<<
>>

Conclusion

The historically grounded analysis of Bangladesh’s constitutional discourse above suggests that power-personalisation tendency, radicalisation and polarisation of the country’s political system have direct consequences on its constitutional consolidation and institutionalisation.

Actions of Bangladesh’s competing political parties, particu­larly their patriarchic leaders, since the independence suggest that they never gave up their desire for a perpetual grasp on power and total elimination of their opponents.[1471] It encouraged suppressing what Olsen calls a ‘Democratic Instrumental Vision’[1472] in institution-building. Bangladesh’s Constitution-framers were largely successful in setting up a liberal and workable constitutional order. However, the post-independence political leaders, including the framers themselves, and the subsequent reformers made and unmade the Constitution in ways that best served their immediate political conveniences rather than the long-term institutional interest of the country.[1473]

As Muzaffar and Seidher put it, democratic and authoritarian actors differ in their attitudes towards uncertainty. While the former seeks to reduce the uncer­tainty of institutions, the latter works to reduce the uncertainty of outcomes.[1474] For the five decades of Bangladesh’s existence, political parties and their patriarchal leaders worked to reduce the uncertainty of their retaining power. Different make­shift solutions and proposals inspired by temporal impulses have been suggested and implemented. In contrast, the conversation on the political party system, intra­party democracy, professional civil service, independent Election Commission or other integrity institutions has been consciously avoided. In the process, the coun­try has become derailed from its original constitutional ideals, dismantled its key constitutional institutions and reduced the Constitution to ‘a fond memory’[1475] of the past. Therefore, Bangladesh could qualify as a textbook example of how to make a good constitutional order and then unmake it.

<< | >>
Source: Bui Ngoc Son, Malagodi Mara (eds.). Asian Comparative Constitutional Law, Volume 1: Constitution-Making. Hart Publishing,2023. — 495 p.. 2023
More legal literature on Laws.Studio

More on the topic Conclusion: