Constitutional and Legislative Drafting

The introduction of the principle of loyal cooperation in the Opinion concerning Romania was a novelty that enriched the contribution of the Commission to the identification of the European constitutional principles.

In the opinion of the legal literature, Central and Eastern European countries ‘have undergone a major process of external governance’.^[82] The adoption of new rules and their implementation in national political systems have been at the centre of important devel­opments controlled by the strategy of conditionality.^[83] The process required time to come into effect. The internal compliance with the European constitutional principles and values had to be coordinated with the national policies of the concerned governments. At times, the adopted reforms were induced by internal factors. In many cases, the relations of those governments with the European authorities were conditioned by internal ‘veto players’.^[84] Therefore, it has been correctly emphasised that the entire processes implied a great deal of negotiation and bargaining that has in some way compensated for the loss in autonomy and power of the candidate states.^[85] These relations had a political dimension that fell in the competence of the governing bodies of the Council of Europe, the European Union and the

32 European Conditionality, Living Constitution and Constitutional Drafting states.

The technical contribution of the Venice Commission was especially relevant in the follow-up of the accession of the above-mentioned states to the Council of Europe and the EU. In the 1990s, the Commission produced Opinions that dealt with the new constitu­tions of some states, in particular Albania, Moldova, Armenia, Poland, Ukraine and Russia. In the following years, the trend changed and the interventions of the Commission inter­ested a large number of countries because Opinions have been required in view of the legislative implementation of the engagements taken by the states at the moment of their accession to the Council of Europe and the EU. Therefore, monitoring and advising activi­ties were undertaken in the face of particular individual acts of the new members. The specificity of these cases has been the cause of the Commission’s detailed elaboration of international constitutional law. Gradually, the Opinions have cumulatively enriched the normative meaning of the European constitutional heritage - that is, the whole complex of traditions, historical doctrines and materials that have conditioned the accession to, and continued membership of, the concerned supranational entities by the Central and Eastern Europe countries. The final results of the monitoring and advising activity of the Venice Commission depended on the decisions of the governing European authorities responsible for relations with Member States. Sharing the conclusions of the Commission’s Opinions, those authorities gave them formal relevance and legally engaged the responsibility of the Members. However, these decisions would not have been effective or credible without the technical contribution of the Commission. The role and importance of this contribution is the focus of attention in the next chapters.