Concluding Remarks: Contingency and Legitimacy
As indicated earlier, I am arguing for using the notion of contingency to promote possibilities of alternative initiatives and outcomes of the politics of cultural/Islamic identity, including ones that are conducive or antagonistic to the incremental success of constitutionalism.
The premise of this argument is that it is grossly misleading to see Islam as a given, objectified, self-contained, static body of doctrine and rituals, as if it has an abstract existence, independent of the consciousness and daily experiences of Muslims everywhere. Similarly, it is dangerously simplistic to take Islam as a totalizing ideology and theology that demands blind and unquestioning obedience from its adherents, regardless of the requirements of their lives in complex local and global conditions of interdependence and cooperation. Instead, I am calling for Muslims’ understanding and practice of Islam, how it relates to various aspects of their lives as Muslim individuals and communities, as well as in their relationships to non-Muslims close and far around them, all to be seen as the subject and outcomes of constant negotiation and mediation. Assuming that the contingency thesis is accepted, how can it be applied in favor of constitutional governance in Islamic African societies?It is critical to my thesis and argument in this regard that one should not be fatalistic or deterministic about the dynamics and outcome of the contestations of cultural/religious identify and politics, or their implications for constitutionalism. The politics of cultural/religious identity can be positive in affirming individual and collective human dignity and self-determination, which are the foundation of sustainable constitutionalism. Cultural identity is equally important for adapting universal features of constitutionalism to the immediate environment and context of the person and community, instead of attempting to implement clearly unworkable or irrelevant principles.
To affirm this possible line of thinking and action is not to deny the counter-possibility that the politics of cultural/religious identity can be negative to the extent that it negates or diminishes the human dignity and self-determination of other persons and communities. Rather, it is an assertion of a personal deliberate choice as a first step in the direction of developing and implementing strategies for its implementation in practice.Whether one type or the other of politics of identity prevails to promote or undermine constitutional governance is a result of an interaction of a complex web of factors over time, and not only a matter of personal choice. For the purposes of the incremental success of constitutionalism, which is my primary concern here, the question is what individual persons can do about this process in relation to the contingent role of Islam in their own situation. It is from this perspective that I would emphasize the role of conscious choice and ability to be self-critical. A favorable choice is more likely to be made to the extent that one appreciates that respect for one’s identity is contingent on respecting the identity of others, while an unfavorable choice reflects a failure to appreciate that moral and pragmatic imperative. For example, as a Sudanese Muslim from the northern part of the country, I can either assert my cultural/religious identity with due regard to the identity of non-Muslim Sudanese from other parts of the country, or do so regardless of or even in violation of their identity. The first choice signifies confidence in one’s cultural/religious identity as consistent with, if not requiring, one’s obligation to concede the same right to other citizens of the same country. In contrast, the second choice indicates an unwillingness or inability to appreciate the need for reciprocity in this regard, probably in the belief that conceding the right of others to their cultural/religious identity undermines or diminishes one’s own right.
The fact that outcomes of the politics of identity are totally arbitrary and unpredictable is clearly demonstrated by the manner in which Islamists have deliberately and systematically promoted their understanding of Islam, with its anticonstitutional consequences in Sudan, as explained in the next chapter. In light of this recent empirical reality, I conclude that an acknowledgment of the moral and pragmatic value of reciprocity in conceding the right of others to their own cultural/religious identity in order to secure one’s own identity is a quality that can be deliberately cultivated and developed in a given population. The next step from this perspective is to investigate and attempt to change the processes by which perceptions of identity in exclusive terms that negate or diminish the right of others happen to prevail in Sudan. Such a “corrective” strategy, I argue, should first seek to understand the rationality of viewing cultural/religious identity in exclusive terms, and address the underlying reasons for it, in attempting to influence people in favor of a more inclusive understanding of the human need for belonging and solidarity that underlies this powerful urge. In speaking of the “rationality” of this sort of negative exclusivity of identity, I am emphasizing that human beings take such positions for reasons that appear to be reasonable and coherent to them at the time. But it is perhaps helpful to briefly clarify an underlying tension in this proposition.
For instance, assertions of identity are by definition exclusive; indeed, that is the common rationale of all identity politics. Whatever basis of identity one is asserting in a given context, the object is precisely to include some people in that identification, which necessarily implies excluding others. When I say I am a Sudanese, for instance, I am at the same time saying that I am not an Egyptian or Kenyan, by affirming that I am a Muslim I am confirming that I am not Christian or atheist, and so forth.
Moreover, there is an implication of self-satisfaction, if not superiority, in at least some forms of identity, especially when they are believed to be a matter of choice or merit. For example, in affirming that I am a Muslim by choice, I am claiming that I believe that to be better than being Christian or atheist. Stressing one’s professional training as a lawyer, for instance, implies pride in that affiliation, often in contrast to being an accountant or engineer or some other professional position. In general, identity is important to people because it affirms their own dignity and worth as human beings, satisfies their need to belong to a desirable group, and attracts the solidarity of other members of that group.If that is the nature and function of identity, how can it be effectively affirmed while at the same time accepting other identities as of equal value? How can the unavoidable exclusivity of identity be meaningful when it does not imply some advantage that is denied to those who identify with something different, especially when it is a competing religion or a culture that is believed to be inferior to one’s own? While acknowledging this inherent tension in the politics of identity, I believe that the principle of reciprocity can provide a moral and pragmatic framework for mediation. Moreover, since such mediation is unlikely to eliminate this tension even in the long term, constitutionalism can in fact provide a useful political and legal framework for the continuous mitigation of its negative consequences for social and economic relations.
By reciprocity I mean appreciating that one’s claim to affirm his or her identity, in whatever terms one deems to be important and relevant, is in fact contingent upon accepting the right of others to do the same. Such reciprocity is both required as a moral justification for one’s own claim, and politically necessary if others are to accept that claim. In other words, if I am unwilling to accept the right of others to assert their own identity, I cannot realistically expect them to accept my claim.
If I should then attempt to impose my right against their voluntary acceptance of it, they will probably resist by any means available to them. When the realm of this contestation is a territorial state, for our purposes here, the effort of one group to impose its own cultural/religious identity to the exclusion of the right of others to do the same will probably result in severe political instability, if not civil war, as illustrated by the case of Sudan in the next chapter.In any case, the whole basis of national sovereignty, economic development, and political participation would be repudiated by an assertion of identity by one segment of the population that denies the right of other segments of the population their right to do the same. This moral and political imperative of reciprocity is both required for, and facilitated by, sustainable constitutionalism as a framework for sustaining overlapping identities, whereby one can be Muslim or Christian, of one ethnic group or another, while at the same time sharing with people who identify in different terms the common quality of being citizens of the same territorial state. Constitutionalism also provides the legal and political mechanisms for negotiating and adjudicating competing claims to resources and services that may arise from the various identities asserted by different segments of the population of the country.