Budgetary and Financial Matters

Judicial councils do not have a decisive say about the remuneration of the judges. The main aspects on the matter should be addressed by ordinary legislation. The Venice Commission is of the opinion

that for judges a level of remuneration should be guaranteed by law in conformity with the dignity of their office and the scope of their duties.

These guidelines have to be considered in connection with the general idea of the budgetary autonomy of the judiciary. The problem of the personal treatment of the judges is part of the problem of the financial independence of the judiciary. At times, the Commission has stressed the deliberative role of the parliament in the matter, and suggested that ‘it would be more practical to entrust one institution as the judicial council with the competence to draft all the parts of the budget for the system of the judiciary as a whole’^[231] It could be advisable to restrain the power of the parliament from reducing the budget of the courts without the consent of the judicial council, except in the case of a general reduction of the state budget.^[232]

This move is a sign of the enlargement of the scope of the functions of the judicial coun­cils by extending them to cover not only the personal status of the judges, but also the organisation of the courts. This solution can imply the self-administration of the judicial budget by the courts.^[233] Supervision of this activity of the courts by the judicial council may be envisaged. However, the line of the Venice Commission in this specific field is still hesi­tating between the idea of entrusting the judicial councils to represent the judiciary in the parliamentary budgetary procedures and the fear that the involvement of that body in the relative battles could endanger its position, engulfing it in the political debate. In any case, the problematic aspects of the judicial budgetary management deserve more attention.

Eventually, a solution may be envisaged that looks similar to arrangements of the rela­tionship between the judiciary and the parliaments in Northern European countries (such as Denmark, Norway and Sweden). However, the Commission has not yet elaborated the experience of the autonomous self-administration of the courts, or its extension to finan­cial and budgetary matters that is practised in those countries.^[235] Further developments in this direction cannot be excluded. According to the guidelines they adopted, the Northern European states are oriented to entrust the bodies in charge of the administration of the courts also with functions about the formation of and continuous professional formation of judges, the evaluation of their behaviour and the drafting of deontological codes. This tendency is counterbalanced by the growth of the alternative model of the Mediterranean judicial councils, which have a pluralistic membership and a peculiar constitutional status. Conversely, it is not clear if the preferences will go in the direction of the centralisation of self-administration of the judiciary in the hands of one body only or if a pluralistic approach will be adopted. For example, more than one body could be established in the field of judicial administration, as has happened in Northern European countries. The Venice Commission could be confronted by this alternative in the future.

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