Conclusion
Nariman, a noted Indian lawyer, is right in observing that “our present leaders have failed to live up to the ideals of the founding fathers.”[752] Successive governments in India failed to read correctly and implement consistently the constitutional vision of bringing a socio-economic transformation in Indian society and developing a limited democracy.
How could the Supreme Court use the basic structure doctrine for occasional course corrections? I have argued in this chapter that although the doctrine should not be seen as a device to address all types of misuse of power by the executive and the legislature, it should be employed to check against all formal and informal pathways of constitutional amendments. Moreover, the doctrine should also bind the judiciary to address fears of judicial arbitrariness and achieve a “constitutional equilibrium” rather than an absolute supremacy of either the judiciary or the legislature/executive. After all, “there is no reason to assume that judges any more than politicians will always protect our liberties.”[753]The real value of the basic doctrine will be in those situations when the judiciary invokes it to preserve core values of a constitution from assault from a dominant government and not merely for a self-serving purpose[754] or against weaker governments. There is no doubt that the Indian Supreme Court has been “a centre of political power” from the very beginning of an independent India.[755] However, if it continues to use this power in a selective, incohesive, or self-serving manner, the Court will erode further its legitimacy and in turn its supreme status under the Indian Constitution.
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