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Conclusion

This chapter explores the issues of democratic legitimacy and deficiency in the Bangladeshi eternity clause. As indicated above, the reasons for its enactment are more ‘political’ than constitutional.

Moreover, the subject matters of constitutional entrenchment, apart from being deceptively wide, were not the outcomes of democratic deliberations and consensus. Specifically, as argued above, the Bangladeshi eternity clause has arguably turned the Constitution of the country into a largely unamendable document, thereby substantially de-constructing two most basic of constitutional cores: constitutional supremacy and popular sovereignty.

The success and efficacy of entrenchment rules usually depend on whether ‘there is a connection between the reason for entrenchment, the manner of entrenchment adopted, and the area of law entrenched’.[926] The connection between these essential attributes of an eternity clause is clearly absent in the Bangladeshi one. This deficiency, coupled with the exceedingly wide scope of this eternity clause, might cause it to incur disobedience or might give vent to political instability. Having become ultra-rigid, it might potentially prevent even political deliberations on the question of national identity principles or constitutional basics.

This chapter argues that the all-embracing Bangladeshi eternity clause is almost certain to yield complex implications for national politics and constitutional adju­dication. While it remains to be seen how the superior courts and the political actors would navigate and manage the unintended consequences of the country's unpragmatic eternity clause, a probable way-out might be to accord unamendability only to the fundamental constitutional cores. This chapter accordingly endorses the legitimacy of entrenching the fundamental cores,[927] and notes at the same time the danger of enlarging the folder of the eternity clause unwieldily.

Acknowledgements I gratefully acknowledge Werner Menski’s helpful comments on an earlier draft. I also thank the anonymous reviewer for the most helpful comments that helped me improve the content of this work. I sincerely thank Tashmia Sabera for her superb research assistance and Emraan Azad for bringing to my notice some important materials.

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Source: Albert Richard, Oder Bertil E.. An Unamendable Constitution? Unamendability in Constitutional Democracies. Springer International Publishing,2018. — 389 p.. 2018
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