TYPOLOGIES OF MEDIA INTERVENTION AND COVERAGE

Many scholars and practitioners have tended to view the media's roles in conflict resolution as an intervention, usually of a third party. Intervention means liberating and reforming the local media and creating political, social and economic conditions favorable for media- sponsored conflict resolution activities.

Most of the projects were designed to strengthen the local media or establish peace- oriented radio and television stations and programs. NGOs and foundations have been the most active.¹ Geelen (2002, p. 46) iden­tified 32 media projects widely distributed around the world, in Africa, South East Asia, the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the CIS, South America, South Asia and the Middle East. The proliferation of projects required a theoretical and empirical effort to study and evaluate them. Media coverage of conflict resolution, especially of international negotiation, has been a constant issue for debate and analysis both inside the communities of scholars and practitioners and among them. Framing has been a major issue in research about coverage. This section offers typologies of media projects and of coverage and framing.

Media intervention

Several scholars and practitioners have con­structed typologies to identify different types of media intervention (Table 23.1). Curtis (2000, pp. 142-143) suggested four types of intervention: The first, improving the media environment, is designed to reform existing media systems, eliminate hate media and create security for journalists. The second provides audiences with information about peace-building activities.

Curtis used the conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia to illustrate the utility of her typology. She investigated Radio Agatashya, independent regional radio broadcasting for Rwandan refugees, and the Media Experts Commission and the Open Broadcasting Network established in Bosnia. Curtis didn't systematically apply her framework and the results of her investigation are mixed and problematic. She acknowledged that implementation of one type of intervention may contradict another one. For example, providing valuable information on refugees driven out of their homes through violence on Radio Agatashya contradicted the need to promote reconciliation among all the groups engaged in the civil war. This is an excellent observation but Curtis didn't say how this dilemma could be resolved.

Howard (2002, pp. 10-11) distinguished among five types of interventions by goals and methods. His first, rudimentary journalism training, is designed to challenge government controlled media systems, especially in non- democratic societies. It seeks to educate journalists about the basic norms of free media including impartiality, accuracy and balance. The second type, responsible journalism development, is deigned to develop more advanced journalism skills in areas such as investigative and exploratory journalism. The goal is to make society responsive to conflict resolution. The third type, transitional journalism development, is intended to cre­ate self-awareness among journalists about conflict resolution roles they should perform in society. The idea is to convert journalists from being just objective observers to serve as active participants in the promotion of conflict resolution.

Howard's typology is somewhat confusing and too simplistic Howard, Rolt, Van de Veen & Verhoeven (2003) employed this typology to classify, analyze and evalu­ate various media projects pursued around the world, mostly since the early 1990s. Table 23.2 reveals the limits of Howard's typology. Too many projects appear in more then one type of intervention. All the projects in Type 1 also appear in Type 2 and all

Table 23.1 Typologies of media intervention

Table 23.2 Media projects by types of intervention

* Also Type 2

** Also Types 4 and 5

*** Also Type 5

Adapted from Howard, R., Rolt, F., Van de Veen, H., & Verhoeven, J. (2003).

but one project in Type 4 also appear in Type 5.

Frohardt and Temin (2003) suggested four types of media intervention in conflict regions: structural, content-specific, entertainment- oriented, and aggressive. They are designed to reform the media in conflict regions and make them stronger, more independent and more resistant to government pressure and manipulations. The first type includes the strengthening of independent media, such as the strengthening of the anti-government Serbian radio station B92 during the Bosnia conflict; developing journalist competence, working with the legislature and the judiciary to protect free speech and independent media; promoting diversity in the journalist corps and media ownership and media monitoring.

Content-specific interventions include “repersonalization” and “issue-oriented training.” Repersonalization calls for the portraying of people mostly as individuals. Pioneered by Internews, Spacebridges is an example of this strategy as it allowed individuals from communities in conflict, such as Muslim, Serb, and Croat refugees from Bosnia, to conduct personal dialogues with each other over a live video feed.

A comparative analysis of the interven­tion typologies yields both similarities and differences.² Curtis' improving the immediate media environment is similar to Howard's rudimentary journalism training and to Frohardt and Temin's structural interven­tion. Curtis, however, distinguished between short- (Type 1) and long-term programs (Type 4) to reform the local media, but the other typologies don't recognize a time dimension. Curtis' Type 1 intervention may include Frohardt and Temin's Type 4. Howard suggested three different interventions for creating media systems responsive to the requirements of conflict resolution while the other two typologies suggested only one type of this intervention.

All the typologies confused goals and means. In just a three-year period, three authors suggested three different typologies using very different terms and characteristics, and instead of building and expanding on one promising typology, they have ignored each other. It would have been more useful to adopt one clearly defined and explained typol­ogy of media intervention and systematically apply it. The main problem with the media projects isn't just confusing terminology and unclear goals and means. Very few scholarly studies have been conducted on the actual results of media intervention, and most of them focused on projects in Africa (Hagos, 2001; Mbaine, 2006; Ojo, 2003). The studies reveal mixed results but there isn't sufficient accumulation to determine which strategies and programs are the most effective and which fail to produce even minimal results.

Media coverage

Theoretical studies and simulation experi­ments as well as practical experience suggest that secret talks, particularly between ene­mies, increase negotiating flexibility and the willingness to make necessary concessions in order to reach agreements (Druckman, 1995; Druckman & Druckman, 1996; Kelman, 1997, pp. 189-190; Pruitt, 1997, p. 246). Policy makers and diplomats prefer secret diplomacy because of the nature of inter­national negotiation and the immunity from political cost in case of failure. Negotiations to resolve difficult international conflicts entail long and hard bargaining. They move in stages from the initial presentation of tough opening demands, through the making of often painful and risky concessions, to a final compromise based on reciprocal concessions of both sides. Diplomats believe that premature disclosure of initial negotiating positions and tactics, and of the potential to make concessions, expose them to pressure from both the other side's negotiators and their own domestic opinion. Such stressful conditions could end negotia­tions prematurely or hamper diplomacy with unnecessary long discussions, resulting in less effective agreements (Eban, 1998).

Gilboa (2000b) developed three concep­tual models to analyze media coverage of international negotiations: Secret Diplomacy, Closed-Door Diplomacy, and Open Diplo­macy. They are based on the degree to which diplomatic negotiations are exposed to the media and public opinion. In the Secret Diplomacy model, the media and the public are totally excluded from negotiations and there is no media coverage of any kind. In Closed-Door Diplomacy, they are partially excluded and media coverage is narrowly confined to mostly technical issues such as who negotiates with whom, where and when. In the Open Diplomacy model, negotiations are much more open to the media and coverage is more extensive. Three main variables determine the ability of policy makers to implement each of these models: purpose, legitimacy, and controllability. Purpose refers to the goals of the sides in a negotiation process. Legitimacy refers to recognition and acceptance of a negotiation process by the public on the basis of moral, ideological or political criteria. Controllability refers to means negotiators employ to control media access and coverage of international negotiation.

In the Secret Diplomacy Model, officials prevent any coverage of negotiation and exercise full control over media access when they negotiate a major transformation in relations with enemies and expect to make significant controversial concessions with overwhelming effects. In the information age, it has been much more difficult to keep negotiations secret, especially at the highest levels of government. Officials and diplomats, however, have found innovative ways to shield critical negotiations from the public eye (Gilboa, 1998a). In 1971, Kissinger pursued secret diplomacy with China, designed to revolutionize the relations between the two powers. In 1977 and 1993, Israel employed secret negotiations with Egypt and the PLO respectively, to achieve a breakthrough in hostile and violent relations. Other cases of secret negotiations include the post-Falklands negotiations between Britain and Argentina, the peace process in Northern Ireland, and the “2 plus 4” (the two German states and the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France) discussions over the unification of Germany.

In the OpenDiplomacy Model, negotiations are readily accessible to the media and to public scrutiny and debate. It is characterized by extensive and direct media coverage of international negotiations. In this model, negotiators frequently conduct official press conferences, hold briefings, grant interviews, and even allow reporters access to conference rooms. Officials use this model primarily in three situations: when they negotiate with friendly or neutral actors to improve or main­tain existing relations; after a breakthrough in relations, when they think that sufficient trust had been achieved and there is no need to conduct secret negotiations; and when they wish to achieve secondary results. Sometimes international actors enter negotiations for reasons other than conflict resolution such as satisfying a third actor, improving image and reputation, gaining time, getting immediate rewards, deceiving enemies and rivals, and obtaining valuable information (Ikle, 1964, pp. 43-58). By definition, open diplomacy is the best model to achieve such secondary results. Many policy makers and scholars believe, for example, that since 2003, Iran has conducted talks on its nuclear programs with a group representing the EU (the UK, France and Germany) solely to gain time for a concealed effort to acquire nuclear weapons.

Closed-Door Diplomacy is the most inter­esting model. It stands between secret and open diplomacy but is much closer to the secret model. The actors in this model typically include a mediator and parties to a conflict who had decided to seek conflict resolution through peaceful means, have gone through several rounds of negotiation and made progress, but have failed to reach an agreement. In Closed-Door Diplomacy, the media cover only technical aspects. They are aware of the dates when negotiations are scheduled to begin, where the talks will be conducted, and the identity and ranks of the participants. Once the actual negotiations begin, a news blackout is drawn over the talks with only limited information being provided about the actual progress and results. This way, the participants are effectively isolated from their respective domestic public opin­ions, from opposition forces, pressure groups, other states, international organizations and transnational actors, as long as the nego­tiations continue. US administrations used Close-Door Diplomacy in difficult conflicts in the Middle East and the Balkans, including the 1978 Camp David conference with the leaders of Israel and Egypt and the 1995 Dayton, Ohio talks between the leaders of Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia.

Much of the literature on media cover­age of conflict and conflict resolution is based on various assumptions about media effects. The communication literature is rich in theories and models of media effects such as agenda-setting and framing, but both scholars and practitioners in conflict resolution rarely employ them, and very few studies integrate framing with concepts and theories from conflict resolution. “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). According to Reese (2001), “Frames are organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world” (p. 11). Contrary to popular myth, the media is only one actor in the framing process. Politicians, policy makers, elites, interest groups, foreign leaders all try to win public acceptance of their framing. The media participate in the framing contest but leaders have much more influence on the final outcome (Entman, 2004, pp. 2-22).

Very few scholars have conducted research on framing of conflict resolution. Shinar (2000) investigated “peace talk” in conflict resolution processes in the Middle East and Northern Ireland. He found that in these two cases, peace was framed in a war discourse and therefore coverage didn't help the process. In another study, Shinar (2002) found that the Israeli and the West­ern media wrongly framed the Oslo peace process through “the reconciliation/end-of- the conflict” model, while the correct one should have been the “conflict management” model. Kempf (2002) used an interesting methodology to decode framing of escalation and de-escalation of the conflict in Bosnia.

Framing may provide valuable information about the readiness of the sides to pursue serious conflict resolution. Zartman (2000) has developed the “ripeness concept” to determine whether parties to a conflict have the needed motivation to reach an agreement. Ripeness may emerge in two main situations: when the sides feel that they have reached a “Mutually Hurting Stalemate” or a “Mutually Enhancing Opportunity.” The first situation “pushes” parties to move from conflict management to conflict resolution, while the second “pulls” them towards resolution. Donohue and Hoobler (2002) have suggested that public exchanges by policy makers and negotiators via the media during negotiations may reveal critical information about the Mutually Enhancing Opportunity dimension of ripeness. To investigate their interesting hypotheses, they combined “relational order theory” from psychology, “ripeness” from conflict studies and “framing” from commu­nication. Donohue and Hoobler applied the integrated approach, “relational ripeness” to the Oslo I and Oslo II Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Their findings are significant because they help to better understand how relational messages evolve, and what they reveal about the social and political context in which negotiations occur. This study also demonstrates the value of integrative multi-disciplinary research. It moves several steps ahead of merely studying framing, because it places the results within theo­retical contexts of both conflict studies and psychology.