment and hold absolute civil and spiritual authority. They divide into three sects (then into sub-sects) based primarily on which line of imams they accept. First and most numerous are the Twelvers, dominant in Iran. Second are the Ismailis (occasionally called Seveners) whose most prominent sub-sect follows the Aga Khan. Third are the Zaidis (occasionally called Fivers), who are a plurality in Yemen.

Beyond these major divisions, Islam includes additional sects such as pacifist Ahmadiyyas concentrated in India, Ibadis who are the surviving branch of the Kharijites concentrated in Oman, and Yazdis who combine Sufism with traditional Kurdish beliefs. A substantial number of additional sects rose up and died out throughout the Muslim world, sometimes taking unusual forms such as the Barghwata in Morocco who synthesized Islam, Judaism, astrology, and paganism.

Before that discussion, one must have some understanding of two Muslim ideas. First, over the centuries the ulama—recognized theological scholars who often served as a curb on excessive government power—elaborated the concept of a world divided in two. A caliph (successor) to Muhammad was supreme in religious and political matters in the dar al-Islam (house of Islam). All else was the dar al-harb (house of war) until its inevitable incorporation into the dar al-Islam. One duty of the caliph was to call all humans to Islam. Under Muslim law, refusal of the invitation was a just cause for war, although it had to be preceded by a declaration of war “in the path of god” by the caliph. Thus, Islam has an equivalent of the ad bellum criteria of just cause, righteous intention, last resort, and legitimate authority—but, unlike it justifies offensive war. The impact is similar to Jewish teaching about the difference between obligatory wars of defense and optional wars of empire. Muslims generally accept the duty of protecting the dar al Islam by any means necessary.

The second idea is that of jihad (struggle). Without getting into the theological subtleties by each sub-sect of Islam, you are likely to hear of four types:

· Jihad bil lisan (of the tongue) is concerned with speaking truth and proselytizing the faith

· Jihad bil qalb (of the heart), sometimes termed the “greater jihad,” is concerned with maintaining one’s faith.

· Jihad bil yad (of the hand) is concerned with doing right and combating injustice

· Jihad bis saif (of the sword), sometimes termed the “lesser jihad,” is concerned with war in the way of Allah

Bernard Lewis argues that the military meaning is by far the most common in the Qur’an (e.g., Surah 2: 186-90; Surah 9: 5, 29, 39, 122; Surah 47: 35), the hadith, and the classic manuals of Islamic law.

Then, when the sacred months are drawn away, slay the idolaters wherever you find them, and take them, and confine them, and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush. But, if they repent, and perform the prayer, and pay the alms, then let them go their way.

David Cook (2005) notes that the supposed primacy of greater jihad comes primarily from Western scholars who study Sufism, work in interfaith dialogue, or are Muslim apologists trying to present Islam in the most inoffensive manner possible. Whether the Qur’an sanctions defensive warfare only or commands war against non-Muslims depends on the interpretation of the relevant passages in the Qur’an, which do not explicitly state the obligatory aims of war.

Muhammad and the classical manuals of Islamic jurisprudence prohibited attacking children, slaves, women, or the elderly, lame, blind, and insane who did not fight. Injury to them was regrettable but justifiable so long as it was unintended. They also prohibited cheating, treachery, and mutilation, as well as damaging cultivated or residential areas. All this is very similar to the restrictions in Deuteronomy in the Hebrew tradition and to jus in bello in the Western one. However, Muhammad did not identify weapons that may or may not be used, the focus of proportionality in the Western tradition.

Defensive jihad appeared with the first invasion of the dar al-Islam during the First Crusade. Al-Sulami (d. 1106) wrote that every able-bodied man must help defend against the invaders. Citing his contemporary, al-Ghazali (d. 1111), this meant that if a town under attack could not defend itself, neighboring Muslims were to help fight under their own leaders and on their own authority.

Radicalization of defensive jihad stems from six key individuals, all outside the mainstream of Islamic scholarship (Habeck 2006).

Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab (1703–1792) emphasized God as Absolute Will and sole lawgiver. Al-Wahhab had little influence until his twentieth century followers allied with the House of Saud.

Sayyid Abu’l A’la Mawdudi, born in India in 1903, believed that the decline of Muslim world power was a consequence of tolerating infidels. In 1941, he founded the Jumaat al-Islami party in Lahore that incorporated Communist ideas of revolution, justified suicide bombing and attacks on civilians, and was a factor in the bloody partition of India and Pakistan.

The Egyptian Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949) urged a struggle against a West that was destroying the spirits and souls of Muslims. His Muslim Brotherhood would cleanse the dar al-Islam of infidels, beginning with Egypt.

Sayyid Qutb (1903–1966), also Egyptian, taught that Muslims who did not live “authentic” Islamic lives were just as bad as Jews, Christians, and unbelievers, all of whom deserved killing. Qutb applied Mawdudi’s example to Egypt, joined the Muslim Brotherhood and wrote books that drew on the most violent and absolutist sections of the Quran to call for violent overthrow of all secular government everywhere. In Milestones, he wrote, “We must return to that pure source from which those people derived their guidance which is free from any mixing or pollution. We must return to it to derive from it our concepts of the nature of the universe, the nature of human existence, and the relationship of these two with the Perfect and Real Being, God Most High.

Ayman Zawahiri (1951–), also Egyptian, extended these ideas based on five assumptions. First, any territory whose population is (or in some versions ever was) Muslim is part of the dar al-Islam. Second, eliminate any non-Islamic presence within the dar al-Islam, regardless of how or why it is there. Third, all Muslims have an individual duty to take part in this struggle so need not wait for commands from leaders. Fourth, any method is acceptable, including attacks on noncombatants. Fifth, any country that supports non-Muslims in the dar al-Islam is an aggressor, making their citizens legitimate targets. These assumptions lie behind much of what we heard from Bin Laden, who had no authority to wage war so claimed his attacks were defensive and the US was the aggressor, the basis for his claim of exemption from limits imposed by Islamic law.

The mainstream Islamic tradition limits use of armed force to legitimate governments, requires just cause, recognizes limits as to whom may be targeted, and limits the means that may be used. The radical doctrine of jihad advanced as the justification for contemporary terrorism violates these traditions. Generally, “the Western distinction between just and unjust wars linked to specific grounds for war is unknown in Islam. Any war against unbelievers, whatever its immediate ground, is morally justified. Only in this sense can one distinguish just and unjust wars in Islamic tradition. When Muslims wage war for the dissemination of Islam, it is a Just War. When non-Muslims attack Muslims, it is an unjust war” (Tibi 1996). It allows killing apostates, beating women, and subjugating non-Muslims, and justifies declaring war to do so.