CONCLUSION
In this and the previous chapter, I have subjected the liberal legalist epistemology of constitutional law to critical scrutiny. With regard to the interpretive question, the assumption that constitutional doctrine forms a coherent and autonomous system of rules was found wanting against a theoretically and empirically grounded account of the disordering forces at play in adjudication.
With regard to the instrumental question, the assumption that constitutional litigation works as a tool for social engineering could not be sustained in light of case studies that highlight the complexity of the internormative social world. The inability of rights constitutionalism to secure its own agenda, thus indicating the poverty of liberal legalist epistemology, forms the interim conclusion of this book. However, despite the fact that liberal legalism manifestly cannot deliver what it promises, these assumptions continue to inform the globalization of rights constitutionalism. This raises the question of why they persist, and what role they play in shaping the constitutional agenda. In Part III, I consider the implications of these questions for our inquiry into the relation between rights constitutionalism and private power in the globalizing age.
Source:
Anderson Gavin W.. Constitutional Rights after Globalization. Hart Publishing,2005. — 155 p.. 2005
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