WHY HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES REJECT CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Likewise, human rights advocates have several strong reactions toward conflict resolution. The first objection is that conflict resolution work is driven by pragmatism, not principle.
We often hear that “conflict resolution people only care about getting a settlement”7 and that they have no normative framework guiding their actions. Two human rights concerns seem to lie behind this critique. The first is that no moral compass is being used to measure the appropriateness of an agreement. The human rights movement is built on a moral base, with the UDHR as a negotiated vision of a better world; from their perspective, all international activity that can do so should be furthering that moral vision. If the conflict resolution metric is “whatever the parties can live with,” then unscrupulous leaders of any of the conflicting parties can fashion the text of an agreement to serve their personal interests, without a thought for their citizens or for the precedents it might set for the wider international community.For example, the human rights view of the Bonn Agreement for Afghanistan, referred to just above, is that the negotiators lost out on the larger goal of creating a government based on the principles of fairness and rule of law, because they invited these “warlords” to the negotiating table in the interests of a pragmatic goal of ending the violence without holding them accountable for the harm they had caused (Niland, 2004: 72-3). It reflects the human rights belief that having a “moral imperative,” even if it is not achieved, is a crucial aspiration in any society. This is seen to be in direct contrast to the conflict resolution view of these events, as discussed in the previous section.
A second human rights concern underlying the critique of pragmatism is that a process not framed by explicit moral norms runs the risk of allowing the powerful to dominate the weak.
For example, this is an ongoing human rights concern in the negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian leadership, in which Israel's military and political power appear to give it an edge in structuring the terms of any final agreement. Much of what motivates human rights declarations and treaties is protecting citizens from the power of the state - in effect, protecting the weak from abuses by the strong. If a conflict resolution actor, in the role of a mediator, does not address this power imbalance directly, and seek to rectify it in the context of any negotiation process, the human rights advocate will ask how the interests of the weak will be protected. If the interests of the weaker party must be compromised in order to keep the stronger party “at the table,” how can the outcome of such a process be considered fair or just?Thus, while conflict resolution and human rights share many key normative principles, conflict resolution practitioners who pay attention to human rights implement them in different ways than human rights advocates do. They strive to balance their role as a mediator or facilitator with their commitment to strengthening compliance with human rights norms - appropriately so. In doing so, however, they face challenges in addressing power asymmetries and social change. I will explore each of these cross-cutting issues in turn, as each must be handled carefully in an expanded conflict resolution agenda.
Power asymmetry
Both human rights and conflict resolution invoke principles of impartiality. However, the concept has completely different meanings for practitioners in each field. To a conflict resolution practitioner, impartiality requires even-handed treatment of all parties, regardless of their status or resources. For a human rights advocate, impartiality refers to the application of human rights norms, most of which are constructed to protect the weak individual from the abuses of the state or other potentially exploitative authorities.
Thus, the human rights result does not appear impartial, but instead looks like (and often is) advocacy for one party over another. This presents a conundrum for the conflict resolution practitioner who recognizes that social justice requires creating a more level playing field, but who needs to maintain even-handedness to be credible.However, as Crocker, Hampson, and Aall point out in their study of the use of Track 1 mediation in so-called “intractable” conflicts, such even-handedness does not mean passivity; in fact, it underscores the need for the mediator to apply pressure to all parties to keep the process moving toward settlement (Crocker et al., 2004: 95). This implies a different kind of impartiality - that of holding all parties' feet to the fire in whatever ways are necessary and possible.
From that framing of the Track 1 mediation role it is not a huge leap to imagine a similarly impartial application of human rights norms to all parties in a conflict. This is the decision that former UN Secretary General KofiAnnan made in instructing his special representatives not to waive accountability for genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. This instruction is consistent not only with the UN Charter and the UDHR, but also with accountability mechanisms now enshrined in the mandate of the new International Criminal Court, created by a treaty with 139 signatories as of 31 December 2000.
In effect, the UN guidance on mediation is creating more salience for these specific norms, which enjoy at least the legalistic definition of universality. Although some would argue that this way of assessing universality is flawed because US and Western European values have superordinate power, particularly in the international bodies that created some of these treaties, the numbers of signatories to each treaty remain notable. One hundred and ninety one states ratified the UN Charter, more than 150 states have signed the UDHR, and 94 states have thus far ratified the ICC.8 It is therefore arguable that parties to a conflict should not be surprised when mediators invoke these particular human rights principles.
The question then becomes whether there are other human rights norms that Track 1 mediators could invoke in an impartial way. Most peace agreements now include such provisions routinely, with both general reference to the foundational human rights treaties and specific provisions for the protection of rights that were abrogated in a particular conflict. In fact, for Track 1 mediators, there is no evidence that including human rights provisions makes it more difficult to conclude a peace agreement (Hannum, 2005: 47). This implies that parties in intra-state conflicts now expect that international mediators will require such provisions, or that their future reputations in the international community will rest on their signaling their intention to abide by such norms.9
Conflict resolution NGOs engaging in Track 2 efforts face a harder problem. Impartiality is arguably their most important source of access into political negotiations. But, as the findings of a 2003 study of peace practices study clearly shows, most Track 2 work, while aspiring to have an impact on “peace writ large,” in fact does not affect decision-making and structural change at the societal level.10 Could this be, in part, because of the hesitancy to explicitly address power asymmetry and abuses of power by the more powerful parties? If so, how can Track 2 processes do this more effectively?
In his 2004 book entitled Beyond Neutrality: Confronting the Crisis in Conflict Resolution, Bernard Mayer raises this question as part of his critique of conflict resolution practice. He proposes that “... conflict resolution professionals have the potential to make a major difference if they can incorporate genuine advocacy into their work.When we serve as advocates, we can still think of ourselves as conflict specialists, bringing to our work the same insights, values, and skills that we may use as neutrals, and we can also urge our field to think of us in that way (Mayer, 2004: 117-119).”11
While I am not calling for non-official conflict resolution processes to deviate from their impartiality stance, I agree with Mayer's provocative statement that such processes must explore ways to include advocacy - not of a particular party, but of a set of social justice principles that are defined by human rights norms.
At the very least, such organizations must engage in a conversation about the role of human rights in NGO work.I would argue further that the conflict resolution community has a responsibility to incorporate human rights norms in cases of extreme power asymmetry. Human rights norms help address these asymmetries in two important ways. First, they help empower the weaker party—a norm that the conflict resolution community already endorses. By strengthening the salience of human rights norms, conflict resolution processes can achieve greater efficacy by giving a weaker party the support it might need to negotiate from a more equitable vantage point.
Second, human rights norms are important in reinforcing the notion that a state's sovereignty carries with it a responsibility to protect the civilians within its borders (Annan, 1999; Deng et al., 1996; International Development Research Center, 2001). This is reflected in the larger ongoing debate about humanitarian intervention: under what circumstances must the international community intervene when civilians are being abused by their own government? The conflict resolution community should not be absent from this discussion. Rather, it should consider when and how to invoke such responsibility in its dealing with state actors.
This brings us to the last aspect of the power equation: the importance of voluntary participation. How will conflict resolution experts get powerful parties to voluntarily participate in processes that bring human rights issues to the table? Again, the human rights approach of “naming and shaming” will not necessarily work in this context. For Track 1 mediators, a significant example of alternative strategies is provided by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, particularly as that role was developed by Max van der Stoel, the first High Commissioner. To fully understand this model of intervention requires knowledge of the political and institutional context within which the High Commissioner role has developed and will be explained more fully below.
In addition to confronting power asymmetry, strategy is a second issue of major concern for conflict resolution practitioners who wish to address human rights concerns. Specifically, how does one catalyze a social change process that can bring about both peace and human rights?
Strategies for social change
Conflict resolution and human rights are both seeking to change the political culture in a given society. Conflict resolution processes are designed to move parties from destructive, violent ways of managing political differences to collaborative, constructive approaches. In addition, much of Track 2 conflict resolution is focused on changing attitudes as well - moving the parties from enmity to empathy. Human rights work also hopes to effect a transformation of political culture (Steiner, 2003: 781). From the human rights vantage point, this involves a move from a culture of impunity to a culture of accountability, one that values tolerance, individual dignity, and respect.
As the types of changes sought are different, the assumptions about how such changes can be catalyzed also vary significantly in the two approaches. Human rights are lawbased, and change is created by invoking the ideals enshrined in the treaties and pushing states to meet these ideals. Although in practice human rights changes are recognized as being incremental (Steiner, 2003: 785)12 the strategy to produce any change is to demand nothing less than the ideal. In conflict resolution, however, the means used to produce change are different: the design of processes to support a transformation of behavior and attitudes, thus opening up the possibilities for change to occur. This strategy is based on the belief that change cannot be imposed, but can only occur when the parties themselves decide that change is possible and beneficial.
The conventional wisdom is that these two strategies of change are antagonistic; that is, they cannot be used in pursuing opposing goals in the same context without undermining each other. This is especially thought to be true in post-settlement peace-building, where human rights and conflict resolution processes often clash. The disagreement between the two perspectives manifests itself most visibly in discussions about whether accountability should be pursued early in a peace-building process. From the human rights perspective, it is crucial to do so because it demonstrates an end to impunity and a commitment to the rule of law. For conflict resolution purposes, however, demands for accountability can interfere with short-term agreement-making and with the longer-term healing process that is necessary for groups to live together in peace. Human rights and conflict resolution thus follow two different strategies for change in this context, sometimes operating at odds with each other.