ETHIOPIA

The Ethiopian state, within its present boundaries, was created by a process of imperial expansion and conquests instigated and led by Emperor Menelik II during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In 1955 the constitution was amended to include 85 articles, providing for such fundamental rights as freedom of movement, due process of law, privacy and property rights, and freedom of religion, assembly, and occupation. The revised constitution also redefined the authority of the emperor, who was to govern “in conformity with the provisions of the constitution” (Ashenafi 2003: 30).

In 1974, a successful military coup by a group of army officers known as the Derg (military committee) sought to transform Ethiopia into a socialist country, based on a Marxist-Leninist single-party state model (Erlich 1999: 67). The Derg claimed that one of their major concerns in taking over the state was to grant the various ethnic groups autonomy (53). Accordingly, they developed and implemented the Program of National Democratic Revolution of Ethiopia in 1976 that granted regional autonomy to different ethnic groups, and claimed that “no nationality will dominate another since the history, culture, language, and religion of each nationality will have equal recognition in accordance with the spirit of socialism” (Wagaw 1997: 395).

In 1987 the military rulers adopted a constitution that was debated at the community level. But because the government maintained careful control and direction over the entire process some Ethiopians as well as outside observers concluded that the whole idea of regional autonomy was a sham intended to give the illusion of legitimacy (Ashenafi 2003: 31). It was intended to give legitimacy to the new ideology, leadership system of government and political culture. The constitution also provided for a wide array of civil rights, subject to the government’s ability to restrict them to “protect the interest of the state and society as well as freedoms and rights of other individuals” (31, quoting Article 58).

After a long and bloody civil war, the Derg military government fell in 1991. On July 1–5, 1991, the interim government of the Peace and Democracy Conference drafted the Transitional Period Charter to be the basis of government until the new constitution was adopted.

The constitutional commission deliberated for two and a half years before forwarding a draft constitution to the House of Representatives for debate. This initial draft included alternative minority views on several points. The House of Representatives then forwarded the draft to the Constituent Assembly, a body composed of more than five hundred individuals elected directly by the population for the sole purpose of ratifying the constitution (Ashenafi 2003: 32). The Constituent Assembly ratified the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on December 8, 1994. This constitution limited the power of government and guaranteed human rights protection according to international standards. It also affirmed a renewed commitment to the right of ethnic groups (nationalities) to self-determination. The preamble to the constitution stipulates that the objectives of the political forces require respect for individual and group freedoms and for the right to live as equals without any religious or cultural discrimination.

The central point in the new, restructured state is the provision for an ethnic-based federalism (Selassie 1997: 125). Under the current constitution the country is divided into fourteen regions based on presumed ethnic demarcations, and there are nine member states of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Within those states the nations, nationalities, and peoples have the right to establish their own states, while each region and subregion has the right to secede. But some critics of this approach charge that the drafters of the Ethiopian Constitution ingrained and glorified ethnicity by establishing a federal government based on tribal affiliation (Haile 1996: 4). They argue that the geographical boundaries of the nine states, defined by ethnicity, separate the Ethiopian people and create tensions among groups that had once learned to live together. This, it is said, gives ethnic groups too much autonomy and undermines national unity (Selassie 1997: 126). Ethnic divisions and artificial regions have weakened the central government and created a fragmented political system (Erlich 1999: 53).

Critics also charge that, while the Ethiopian Constitution attempts to project an aura of constitutionalism and provides for an impressive set of human rights, there are no effective limitations on the power of government. The constitution is seen as a tool for the ethnic groups who overthrew the Marxist regime, namely the Tigrayans, to keep complete control over the state (Erlich 1999: 57). In theory, the powers of the Ethiopian government may be scrutinized by the Federal Council, a group composed of representatives of the ethnic regions which have the final authority to interpret the constitution. In this way, the representatives of the regions in the Federal Council have the hypothetical power to establish the extent of their own authority (62), leaving the federal government with virtually no power. In reality, critics argue, the state and federal government have unlimited powers under the constitution because of the absence of separation of powers, lack of genuine federalism that divides power between the central government and the sub-units, and absence of judicial review as a means for limiting the powers of government (Haile 1996: 51–52).

Other commentators argue that the use of ethnicity in this way has served a useful purpose for the nation as a whole by promoting the empowerment and effective participation of all ethnic groups (Twibell 1999: 453). This approach allowed for the release of tensions that would have built up if Ethiopia became too centralized or nationalistic after hundreds of years of monarchal rule, and a decade of dictatorial military rule during which one ethnic culture was dominant (435). However, due to extensive public involvement in the drafting process, the Ethiopian Constitution contains an exhaustive list of every objective the government should implement and an extensive array of democratic and human rights. This lack of clear criteria for setting priorities in effect allows for the treatment of important policies as urgent needs, thereby justifying extraordinary measures (440). Many of the rights listed are vague on what exactly the right is and how it should be implemented by the state, making them more in the nature of resolutions than constitutional rights as such (441). Thus, the text of the constitution presents a problem for its implementation because it enables the government to claim that any action, however remote, is sufficient.

Despite such criticisms, the country is apparently stable and successfully operating its complex regional and federal system. There is a good mix of political parties represented in the House of People’s Representatives (lower elected House of Parliament). Meles Zenawi, the leader of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) that defeated the Derg regime seems to be firmly in control of the country, was Prime Minister (executive head of government) in 1995, and was reelected in 2000 through a coalition of several parties in the House of Representatives. The threat to political stability in Ethiopia appears to be linked to the all too familiar problem of one party or ruler seeking to hold on to power at any cost, more than to presumed or anticipated risks of ethnic federalism. Charges that the May 15, 2005, elections were rigged by the ruling party provoked a series of strikes, processions, and civil disobedience by opposition parties. In the crackdown that ensued, dozens of people lost their lives, and opposition leaders and journalists were charged with treason.