Conclusion
The ten prima facie benefits outlined above in my view constitute a core of instrumental value offered by legal accountability. In most cases, the benefit asserted is at least to some extent contingent.
It is not asserted that the existence of each feature leads inexorably to the attainment of a beneficial end (net of its costs). It is rather contended that in many systems of legal accountability that possess these features, it will be common for them to function as prima facie benefits that are nonetheless rebuttable. The benefits, again, are: focus; principled reasoning; constitutional authority; independence and impartiality; rule-interpretation competence; procedural fairness competence; participation; expressiveness; publicity; and inter-institutional collaboration. Whether these prima facie benefits amount to actual benefits will depend on the contexts in which they are applied. It is hoped the list will help point out fruitful areas for inquiry, and perhaps emphasize, as a form of feedback, which aspects of legal accountability stand out as particularly important for securing these prima facie benefits. For instance, the requirement of giving reasoned decisions appears to be more greatly respected in some legal systems than in others. And of course, in those systems where the judiciary is not independent, the analysis suggests that we have reason to doubt whether it is appropriately called legal accountability at all.This leaves one difficult methodological issue that I will address by way of conclusion. It is the problem of incommensurability. A list of benefits and stated costs may imply to some that I envisage some heaven of commensuration wherein if we had all relevant information, all the variables could be compared and that an arithmetical operation would yield the answer to any question of legal institutional design. I have no such idea in mind. At the end of any fully informed analysis, some public figure will need to decide just how much individual consideration is worth a reduction of allocative efficiency, and whether some amount of judicial independence is worth a novel extension of responsibilities through, for example, a new tribunal or bill of rights. The fact that these public choices require difficult judgement and are not reducible to any calculus does not mean that an account of benefits and costs is useless to the task. Sure, someone must simply decide, but they must decide in light of the best information. And if we accept that legal accountability is a means, we must have an approach to public decision-making that is susceptible to evidence of its success and costs before any sensible choices can be made.