Conclusions
As seen above, the politics of unconstitutional constitutional amendments in Bangladesh is inseparable from constitutional politics generally. In enacting what would in a normal constitutional sense be an unconstitutional amendment, the
ruling party and the government in power come together often to realise their narrow political interests, especially to have an undue electoral advantage.
As such, the unconstitutional constitutional amendments are essentially exclusionary in decision-making.This chapter shows that in some cases, the Supreme Court may turn out to be an active player in the politics of unconstitutional constitutional amendments. For example, the Court played varying roles in regard to the 8th and 15th Amendments: it stood against an unconstitutional amendment, refused to intervene when the amendment involved the sensitive issue of state religion, and laid the groundwork to enable the political branches to shun the NPCTG system arbitrarily, which had been chosen through a wider political consensus. This pattern of judicial behaviour is also discernible with respect to other constitutional amendments not covered in this chapter.
Beyond the judiciary, multiple political factors including the personal rivalries between the leaders of the major two parties and the conflict between the executive and the judiciary, which were beyond the scope of this chapter, are critical determinants in the politics of unconstitutional amendments. As reflected in the analyses of the 8th and 15th Amendments above, the people generally do influence, and are informed of, the politics surrounding an unconstitutional amendment. Undeniably, as is the case in any democracy, the politics of unconstitutional amendment in Bangladesh is deeply tied to diverse parameters of local (constitutional) politics. As a result, the concerned actors operate both cooperatively and against each other as regards unconstitutional amendments, depending on their self-interest.