Conclusion

Let me conclude then with a brief summary of what I believe to be the proper breadth of the BSD, which I believe to be restricted in the several ways I have suggested.

First, the facts of constitution-making and entrenchment may or may not sup­port the notion that the basic structure was, as a matter of implication, intended to be protected, and is accordingly beyond the power of the bodies ordinarily empowered to effect a constitutional amendment.

Second, we should be especially careful in implying the BSD in cases where some provisions are protected by a referendum requirement, as this is an exercise in popular sovereignty.

Third, the actual content of the basic structure varies from case to case, and we should be careful also in implying an intention to entrench a particular structure of government, as opposed to general principles such as the rule of law, judicial independence, and fundamental rights. Yet even these will take different forms in various cases.

Fourth, the BSD is not in principle applicable to unwritten constitutions and constitutions that are not entrenched. But this does not necessarily prevent judi­cial review of legislation in a way which is similar or analogous to BSD.

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