BOTTOM-UP PRESSURES (ASCENDING PHASE)
With regard to the bottom-up perspective, we should first of all observe that regions, and especially those with legislative powers (RegLeg), reacted to Europeanization by demanding measures concerning participation in the national and supranational decision–making process concerning European affairs.
There is of course no uniformity in the level and efficiency of the changes both between and within Member States. The success of regional demands to adapt the vertical power balance in order to compensate for the impact of European political integration depends on the constitutional circumstances at the sub-national level: the stronger the constitutional status of regional autonomy, the stronger the pressure to guarantee regions an active role in EU policy-making. In addition, several non-constitutional factors may further increase the pressure for adaptation: these include entrepreneurship,21 legitimacy and social capital (in terms of firmly established civil societies),22 and the composition of political party majorities at the central and regional levels of government. Moreover, it can be said that the EU integration process itself has increased pressure on some regions to develop coherent strategies to promote regional development. This has sometimes led to the enhancement of the region’s political identity in order to ensure strong political support for the regional administrations responsible for these tasks (as is the case in Scotland).Consequently, participation mechanisms of access to EU policy-making have been laid down at different levels (European and national). At the EU level, regional activism produced its first result in 1991, when the TEU created the Committee of the Regions (CoR).23 Its role is advisory. The CoR includes representatives of both regional (legislative and non-legislative) and local bodies, but it seems to have been marginalized, largely as a result of its extremely modest powers and its mixed membership.
Only recently, the Reform Treaty increased the CoR’s role, giving it the right to act before the ECJ in order to protect its “prerogative” if the principle of subsidiarity has been infringed in any of the fields on which it has to be consulted. Consequently, the CoR may offer better prospects for the legislative regions if it develops regular scrutiny concerning subsidiarity. Because of the ex post right of appeal to the European Court on subsidiarity, the Commission should have an interest in hearing CoR concerns at an early stage precisely to avoid the possibility of action later. However, in order to undertake these new responsibilities the CoR would have to rethink its principal role, putting the focus on monitoring subsidiarity.24It is now evident that legislative regions in particular, frustrated by the limited ability of the CoR to meet their demands, are searching for other channels outside the formal parameters envisaged by the treaty to determine themselves. Indeed, the regions tend to participate directly in the consultative procedures launched by the European institutions,25 even though these forms are in fact part of an intra-state channel. For example, they lobby from their own offices in Brussels26 or they pursue horizontal cooperation, most conspicuously in the RegLeg Group. The regional offices in Brussels are mainly concerned with supplying information for application in intergovernmental relations with the central State.27
The regions may also cooperate in a horizontal way in the creation of common offices or transnational networks.28 With regard to Italy, for instance, the Central regions (Abruzzo, Lazio, Marche, Toscana, and Umbria) established joint representation in Brussels in 2001, sharing premises, costs, and information. In addition, the three provinces of Tirol, Sudtirol/Alto Adige, and Trentino have a common liaison office, which has gained visibility for its lobbying activities.
However, the Italian regions do not have a common liaison department in Brussels similar to that of other Member States. Moreover, there is no identifiable contact person for the regions who may be engaged by the representatives of the central government, nor is there a central collecting point that filters and processes relevant information from Brussels according to the needs of all regional governments. As a consequence, regional participation through these forms remains rather sporadic.Furthermore, some regions may participate more directly in the decision-making power. Indeed, regional representatives have access to national permanent representations in Brussels and can participate in the delegation to the EU Council (the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, and recently Italy, according to the agreement of 16 March 2006). Nevertheless, regional representatives have in practice participated only sporadically in the working group and at the EU Council.
However, even for those regions that have gained access through the State, their participation is of dubious effectiveness: “the central state representatives are always present and exercise extensive constraints on the freedom of action” of regional representatives.29 Consequently, regional influence appears more successful in the phase of internal preparation than within the EU institutions.30 In practice, the European integration process itself brings about the need for intra-state mechanisms of intergovernmental coordination that permit both the central government and the regions to share responsibility as EU policy shapers and takers according to the domestic distribution of powers.31 Indeed, important changes have been undertaken in the Member States in relation to those areas that fall within the ambit of European integration, but the level of these changes varies widely both from State to State and within each State.
Most EU Member States have established specific systems to ensure consensus building between the central government and the regions and promote-co-operation between national and local administrations and joint decision making.
As for the sources of law, these legal systems can be regulated in several ways: they can be overseen by the national constitution (e.g., Germany, Austria), established by ordinary laws (e.g., Spain, Italy), or subject to a peculiar tool, such as in the United Kingdom with the Concordat on International Relations (an agreement between the United Kingdom government and devolved administrations). As for the institutions, the main bodies where consensus between the regions and the national government is sought and may be reached are either the second chambers of the national parliaments (e.g., the Austrian and the German Bundesrat) or specific conferences (e.g., the Italian State–Regions Conference).If we focus for a moment on the Italian case, current circumstances seem especially interesting, with potential solutions being drawn from other EU Member States. Indeed, it would seem that the reform process is continuing apace. In a certain sense, the Italian experience reflects initiatives taken by sub-national units beyond their borders; for this reason the reform can be seen as an effect of a kind of “horizontal federalism.”32 An important mechanism adopted by the Law of 2005 is the CIACE (Comitato interministeriale per gli affari comunitari europei), an interministerial Committee for EU Affairs. The CIACE is linked to the presidency of the Italian Council of Ministers. It can be seen as a sort of “cabinet of European affairs.” The aim is to facilitate an in-depth analysis of issues related to Italy’s participation in the EU. Furthermore, regions, autonomous provinces, and local entities can take part in CIACE activities when they have an interest in the body’s agenda. The CIACE began work in March 2006. The principal topics on its agenda at the moment are the following: monitoring the Lisbon Strategy, transport (maritime transport), sustainable development, and better regulation and research. Although this certainly represents an interesting new development, it is still early to evaluate the results of its activities.
Finally, an important role is allocated to the Conference System in Italy. The State-Regions Conference is a cooperative body established to discuss matters of regional interest. The Conference System allows regional participation in the decision-making process and in the implementation of EU legislation through non-binding opinions. Only recently Law No. 11/2005 institutionalized the community meeting (sessione comunitaria), which can also be “called” on request of the regions and the autonomous provinces. In other terms, it may be argued that the Italian political system tends to adopt the consultation-negotiation model for resolving competency issues between the national government and the regions.
In the light of these developments, the tendency towards a higher degree of formalization is clearly evident. Despite the existence of these different channels of participation established within the framework of the Member State, the involvement of the Italian regions in EU affairs remains rather sporadic. The reform is generating fragmentation: considerable deficiencies remain in central-regional government coordination. Generally speaking, the bottom-up process seems to be more formal than effective in practice, and the channels that have been established so far do not appear to undermine the capacity of central state institutions to maintain a monopoly of competence over European integration policy.