Index

abstract freedom/autonomy, 15—18

balancing competing concerns (indirect horizontality) and, 58-59, 60

constraint of state's power as supposed ipso facto promotion of, 16, 28-29, 202

erosion by civil rights legislation imposing obligations on private parties, 16-17

as ‘freedom from' vs ‘freedom to' concept/ abstract dematerialisation, 16-18, 29 individual responsibility compared,

18-19

historical development, 18 institutionalism's approach to: see ‘constituted freedom' (institutional approach)

jurisprudence

Civil Rights Cases, 17

Cruickshank, 17-18

Du Plessis, 18

Jackson, 4

Lugar, 16

McKinney, 16

PUDR, 115-20

state action doctrine and, 16

see also state action doctrine

vertical approach, as supporting pillar of, 15-16, 202

see also default vertical approach, core concepts/underlying assumptions views of

Atiyah, 18

Dowdle and Wilkinson, 16

Gardbaum, 16

Grimm, 16, 17, 18, 23, 126

Henkin, 16

Hershkoff, 16

Hobbes, 17

Lewis, 16

Pashukanis, 18

Peller and Tushnet, 17

Polyani, 18

Sciulli, 126

Seidman, 16

Sunstein, 17-18 van der Walt, 73-74, 127

Whittington, 16

algorithms: see ‘app’

‘^aPP’

algorithmic transparency

EU guarantees, 162 institutional approach to, 165, 171 as basis of difference in power between platforms and workers, 138-39, 153-55

collective bargaining, applicability to, 165 definition/role, 138-39, 153-55, 157-58, 161, 207

jurisprudence

ICTU (ECSR), 155

Palermo Tribunal decision of November

2020, 155

Spanish Supreme Court decision of

25 September 2020, 154 Uber app, 153-55 use as violation of rights algorithmic bias and discrimination,

162

collective bargaining, 165 determination of status of drivers as

‘Limb B' workers, 143, 167, 168-69 discriminatory effect, burden of proof,

162

right against unfair labour practices,

162

right to a fair trial, 161

views of

Aloisi, 155

Bogg, 155

Pietrogiovanni, 153, 154

Prassl and Risak, 153-54

Rogers, 154

Rosenblatt, 153, 154, 162

Schein, 154-55, 162

Signes, 154

Slee, 154 Tomasetti, 154

‘application’: see ‘app’

attribution: see state action doctrine balancing competing concerns (direct horizontality), 62—63, 102-03 Tomlinson, 217-24

balancing competing concerns (indirect horizontality), 57-61 as an intuition, 58-59, 61-62 comparison with

abstract freedom/autonomy (second assumption), 58-59, 60

individual responsibility (third assumption), 58

third-party effect, 57 criticisms of

an ‘open-ended and unwieldy process', 57 domination of balancing requirement, 58 equal treatment vs freedom of contract rights, 56-57, 58-60 institutionalist approach compared, 128-29 jurisprudence

Lee v Ashers, 225-26

Shelley v Kraemer, 56-57

social and economic background, resistance to consideration of, 58

transplant problem, 57-58

see also transplant problem (indirect horizontality), views of

Barak, 58-59, 128-29

Collins, 57

Frantziou (ECJ jurisprudence), 59 n55

Gerstenberg, 57

Kumm, 57

Leisner, 57

Lewan, 57

Oeter, 57

Sprigman and Osborne, 58

Thomas, 58, 59

Van der Walt, 58

Von Prondzynski, 58 see also equality

balancing competing concerns (institutional approach), 207

bills of rights

centrality of the relationship between the individual and the state, 4, 14, 31 jurisprudence

Barsky (Douglas J (dissenting)), 4

Du Plessis, 4

private parties, applicability to, 35, 70 public/private divide, particular applicability to, 4

sovereignty and, 14, 24, 31

views of

Grimm, 4

see also default vertical approach

‘bounded direct horizontality’, overview approach (direct application of specific constitutional rights), 50 applicability of default verticality in case of unspecified rights, 50 constitutional provision for

Kenya, 214-17

see also Kenya South Africa, 209 see also South Africa enforcement of rights, requirements, 187 principled framework, direct horizontality's need for, 45, 46, 47, 64-69, 71, 84-85, 128, 191, 200, 201-02, 204, 205, 208, 210-14 scholarly models (Van der Walt/Thomas), overview, 71-72, 204-05 as basis for the institutional approach, 72, 86-87, 205

models compared, 78-79, 84-85, 86-87 state action approach/indirect horizontality, lessons from, 47

‘bounded direct horizontality’ (Thomas model), 83, 85, 86-87

as basis for institutional approach, 205 concerns, 205

need to avoid subjecting all private law disputes to constitutional review, 130

principled limits in the private domain, 45, 69, 77, 79, 128, 205

transplant problem, 77-79 default verticality, rejection

existence of power structures other than states similarly capable of violating rights, 76

as historically contingent phenomenon, 76

key features dependency relationship, 76-78, 79-82, 95, 129

extrapolation of normatively significant features of state/individual relationship, 76-77, 79, 85, 122-23 focus on questions of power and vulnerability, 42, 44-45, 72, 86, 128, 205

monopoly over core goods, 72, 77, 79-82, 124 monopoly/no exit relationship, 81, 124 retention of structure of established public law rights, 72, 83

rights bearer as priority, 76 sufficiency of link between private rights holder and duty bearer to establish responsibility, 76—82, 95, 129, 205 transplant problem, 58, 76, 77—82 voluntary undertaking by the more powerful party, 77-78, 79

purpose of horizontal rights programme, 76 strengths and weaknesses, 79-82, 205

‘bounded direct horizontality’ (van der Walt model)

as basis for institutional approach, 72 default vertical approach, rejection of underlying assumptions, 73-76 abstract freedom/individual

responsibility, 73-74 presumed equality of private parties operating in the same plane, 73-74 sovereign monopoly as threat to liberty/ proposed replacement with ‘differential sovereignty', 75

key elements

limitation of institutional conflict to that between ‘social majorities and minorities', 72, 75, 84, 204-05 location of horizontality in private transactions embodying ‘institutional conflict', 75, 78-79, 83-84

principled framework, 69, 74-75, 76, 83 rejection of transplant of the rights framework to private ‘hierarchies', 83

rejection of verticality's three assumptions, 75

need to avoid subjecting all private law disputes to constitutional review, 24, 130

purpose of horizontality determination of normatively significant power relations/inequalities, importance, 72, 74

identification of institutional conflict in individual forms of action, 74-75 strengths and weaknesses, 82-84, 204-05

Teubner, 74

views considered

Shelley, 74-75

Tribe (‘subjugation' thesis), 75

‘bounded (institutional approach): see institutional approach

‘bounded interpretive direct horizontality' approach (generic terms left to judicial interpretation), 50, 209

‘bounded direct horizontality distinguished, 50 South African Constitution 8(2) as, 209

Canada

collective bargaining, 144—45, 150—51, 165-66

Constitution as definition and limits of the state, 3-4, 15

indirect horizontality approach balancing competing concerns, 57 ubiquity of the state, 49, 55

platform work, 142 n16

state action doctrine, 32 n3, 36, 39, 43-44 caste

caste hierarchy, 189

as institution

‘comprehensive' status, 123 powerlessness of individual to counter, 123 cis-heteropatriarchy: see patriarchy Civil Rights Cases (US), 6-10

as constitutional challenge to the Civil Rights Act 1875, 6-7

default vertical approach, 5

Harlan J (dissenting)

summary, 8-9 institutional approach, 8-9 ‘institution' (S-G Phillips)

Harland J's endorsement of slavery/ involuntary servitude as race-based institution, 99

historical context and social backdrop indicating a ‘social tendency', 98 majority's rejection of S-G's interpretation, 98-99

widely practiced custom vs scattered practice, 98-99 the issues/Court's decision to strike down the Act

clean separability of issues/order of determination, 7-8

rejection of applicability of Fourteenth Amendment (section 5 enforcement powers) to private conduct, 7-8 state action doctrine and, 9-10 strict limitation of Thirteenth Amendment discrimination amounting to renewal of slavery, 8

public/private divide and, 6, 7—9

see also discrimination; race/racism; racially restrictive covenants

collective bargaining

attempts to impede, 165—66

as constitutional/fundamental right

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 145

constitutional tort claims, 67

EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000), 165

European Works Council Directive

(2009), 165

freedom of association as basis, 139, 144-45, 163-64

invalidation of substantive interference or undue burden, 165-66

US Wagner Act, 145, 150-51, 163 difficulty of exit as justification for right, 150-51

as feature of collective laissez-faire,

143

immunities approach to protection of,

143

constitutional protection, role, 144 insufficiency, 144

institutional approach, 144, 158, 163-67 explanatory role, 167-69 extension of right, 138, 163-67, 171 jurisprudence

First National Maintenance Corp v NLRB, 164

Fraser, 165

Health Services & Support, 144-45, 150-51, 165

IWUGB v Deliveroo, 166-67

IWUGB v DWP, 138, 169

NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 145

Sindicatul ‘Pastorul Cel Bun’, 166

Swedish Engine Drivers' Union, 165 means/methods, variety, 143, 164-65 participation in government deriving from associational rights, 163-64

‘apps’, applicability to, 165 codetermination, 164 n108 constitutionalisation of, 165

European Social Charter (Revised) (1995), 164 n108

institutional approach to, 164-65 workers’ councils, 164 n108

platform work and, 165

redress of structural imbalance between employers and workers as goal, 145, 151, 163

scope

extension under the institutional approach, 163-67

wages/working hours, 164

see also participation in government deriving from associational rights above

trade union involvement, 164 n106

lack of ‘institutional’ status, 164 n106 views of

Banks, 165-66

Bogg, 164, 166

Compa, 164, 166

Davies, 164 n108

Ewing, 164

Fudge, 165-66

Hsieh, 164

Jager et al, 164

Klare, 164

Langille, 165 n109

Michel, 164

Rosenblatt, 165

Tomasetti, 164

collective laissez-faire

applicability to platform work, 143-44 collective bargaining as feature of, 143 description of, 143

equality of employers and workers as goal,

143

as immunities regime, 143 limitations of/alternative approaches, 144, 165-66

as response to changing capital-labour relationships, 141

role of trade unions, 143

effect of their decline, 143

UK labour law and, 143

views of

Collins et al, 144

Davies and Freedland, 143

Doherty and Franca, 144 Kahn-Freund, 143 Wood et al, 143

Colombia

horizontal approach, 32-33

property rights, 195-96, 198 ‘constituted freedom’ (institutional approach), 126-27

definitions, 126

distinguishing features

coercion as act of individual vs act

of institution, 126—27 irrelevance of context vs socioeconomic status/institutional location, 126 views of

Grimm, 126

Marx, 127

Mau, 126 Sciulli, 126

constitutional models, overview, 3

centrality of state, 4

Constitution as definition and limits of the state, 3-4

public/private divide: see public/private divide

constitutional scrutiny

failure of

definition, 51 indirect horizontality resulting from, 51-52

Irish constitutional tort cases and, 67-68 family relationships, traditional exclusion of, 173-74, 179-80

‘going through the state' requirement and, 61-62

jurisprudence

Du Plessis (Mahomed DP), 102

PUDR, 117

striking down/modification of law and, 49, 64

ubiquity of the state approach and, 55 constitutionalisation of labour rights: see labour and employment rights, constitutionalisation of

Cyprus

constitutional scrutiny, failure of, 68

default vertical approach, 3-30

bills of rights, particular applicability to, 4 see also bills of rights

core concepts/underlying assumptions overview, 4-5, 29-30, 201-05 alternative justifications/reservations regarding, 5-6, 23-25 constraint of state's power as ipso facto promotion of freedom and autonomy, 16, 28-29 dependence on a clean separation between ‘state' and ‘society', 10-11 interdependence/mutual reinforcement, 29-30 as justification for constraint of sovereign power/failure to protect against non-state violation of rights, 5—6 see also abstract freedom/autonomy;

sovereignty (verticality); state action doctrine

as justification for counterintuitive nature of the vertical approach, 5—6 protection of private space from destruction by the state, 16

state monopoly of [lawful] force/binding conflict resolution, 10, 11, 12—13

see also abstract freedom/autonomy; individual responsibility; sovereignty departures from/alternative approaches classification of, 31—32

comparative approach to, 32—33 constitutionalisation of horizontal rights, 6, 52—54

see also horizontality; India; labour and employment rights, constitutionalisation of; state action doctrine

forces militating against, 25, 29 legislative intervention in the ‘private sphere', 6

privatisation of public functions, pressure from, 33—34

departures from/alternative approaches, analysis

Akrivopoulou, 32

Black, 33

Gardbaum, 31—32

Mathews, 32, 33

Rivera-Perez, 31—32

Rodriguez Liboreiro, 32

Supiot, 34

Thomas, 31—32, 33, 34 jurisprudence

Civil Rights Cases (US): see Civil Rights Cases (US)

Du Plessis (Madala J (concurring/ dissenting)), 3

Jackson, 4

Kenya Bus Service, 3

McKinney, 3

normative foundation, need for, 5 origin

context-specific, 6, 25, 86

public/private divide, 4

see also public/private divide

US constitutional jurisprudence, 4—5, 32

views of

Chemerinsky, 4

Dowdle and Wilkinson, 4-5, 25

Gardbaum, 4

Gibson, 3-4

Grimm, 4, 6, 10, 86

Kay, 3

Michelman, 5, 10, 14

Peller and Tushnet, 5, 6

Seidman and Tushnet, 6

discrimination, protection from

balancing competing concerns (indirect horizontality), 56-57, 58-61, 128-29

EU/EC Treaty (on grounds of nationality), 65-66

gender-based discrimination in a marriage/ domestic relationship, 187-88

gendered nature of the public divide, 181-89

Indian Constitution, 25, 27-28, 91, 105-14 IMA, 106-11, 149, 177, 188-89 Sabarimala Case, 110-14 see also India (institutional approach) (constitutional horizontal rights provisions)

institutional approach to, 188 court's focus, 132-33 recognition of direct and indirect discrimination claims, 132

‘structural'/‘institutional' discrimination as norm, 97, 127

motivation, relevance, 127 platform work

Uber's obligation to comply with US non-discrimination laws, 161-62 use of ‘app' as, 162

state action doctrine and, 35-36, 56

see also state action doctrine

US

Civil Rights Act/Civil Rights Cases, 6-10, 19-21, 97-101

see also Civil Rights Cases (US) Shelley, 56-57, 75

see also caste; ‘equality' of parties operating within the same plane; patriarchy; race/racism; racially restrictive covenants; unpaid domestic labour domestic relationship

Note: to avoid unnecessary repetition most ‘domestic relationship' entries have been consolidated under ‘marriage'.

definition (in present context), 174-75 embedding in the institution of the patriarchal family, 176

as institution

comprehensive nature, 176, 185, 198, 208 constituting the ‘basic structure of society, 185

hierarchies of power, 175, 176, 198 nesting within the social institution of the family, 174-75, 176, 185, 187, 198, 208 scope for violation of party's rights/ examples

equality, 177

forced labour, 177

non-discrimination, 177

rights to property, 177

unpaid labour, 177

see also family, as social institution; marriage, applicability of the institutional approach/issues; patriarchy; unpaid domestic labour

‘equality’ of parties operating within the same plane

dematerialisation/separation of law from socio-economic bases, 17, 18-19, 21, 73-74

a flawed assumption, 28-29, 46, 58, 60-61, 63, 91-92

imbalance of institutional power between the parties, 91-92

systematic and structured violation of right, 108-10

‘horizontal' as indicator of ‘flattening'/‘equ ality', 18-19, 127

individuals as abstract wills and, 17, 18-19 institutionalism's approach to, 91-92, 127-29, 132-33

jurisprudence

Drummond Wren, 59

Du Plessis, 101-02

Wilson, 60

relational context, importance, 59-60, 70, 77-79, 123-25, 128-29

transplant problem and, 58, 63, 69, 74 views of

Atiya, 18

Benson,60

Kumm, 60

Sunstein, 17

Thomas, 58, 76-79, 123

Tribe, 127-28

van der Walt, 21, 73-74, 78-79, 127-28 see also abstract freedom/autonomy; balancing competing concerns; individual responsibility (verticality)

family

hierarchies, 173, 174-75

as social institution, 174-75, 176, 185, 187, 198,208

pervasiveness, 174

variety of relationships qualifying as, 173 see also domestic relationship; patriarchy feminist perspectives/constraints on women, 173-99

colonial India, 27

patriarchal institutions and structures, 96 views of

Arruzza, 173

Mau, 173

Satz, 174

see also India (institutional approach) (constitutional horizontal rights provisions), jurisprudence (Constitution 17 and ‘untouchability’) (Sabarimala Case) forced labour

unpaid domestic labour as, 177, 188-89, 190, 208

freedom: see abstract freedom/autonomy; ‘constituted freedom’ (institutional approach)

functional equivalence: see state action doctrine

gender

gendered hierarchies, 91, 114, 176, 189, 198, 213

as institution, 91, 110, 111, 112, 113 public/private divide and, 181-89

Germany

indirect horizontality/third-party effect (mittelbare Drittwirkung), 32, 49, 51, 52-55, 62 n70, 130

Luth, 52-54

institutional approach/Handelsverter, 103-04, 120, 131-32

presumed equality of private parties operating in the same plane, 58 n51 Grimm, D

abstract freedom/autonomy, 16, 17, 18, 23, 126

default vertical approach, 4, 6, 10, 86 institutional approach, 124-25 public/private divide, 4, 6 sovereignty, 10—11, 14 vertical approach, 4, 6, 10

hierarchies

institutional/structural power hierarchies caste hierarchy, 189 domestic relationships, 175, 187, 198 family hierarchies, 173—74 gendered hierarchies, 91, 114, 176, 189, 198, 213

impossibility of escape from, 88 interrelationship with existence of an institution, 90, 121

as natural outcomes of virtuous diligence and natural talent (Van der Walt), 21 permanence/endurance, 88, 128, 187 racism/racially restrictive covenants and, 94—95, 189

subjugation theory (Tribe) and, 128 workplace hierarchies, 147—48, 159 private hierarchies

applicability of private law, 202 applicability of the rights framework, 74, 81—82, 83, 85

horizontality and, 74 vs public, 21, 82—83 stigmatised hierarchies (IMA (Chandrachud J)), 111, 113 horizontality (overview), 46—47 as archetypal model of departure from verticality, 46

definition (Unwin), 48

as exception requiring strict interpretation

(Civil Rights Cases), 8

as flattening concept/treatment of parties as equals, 18—19, 78

see also ‘equality’ of parties operating within the same plane indirect and direct horizontality, distinguishability, 46, 47, 48—51 counter-arguments, 61—63 a matter of form?, 61—62 purpose of: see ‘bounded direct horizontality’ (van der Walt model) see also ‘bounded direct horizontality’;

‘bounded interpretive direct horizontality’; horizontality (direct); horizontality (indirect); institutional approach; positive obligations theory

horizontality (direct)

concerns

overlap with existing private law regimes/ persistence of the transplant problem, 46, 64

separation of powers issues, 64 unworkability, 3 examples

Indian Constitution: see India (institutional approach) (constitutional horizontal rights provisions)

Irish constitutional tort doctrine, 32, 62, 67-68, 216

Kenyan Constitution s 20, 49-50,

63

South African Constitution 8(2), 29, 41-42,49,145

Thirteenth Amendment (slavery and involuntary servitude), 49 positive aspects, 63-64

abolition of distinction between state and non-state parties, 46

‘direct’ subjection of private conduct to the constitution, 47, 49, 63-64 principled framework, need for, 45, 46, 47, 64-69, 71, 84-85, 128, 191, 200, 201-02, 204, 205, 208, 210-14 see also ‘bounded interpretive direct horizontality’ horizontality (indirect) (critique)

concerns

individual responsibility and abstract freedom, 57-61

infringement of separation of powers, 47, 68, 130, 204, 214

vagueness, 47

see also balancing competing concerns (indirect horizontality); transplant problem (indirect horizontality) positive features, 62-63

displacement of state/avoidance of the sovereignty requirement, 62-63

views of

Gerstenberg, 57

Kumm, 57

Leisner, 57

Lewan, 57

Oeter, 57

Oliver, 57

Webber, 63

horizontality (indirect), forms and limits, 51—57 bases for

‘inadequate constraints’/‘a failure of constitutional scrutiny' (Thomas), 51, 55, 62, 64

features

application of rights to the private domain, 46

non-constitutional law mediation between the Constitution and the individual dispute, 48

state’s pervasive presence/inevitable implication in ‘private’ transactions, 46, 55 jurisprudence

Khumalo v Holomisa, 48 n3 New York Times v Sullivan, 48—49 RWDSU v Dolphin Delivery Ltd, 49 positive obligations as source of indirect horizontal effect/overlap with, 51 see also positive obligations theory third-party effect/ubiquity of the state, conceptual differences, 51—52

see also horizontality (indirect) (third- party effect); horizontality (indirect) (ubiquity of the state) views of

Gardbaum, 49, 51

Thomas, 51

weak vs strong indirect horizontality, 49 horizontality (indirect) (third-party effect) absolute constitutional sovereignty concept, 54

constitution as ‘objective order of values’ pervading the private legal realm, 51 global reach, 52, 54 ‘going through the state’ requirement, 51—52 as interpretive technique leaving private law rules unaffected, 53, 54 jurisprudence

Burghschaft case, 53

Luth, 52-54 positive obligations distinguished, 54 post-war German constitutional doctrine (mittelbare Drittwirkung') as origin, 51,52,130

views of

Barak,54

Benson,55

Cohen, M, 53

Drzemczewski, 52

Ellgar, 54

Engel, 54

Gerstenberg, 54

Heidrich and Rehm, 54

Kumm, 54

Mak, 53

Mathews, 52

Quint, 52

Smits, 53

Van Aswegen, 52

Van der Walt, 52 n52

horizontality (indirect) (ubiquity of the state),

55-57

adoption in Canada, 49, 55 constitutional scrutiny and, 55 description/examples, 55-56

‘going through the state' requirement, 51-52, 61-62

state as public/private divide and continuing presence in the private legal realm, 51, 55 jurisprudence

Du Plessis (Ackerman J), 62-63

Du Plessis (Mahomed DP), 55-56 Shelley, 56-57

US legal realist scholarship as origin, 51,

55-56

views of

Alexander, 55

Benson,55

Cohen, 55

De Almeida Ribeiro, 56

Gibson, 55

Hale, 56

Henkin, 55-56

Klare, 55

Kumm, 61-62

Mathews, 55

Thomas, 61

Woolman and Davis, 55

India: see India (Constitution) (fundamental rights) by article; India (Constitution/bill of rights) (public/private divide); India (institutional approach) (constitutional horizontal rights provisions)

India (Constitution) (fundamental rights) by article

12 (‘State'), 25

14 (equal protection of laws), 25 15(2) (non-discrimination), 25, 91, 105 direct horizontal applicability, 105 examples, 26

IMA, 106—11, 149, 177, 188—89 legislative history, 27—28, 107—09 15(2)(a) (grounds/discrimination), 25 17 (untouchability), 26, 91, 105 direct horizontal applicability, 105, 111 examples, 26, 108—09 legislative history, 111, 112 PUDR, 114—20

Sabarimala Case, 110—14

21 (life and personal liberty), 25, 114 23(1) (forced labour), 91, 105 direct horizontal applicability, 105 examples, 26 legislative history, 118—19 minimum wage as corollary, 114—20, 133, 139, 149, 160—61

PUDR, 115—20

24 (child labour), 26 historical evolution, 26—29

India (Constitution/bill of rights) (public/private divide), 25—29 bill of rights' departures from the default verticality model, 25—27 as attempt to remedy community- sanctioned ‘legacies of injustice', 26—28

examples of injustice, 26—28 specificity/absence of reference to the state, 26, 105

women's rights, 27 default verticality features, 25 layered sovereignty/non-interference with personal laws of self-regulating communities', 26—28 sources (US, Ireland, Japan), 25, 26 state action/applicability of bill of rights to private body, 35—36 views of

Ambedkar, 27, 28—29

Chatterjee, 26

Dirks, 26

Kaviraj, 26—27 Sarkar, 27

Singha, 26 Teitel, 26

Zelliott, 27—28

India (institutional approach) (constitutional horizontal rights provisions) evidence of institutional approach (general) focus on social practices, 105—06

references to social institutions, 105 specificity of provisions, 26, 105 jurisprudence (Constitution 15(2) and shops) (IMA), 106-10

summary of the case, 106-09 applicability to ‘all service providers’, 107-08

applicability to economic transactions, 107-08

enforceability by private parties, 107 injustices covered by, 108-09 legislative history, 107-09

‘shop’ as generic term (Ambedkar), 107-08

jurisprudence (Constitution 15(2) and shops) (IMA), evidence of institutional approach

dependence of individual’s economic and social power on relative position in institution of caste, 109

diagrammatic representation, 114 enforcement of social boycotts, 110 identification of caste as ‘institution’, 109 remedy (constitutional provision applied horizontally), 110 jurisprudence (Constitution 17 and ‘untouchability’) (Sabarimala Case),

110- 14

Chandrachud J (concurring), 110-14 legislative history, 111, 112 summary of the case, 110-11

Supreme Court’s decision/review, 110-11 ‘untouchability’ as generic term covering other cases of social exclusion,

111- 14

jurisprudence (Constitution 17 and ‘untouchability’) (Sabarimala Case), evidence of institutional approach diagrammatic representation, 114 identification of ‘patriarchy’ as institution, 112-14

identification of practices, patterns of behaviour, and social norms (legislative history), 113 jurisprudence (Constitution 23 and ‘forced labour’) (PUDR) constitutionalisation of institutionally grounded relationship, 116-20 criticisms of Court’s decision, 117-19 ‘other similar forms of forced labour’, wide applicability, 115-16 summary of the case, 115-17 jurisprudence (Constitution 23 and ‘forced labour’) (PUDR), evidence of institutional approach

Court’s articulation of an institutionally grounded understanding of freedom, 117

diagrammatic representation, 119 labour market as ‘institution’, 118, 119-20 significance of institutional location of the parties, 116

mechanics of the institutional approach, 120-22

property rights, absence of a direct applicable horizontal right/ Domestic Violence Act, scope, 194-95

social institutions

diversity of, 105

forced labour (begar) (Vasudevan), 105 untouchability, 105

see also India (Constitution) (fundamental rights) by article

individual responsibility (institutional approach), 127-29

balancing competing concerns, 128-29 departure from default verticality approach/ determination of horizontality equality of responsibility, 202 existence of social coercion as test, 127 rejection of formal equality, 127-28 relative institutional location as the salient factor, 127

remedies, limitations on, 129

views of

Fredman, 129

Van der Walt, 127-28

see also individual responsibility (verticality)

individual responsibility (verticality), 18-23

‘abstraction’ (separation of law from socio­economic environment), 18-23 European comparisons, 22-23 freedom/autonomy compared, 18-19, 21 high-water mark of US freedom on contract supremacy, 20-21 replacement of rights holder/duty bearer relationship with contractual relationship, 19-20

as core concept/supporting pillar of vertical approach, 5, 19-21

see also default vertical approach, core concepts/underlying assumptions freedom of contract principle, 18—23 evolution of contract law, 22—23 insulation of the private sphere from rights, 23 presumption of the equality of parties,

58, 60

‘will’ theory/rejection of material differences between parties, 22—23 impairment vs invasion/denial vs obstacles, 13, 20 jurisprudence

Civil Rights Cases, 19—20

Coppage, 20—21

Dartmouth College v Woodward, 19 Fletcher v Peck, 19

Rives, 20

sovereignty and, 6 views of

Attiyah, 17, 18, 23

De Almeida Ribeiro, 21, 23

Gordley, 23

Grimm, 23

Horwitz, 22-23 Kennedy, 23 McPherson, 23 Maine, 21 Marx, 22

Nerken (‘atomisation’ of private

relationships), 19-20, 22, 98-99, 127 Olsen, 23 Pashukanis, 22 Van der Linden, 22 Van der Walt, 18-19, 21, 73-74 see also individual responsibility (institutional approach) institutional approach: see ‘constituted freedom’ (institutional approach); individual responsibility (institutional approach);

‘institution’, examples; ‘institution’, key features; institutional approach, general; institutional approach, judicial leanings towards; institutional approach, philosophical foundations;

institutional approach, private law relationship; sovereignty (institutionalism’s approach to) ‘institution’, examples of qualifying/ non-qualifying groups

caste, 27-28, 88, 91, 108-10, 111-13, 114,

123, 126, 206

domestic relationship, 174-75, 176-77, 178-80, 185-89, 191-92, 194, 198, 208

family, 174-75, 176, 185, 187, 197, 198, 208 gender, 91, 110, 111, 112, 113

involuntary servitude, 97-99

labour market, 90, 91, 119-20, 138, 140,

149- 52, 157-58, 168-69, 171-72, 198, 206, 207

marriage: see marriage, applicability of the institutional approach/issues status as social institution

mass media, 221-24 patriarchy, 91, 96, 113, 114, 123, 174-75,

176, 178-79, 194, 206

race/racism, 88, 97-105, 123 school/hospital (exclusion), 88, 206

‘institution’, key features (for purposes of a horizontal rights framework) coherence and unity, 87

determination of power by relative locations within the institution, 87, 95, 104, 109, 119, 120, 123, 147, 148, 151, 179, 205

difficulty of exit/absence of a right, 81, 88, 98, 123, 124, 125, 138, 147, 150-51, 152, 176-78, 187, 190-92, 194, 200, 206, 208

dominance of the structural/‘institutional’ power, 88, 176, 185-86

institutionally assigned roles, functions and powers, 87

institutionally mediated difference in power, 88, 138

low threshold/establishment as a first step, value of, 89-90, 120-22

monopoly, 81, 124-25, 152

norms (created by prolonged convergence of behaviour by multiple actors), 87 pervasive influence over individual’s everyday life, 98, 123, 138, 149-51, 176, 185, 205-06

powerlessness of individual to counter,

123

a set of ‘social relations which have an ongoing, organised and relatively enduring quality to them’ (Layder), 87, 200

structure

differantial sovereignty (Van der Walt), 75, 126

individuals as key players, 87-88, 129 limitation to interactions between social majorities and minorities (van der Walt), 72, 75, 79, 84, 85, 126, 127, 203, 204-05

nesting of/within institutions, 72, 174-75, 176, 185, 187, 198, 204,208 views of

Grimm, 86, 124-25

Harlan J (slavery as institution), 8-9

Isaac, 88

Layder, 87, 88

Miller, 87

Postone, 87

Van der Walt, 72

Wittgenstein, 75, 89, 126

institutional approach, general introduction/summary, 90-92, 201-08 application to

domestic relationships: see marriage, applicability of the institutional approach/issues

platform work: see ‘app’; platform work ‘comprehensive’ institution

definition/requirements, 123, 138, 149, 176, 185, 205-06, 222

examples, 123, 138, 149, 176, 185-87, 198, 200, 205-06

continued centrality of the state, 120 ‘institutional approach’ (replacement of the concept of interpersonal domination with an institutional one), 186, 189

objections to the concept/rejoinders vagueness, 88 width, 88, 89-90

principled framework, need for, 45, 46, 47, 64-69, 71, 84-85, 128, 191, 200, 201-02, 204, 205, 208, 210-14

rule of law/legal stability issues, 89

AMS v Union locale des syndicats CGT (AG Villalon), 89, 156

Langille and Davidov, 89

sources for construction of

state action/indirect horizontality, 47

Van der Walt/Thomas models of bounded direct horizontality, 72, 86-87, 205

tentative leanings towards (South Africa/ Kenya/Jamaica), 41-42, 209-25 institutional approach, judicial leanings towards, 97-104

AB v Pridwin, 212

Blinkfuer, 104

Certification Judgment, 209, 211 Civil Rights Cases, 98-99

see also Civil Rights Cases, ‘institution’ Daniels, 211-12, 213

Du Plessis, 101-03, 130-31, 209-10 Duncan Muriuki Kaguuru, 216 Griggs v Duke Power, 100-101 Handelsvertreter, 103-04 Holomisa, 210-11

IMA, 106-11

see also India (institutional approach) (constitutional horizontal rights provisions), jurisprudence (Constitution 15(2) and shops) (IMA) Inclusive Communities Project, 100, 132 Jemimah Wambui Ikere, 215-16 Jones v Alfred H Mayer, 100 Juma Musjid, 210-11 Kenya Bus Service, 214-15 Khumalo v Holomisa, 210

King (Victor AJ), 213, 214 Law Society of Kenya v Betty Sungura

Nyabuto, 215

Lee v Ashers, 225-26

Mureithi, 215

Reitman v Mulkey, 99 Rose Wangui Mambo, 216-17 Shelley, 99

Stephen Saitoti Kapaiku, 216 n41 Tomlinson, 217-26

Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, 215 Wilkinson v Crawford, 213-14 institutional approach, philosophical foundations, 92-97

issues considered

class-based vs intra class relationships,

93 n18

contractual exchange of labour power as social coercion, 93

‘domination’/‘oppression’, definitions, 94 exploitative practices, 96-97 feminist legal tradition, 96

formal vs substantive relationship, 93 individual acts of oppression vs structural constraints, 92-93, 95-96

institutional power derived from capital, 93 non-dyadic relationships, 93-94 right to work, 96

social power, importance of, 92 structural injustice, factors contributing to, 94-97

views of

Altman, 97

Cohen, GA, 93, 124

Elliott, 92-93

Foucault, 96 n34

Fredman, 95, 129

Heinrich, 92

Kruse, 95-96

Mantouvalou, 96-97

Marks, 93 n16

Marx, 92-93

Mau, 92, 93-94

Parekh, 95

Pincus, 97

Roberts, 93

Shoikhedbrod, 92, 93

Wolff, 93

Wood, 92

Young,94-95

Zwolinski, 97

institutional approach, private law relationship overview

as bounded horizontality approach, 133-34, 187, 200, 205

complementary role, 90, 92, 130-33, 192, 199, 206-07

summary, 133 existence of both an applicable constitutional right and an existing legislative or common law regime, 92

analytical primacy of statutory scheme, 63, 130-31, 139

examples, 131

inadequacy of the legislative framework, 197, 198

existence of a constitution without applicable direct horizontal right, 135, 194-95, 196, 197

existence only of a legislative framework, 192-95, 199

New Zealand (Property (Relationships) Act (1976/2001)), 135-36, 192-95 institutional approach

explanatory role, 167, 168, 194 interpretive support, 131, 132, 133, 140, 141, 158, 159, 167, 180, 191-94, 197, 206-07, 208, 209-10, 213-14, 221

jurisprudence

Du Plessis, 131 n164

IMA, 133

Inclusive Communities Project, 132

PUDR, 133

legislative vacuum, 92, 133, 192 parties' challenge to private law regime as curtailment of their rights, 92, 132-33

views of

Cherednychenko, 130

Kumm, 130 n161

Langille, 138-39, 140 van der Walt, 130

Webber and Yowel, 130-31

intuitions

articulation of, 224

balance between competing rights, 58-59, 61-62

relationship between parties vs state's successful balancing of the interests, 61-62

bills of rights as primarily constraints on the state, 3

grounding the intuition, 59 normatively significant features of state-individual relationship as key, 123

state legislation as appropriate response to rights infringement, 45

views of

Barak, 45, 58-59

Barak-Erez, 45

Thomas, 45

Ireland

abortion cases, 68

constitutional tort doctrine

as direct horizontality, 32

lack of conceptual clarity, 67

principled framework, absence, 67 constitutional tort doctrine, jurisprudence Byrne, 67

Educational Company v Fitzpatrick (No 2), 67

Grogan, 68

Hanrahan v Merck Sharp, 68

Hosford, 68

Meskell, 67

Open Door Counselling, 68

W v Ireland, 68

constitutional tort doctrine, views of Butler, 67 Forde, 67, 68

McMahon and Binchy, 68

O'Cinneide, 67, 68

Temple Lang, 67

Von Prondzynki, 67

Whyte, 67

Jamaica (Tomlinson)

balancing competing concerns (direct horizontality), 217-24

failure to develop a principled framework, 217, 224

institutional approach alternative, 221-24

Kenya

Constitution as definition and limits of the state, 3-4

direct horizontal approach (Constitutional provisions by section)

20 (application of the Bill of Rights), 29 n123, 49-50, 63, 214-16

27 (non-discrimination), 216-17

45 (family), 196-97 institutional approach, leanings towards, jurisprudence, 197, 214-17

Ikere, 214-15

Kaguuru, 215

Kapaiku, 214-15

Kenya Bus Service

(Sang YK), 214-15

Kenyatta, 214

Mureithi, 215-17

Ngugi, 215

Nyabuto, 214

Rose Wangui Mambo, 215-16 institutional approach, leanings towards, views of

Miyandazi, 216 n44

Murray, 215

Sang, 217

principled framework, courts' hesitation to adopt, 217

property rights upon separation (Constitution 45(3) (equality of parties to a marriage))

CMN v AWM, 196

as directly applicable horizontal right, 196-97

Echaria, 196

William, 196, 197

property rights upon separation (Matrimonial Property Act 2013) Federation of Women Lawyers, 196-97 relative contribution of the spouses test, 196-97 labour and employment rights, constitutionalisation of, 144-49 applicability of institutional approach,

149- 52, 170-72

see also labour market as institution; labour market regulation, applicability of the institutional approach

definition, 144

as fundamental/human rights, 144

as peremptory/constitutional rights, 144 international examples of constitutional provision

EC Treaty, 65-66

EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000), 146

ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998), 146

UDHR (1948) and, 146 jurisprudence

Health Services & Support, 144-45,

150- 51, 165

Murray v Minister of Defence, 145 NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 145

PUDR, 115-20, 149

SANDU v Minister of Defence, 145 Vertreter, 120

justification for constitutional approach/ purpose

protection against politicised legislation, 144

protection of right to collective bargaining, 144-45

protection of workers from asymmetric power/remedies, 148-49

as remedy for imbalances of power in the workplace, 144, 145

national examples of constitutional provision, 144-45

structural power, significance, 147-49 see also hierarchies, institutional/ structural power hierarchies theories

Irish constitutional tort doctrine, 32, 64 n78, 67-68, 216

see also Ireland, constitutional tort doctrine

republican theories, 146-48, 150 see also republican theories vertical approach, dominance, 146

views of

Adams, 145, 146

Ambedkar, 118-19

Anderson, 119

Breen, 148

Collins, 142 n16, 144

Collins et al, 144, 148

Doherty and Franca, 142, 144

Fudge, 145

Gilabert, 148, 150, 151 Kahn-Freund, 143

Mau., 148

Michel, 148 n48

see also republican theories (labour market)

see also platform work labour market ‘freedom’ constitutionalisation of institutionally grounded relationship, 116-20 contractual exchange of labour power as social coercion/exploitation, 93, 115-16

formal (contractual) vs substantive (relative institutional locations) relationship, 93, 116

institution-based exploitation, 96-97 views of

Banaji, 116 n123

Herr, Kazandziska and Mahnkopf- Praprotnik, 117 n124

Mantouvalou, 96-97

Marks, 92-93

Sartre, 117 n123

Young, 96

Zipperer, 117 n124

Zwolinski, 97

wage-fixation, effect, 117-18 women and, 96

see also India (institutional approach) (constitutional horizontal rights provisions), jurisprudence (Constitution 23 and ‘forced labour') (PUDR)

labour market as institution

qualifying features

asymmetry of relationship at point of entry and during, 139, 151-52, 159 comprehensive nature, 138, 149, 151 difficulty of exit, 125, 138, 147, 150-51, 152

pervasive influence over individual's everyday life, 138, 149-51

power determined by relative locations within the institution, 151-52

right to work for multiple employers, 152 views of

Anderson, 151

Cetty, 151

Cohen, 150-51

Collins, 150, 151 Gilabert, 150, 151

Heinrich, 151

Hunter, 150

Klare, 149-50

Marx, 149

Mau, 149

Naidu and Carr, 150 van der Linden, 149, 151

Wood, 150

labour market regulation, applicability of the institutional approach, 149-52, 170-72

advantages applicability beyond labour law, 171 practicality, 171

responsiveness to realities, 171

as complementary approach to existing accounts, 170

contributions

avoidance of the employment/contractor binary, 171

as brake on legislative attempts to roll back basic rights, 170-71 facilitation of relations between statutory labour law regimes and constitutional rights, 170 justification for algorithmic transparency, 171

see also ‘app'

promotion of increased worker participation in management, 171 see also collective bargaining qualifying criteria

existence of a difference in power flowing from parties' institutional location,

151- 52

‘inequality of power' justification for labour law, 149, 170

labour market as ‘institution': see labour market as institution

marriage, applicability of the institutional approach/issues, 185-89

definitions/qualification as

domestic relationship, interchangeability of terms, 175

non-heterosexual relationships, importance of, 180 institutional approach (replacement of the concept of interpersonal domination with an institutional one), 146, 168, 186, 189 institutional inequality of power as ‘a set of impersonal structural mechanisms’, 186

as contribution to difficulty of exit, 176-77,187

exacerbation by legal framework/marital property rules, 176-77

examples of impact on women, 185-86 marriage contract as a set of ‘master/ subject’ relations, 186

as permanent feature inherent in the institution, 186, 187

persistence of gender inequality, 192-93 scope for violation of a party’s rights, 177 jurisprudence

Columbian Constitutional Court, 188

Olga Tellis, 188

PUDR, 188-89 rights at issue

enforcement requirements, dependence on compliance with, 187

livelihood/right to life, 188, 190 non-discrimination on grounds of gender, 187-88

property/factors contributing to breach, 188 protection against forced labour, 188-89 status as social institution, 176

comprehensiveness, 187

difficulty of exit, 176-78, 180, 187, 190-91, 198, 208

dominant and pervasive influence on individual, 176, 185

gender-based structure, 185-86 non-applicability of justice requirement/ response to, 151, 173-75, 176, 179-80, 181-86, 187, 198, 208 ongoing impact of norms and expectations, 185, 186, 189 views of

Barlow, 180

Brake, 186, 187

Fraser, 182, 186, 187, 190-91

Kleingeld, 182, 185-86

Kotiswaran, 180, 189

Naidu, 189

Okin, 173, 181, 185, 186, 187

Pateman, 181, 182, 186

Quinn, 180

Rawls, 185

Regan,185

Satz, 189

Sen,187

Shanley, 189 Waldron, 187 see also domestic relationship; unpaid domestic labour

marriage contracts

institutional constraints on, 191-92 structural inequality of, 186, 192 views of

Fraser/Pateman, 186

Sunstein and Thaler, 191-92

mass media as institution, 221-24

difficulty of exit, 222

Michelman, F

Fourteenth (due process clause), 9 default vertical approach, 5, 10, 14 public/private divide, 10, 41 sovereignty, 10, 12-13, 14, 15, 18 state action doctrine, 9-10, 33 minimum wage, right to constitutionalisation of, 120, 131 court’s declaratory judgment confirming constitutional right, 139, 149 as a corollary of the right to protection against forced labour, 115-20, 160 as evidence of unequal institutional power structure, 117, 160-61 institutional approach to, 160-61, 207 jurisprudence

PUDR, 115-20, 133, 139, 149, 160-61 legislative vacuum, 133, 139, 156, 158 platform workers and, 131 as remedy/mitigation of inequality of power, 117, 119, 120, 129, 133 views of

Collins et al, 160

Davies, 160

Prassl, 160

monopoly as feature of institution, 81

default verticality/Thomas’s approach distinguished, 124-25

difficulty of exit, relationship with, 81, 124, 147, 152

monopoly vs monopolist, 125, 147

see also state monopoly of coercive powers nationality, discrimination on grounds of,

65-66

New Zealand (Property (Relationships)

Act (1976/2001))

establishment of a presumption of equal sharing of property at time of separation, 170, 192-94, 198 displacement of presumption, 192-93 gendered division of labour, as attempt to address/persistence of, 192-93 institutional approach (interpretive support), 135-36, 193-94 interpretive disputes, 193-94 jurisprudence, 192

Alan v Alan, 194

B v B,192

Clayton v Clayton, 193

Martin v Martin, 192, 194

P v P,192

Reid v Reid, 194

Williams v Williams, 192 non-discrimination: see discrimination; race/ racism; racially restrictive covenants

patriarchy

definition, 174

as institution

‘comprehensive’ status, 123 powerlessness of individual to counter, 123

normative primacy, 174-75

platform work

‘app’: see ‘app’

collective laissez-faire, 143-44 see also collective laissez-faire definition, 131, 137

range of possibilities, 155 examples

Deliveroo, 142, 166-67 Uber, 104 n74, 137-38, 142^3, 153-55, 167-69, 194 institutional approach

advantages, 157-58 purpose (determination of workers’ rights), 156-57

jurisprudence

AMS v Union locale des syndicats CGT (AG Villalon), 156, 158

Cotter v Lyft, 142

David Heller v Uber Technologies, 104 Douglas O’Connor v Uber Technologies, 142

Dynamex, 142

Inake v Deliveroo, 142

IWUGB v Deliveroo, 166-67

IWUGB v DWP, 138, 169 Lawson v Grubhub, 142

M Kaseris v Rasier Pacific, 142 Pallage v Rasier, 142

Uber v Aslam, 137-38, 142

Uber v Bensalem, 142

Vega v Postmates, 142

views of

Boggs, 152

Davidos, 157

Davies, 140 n11, 141, 142, 155, 156

Davies and Freedland, 143 de Stefano, 141

Deakin, 157

Deakin and Wilkinson, 140 n11

Dukes, 143

Fredman and Du Toit, 137, 142 Hepple, 140 n11

Jowell, 140 n11

Klare, 141

Langille, 139-40

Langille and Davidov, 89, 142 n16

Mau, 137

Prassl, 137, 143

Prassl and Risak, 141

Rosenblatt, 137

Schein, 137, 142

Supiot, 157-58

Wood et al, 143 Zatz, 140 n11 workforce

characteristics, 137 uncertain status, 131, 137

see also labour and employment rights, constitutionalisation of; platform workers' rights, application according to the institutional approach; platform workers’ rights, traditional entitlement/legal framework

platform workers' rights, application according to the institutional approach, 139-40, 158-72 applicable law

constitutional charter, disadvantages, 139 constitutional context, importance, 158-59

constitutional and labour code rights, parallel existence, 139, 158 applicable rights at point of entry to and during the relationship, 139, 151—52, 159

applicable rights (collective rights), 139, 159-60

collective bargaining, 139

applicable rights (individual) minimum wage, 139

see also minimum wage, right to non-discrimination, 139 safe working conditions, 139

see also safe working conditions, right to

courts' role

declaratory judgments in case of legislative gaps, 139, 156, 158 incremental extension of legislative rights, 138, 158

interpretive support, 131, 132, 133, 140, 141, 158, 159,167

‘judicially-created labour code', rejection, 139

jurisprudence

AMS v Union locale des syndicats CGT (AG Villalon), 158

legislative gaps, 158

purpose (aid to determination of workers' rights), 156-57

sources

legislation as primary source, 139 traditional approach to rebalancing of power differentials, 140

utility of institutional approach, 140 views of

Langille, 139M0, 158

platform workers’ rights, traditional entitlement/legal framework courts' focus on substantial content of parties' relationship, 152 courts' ‘indicators' for determining status of worker

existence of a substitution clause, 166-67

freedom to work for more than one employer (flawed monopoly approach), 138, 151, 152 provision of equipment, 138, 153 see also ‘‘app'

similarity of indicators across jurisdictions, 152

variety/range of possibilities, 138-39,

155

traditional legal framework, difficulties with, 131-36, 157-58

ambiguity, 131 employer/contractor binary as basis, 140-41, 152, 155

legislative gaps, 89, 131, 133, 136, 138, 140, 141, 158

uncertain status of parties/categorisation of ‘worker', 155-57

positive obligations theory

continued centrality of the state, 45 definition (omission or inaction as violation/obligation to act positively), 45, 50-51 determination of rights violations, ‘going through the state' requirement, 45 n70

Fourteenth Amendment and, 9-10 imposition of positive obligations on private parties, 211

Luth, 54

overlap with/source of indirect horizontality, 51

‘privatisation' of the family/abdication of welfare obligations, 178-80

state action distinguished, 33 views of

Fredman, 9-10, 50

Gardbaum, 51

Michelman, 9

principled framework (bounded horizontal/ institutional approach): see ‘bounded direct horizontality’, overview

public/private divide

bills of rights, particular applicability to, 4 constitutional dichotomy between deprivation of rights by the state/ deprivation by private conduct as basis of divide, 4

core assumptions (abstract freedom/unitary sovereignty/individual sovereignty), 202

freedom/autonomy and, 16-18 deprivatisation of society's ruling power/privatisation of society,

9- 10, 18

erosion by civil rights legislation imposing obligations on private parties, 16-17

see also abstract freedom/autonomy gendered nature, 181-89

jurisprudence

Civil Rights Cases, 6, 7—9

Du Plessis, 55—56, 62—63

Jackson, 82

Shelley, 56—57

justice requirement, applicability, 151, 173-75,176, 179-80, 181-86, 187, 198,208

vertical approach, 4, 6, 28-29

views of

Ambedkar, 28-29

Dowdle and Wilkinson, 6

Grimm, 4

Horwitz, 6

Michelman, 10, 41

see also unpaid domestic labour (context/ historical review), public/private divide

race/racism

as institution

‘comprehensive’ status, 123 difficulty of exit, 81, 98, 123, 124 powerlessness of individual to counter, 123

racially restrictive covenants as evidence

of, 94-95, 99, 121, 123, 124, 204

see also discrimination

racially restrictive covenants constitutional obligations to equalize the relationship between the parties/ eliminate institutional racism, 129, 209, 217

as evidence of racism as institution, 80, 123, 124, 204

jurisprudence

Griggs v Duke Power, 100-101

Inclusive Communities Project, 100, 132

Jones v Mayer, 100

Reitman, 99

Shelley, 56-57, 74-75, 80, 99, 127-28 as part of the larger social context, 204, 223-24

as part of a pattern of discriminatory conduct constitutive of the institution of racism, 99

as reflection of relative locations of power within the social institution of race/ race, 80, 94-95

as reinforcement of existing institutional discrimination, 80, 225

remedies, 132-33

views of

Tribe (subjugation theory), 74-75, 80, 127-28

Van der Walt, 74-75

see also discrimination

republican theories (labour market), 146-48,

150

chief concerns

dominant relationships, 146

location of arbitrary sources of power, 146-48

viability of exit option, 147

exemplars, 146

genealogy of the term, 146 views of

Bogg, 147

Breen, 147

Gourevitch, 147-48

Lovett, 146, 147

Marx, 147

Pettit, 146

Taylor, 147

Whyte, 146

restrictive covenants: see racially restrictive covenants

safe working conditions, right to, 139, 155 institutional approach to, 169

IWUGB v DWP, 138, 169

jurisprudence, 169 platform work and, 162-63 slavery: see Civil Rights Cases (US);

US Constitution/bill of rights

social reproduction

definition, 173

family as central social institution, 173 see also family

views of

Arruzza, 173

Bhattacharya, 173

Hoskyns and Rai, 173

Mau, 173

Wood, 150

South Africa

Constitution as definition and limits of the state, 3-4

default vertical approach (Constitution 8(1)), 29, 39

direct horizontal approach (Constitution 8(2)), 29, 41-42, 49, 145, 209-14 as ‘bounded interpretive direct horizontality’, 209 negotiating history, 101, 102-03, 209 principled framework, need for, 65, 102, 210-14

summary of jurisprudence, 214 direct horizontal approach (Constitution 8(2)), jurisprudence

AB v Pridwin, 212

Certification Judgment, 209, 210-11

Daniels, 211-12, 213

Daniels (Froneman J concurring), 212

Du Plessis, 101-03, 209-10

Du Plessis (Madala dissenting), 102, 209

Du Plessis (Mahomed DP concurring), 55-56, 102, 209

Juma Musjid, 210

Khumalo v Holomisa, 210

King (Victor AJ), 213, 214

Wilkinson v Crawford, 213-14 direct horizontal approach (Constitution 8(2)), views of

Bhana, 212

Brickhill and Bishop, 212

Currie and de Waal, 210

Finn, 212

indirect horizontal approach

balancing competing concerns, 58

Du Plessis (Mahomed DP), 55-56 third-party effect, 48 n3, 52, 54 ubiquity of the state, 55-56 institutional approach, tentative leanings towards, 41-42, 209-14

Bhana, 209-10

Cheadle and Davis, 209

Liebenberg, 210

Sutherland, 209

labour rights, constitutional protection of (Constitution 23), 145 complementarity to existing labour legislation/subsidiarity, 145 race issues/apartheid

Du Plessis, 101-03

state action/applicability of bill of rights to private persons, 32

AAA Investments, 35, 39-40

Allpay, 40, 42

Calibre Clinical Consultants, 34-35, 43-44

evasion of responsibilities considerations, 39

functional equivalence, 39-40, 43-44

Khumalo v Holomisa, 41-42

monopoly test, 39-40

private body as ‘organ of state'

(Constitution 239), 35, 39^0 private body's ability to affect rights as

determining factor, 41—42 sovereignty: see default vertical approach;

default vertical approach, core concepts/underlying assumptions; sovereignty (overview); sovereignty (institutionalism’s approach to); sovereignty (verticality) sovereignty (overview)

definition (concentration of power in the

state), 10—11

horizontality and, 54, 62—63 ‘layered sovereignty' (India), 26—28 state monopoly of coercive powers and,

10— 11, 12—14, 29, 34, 44 state/sovereignty link, inextricability, 12 views of

Loughlin, 13, 14

sovereignty (institutionalism’s approach to),

122— 26

default verticality's approach to distinguished, 123—26

rejection of verticality's unitary concept,

92

focus on

normatively significant features of state—individual relationship,

123— 26

parties' relative locations within an

institution, 123

sovereignty (verticality)

as a centralised and unitary concept, 10—11,

27, 31, 34,37,69,80, 84,122—26,

202

as basis for limiting rights claims to the individual—state relationship, 78, 122, 125

deprivatisation of society's ruling power/ privatisation of society, 9—10, 18 monopolistic powers, 34, 80, 125 constraint of state's powers

role of sovereignty in determining state's normatively salient attributes, 10—15, 122

vs the exercise of unconstrained

non-state powers, 14—15 jurisprudence

Flagg Bros, 11—14

Flagg Bros (Marshall J dissenting), 37

Flagg Bros (Stevens J dissenting), 11

normative salience

historical origins, 14 uniqueness, 14

views of

Grimm, 10-11, 14

Kay, 13

Michelman, 10, 12-13, 14, 15, 18

Thomas, J, 13, 14

state action doctrine

overview, 31, 33-34

as archetypal model of departure from verticality, 46

definition, 5 lack of a principled framework, 33, 44-45, 47

normative political theory vs conceptual basis, 10

attribution of acts of non-state body to the state, 31, 35-36 delegation/monopoly alternatives, 33-34 effacement vs close nexus, 35-36 functional test: see functional equivalence below

imposition of obligations on the state distinguished, 33

attribution of acts of non-state body to the state, jurisprudence

AAA Investments, 35, 39-40

Burton, 35-36

Calibre Clinical Consultants, 35 Jackson, 35

Jackson (Douglas J (dissenting)), 36 Moose Lodge v Irvis, 35-36

Pollack, 35

Pradeep Kumar Biswas Case, 35

elements of

applicability of bill of rights to non-state actors, 12

denial of rights vs obstacles to, 13, 20 focus on the state/entrenchment of sovereignty, 34, 36, 40, 46-47, 203 functional equivalence: see below impairment of a constitutional right vs invasion, 13, 20

‘natural monopolies'/outcomes of unregulated markets, exclusion, 17-18, 40

normative difference between sovereign and non-sovereign powers, 13-14 performance of core sovereign acts by non-state actors, dependence on state authorisation, 11-12 functional equivalence, 36-40, 202-03 tests for, 34-35

functional equivalence (delegation), 38-39 evasion of responsibilities considerations, 38, 39, 51

functional equivalence (delegation), jurisprudence

AAA Investments, 39

Blum v Yaretsky, 37, 43

Civil Rights Cases, 9-10

Cruikshank, 9

Evans v Newton, 38

Flagg Bros, 11-14

Hudgens, 38

Jackson, 17-18, 35, 43

Jackson (Douglas J (dissenting)), 41

Jackson (Marshall J (dissenting)), 40

Logan Valley, 38-39

Marsh, 38-39

Reitman v Mulkey (Douglas J (concurring)), 43

Rives, 9

functional equivalence (monopoly status) South Africa, 39-40

US, 40

functional equivalence (monopoly status), jurisprudence

AAA Investments, 39-40

Allpay, 40, 42

Hudgen, 40

Jackson, 40

Kohn, 40

McKinney, 44

Marsh, 40

functional equivalence (traditional functions), 37

Clapham on, 37 historical vacuum, 37

functional equivalence (traditional functions), jurisprudence

Calibre Clinical Consulting, 43-44

Flagg Bros, 37

Jackson, 37

Kohn, 37

San Francisco Arts and Athletics v USOC, 37

individual freedom and, 16

see also abstract freedom/autonomy private body's ability to affect rights as determining factor, 41-42, 203 Barak-Erez on, 42, 45

Khumalo v Holomisa, 41-42

Marsh, 41

Thomas on, 42, 45 privatisation of public functions, effect, 33-34

‘inadequate constraint' hypothesis, 28-29, 34-35, 51 views of

Barak-Erez, 33, 42, 43

Berle, 33

Black, 33

Brest, 33

Finn, 39

Hershkoff, 34

Michelman, 9-10, 33

Sedley, 33

Wyver, 43

state monopoly of coercive powers

as justification for

constraint of state's powers/default verticality, 10-11 as mark of ‘sovereignty', 10-11, 12-14, 29, 34, 44

‘differantial sovereignty', 75, 126 transplant process and, 80-81 monopoly as component of functional equivalence, 39-40, 44 monopoly as ‘flawed' concept, 80-81, 138-39

monopoly over law-making powers, 29, 122 as uniquely significant threat to core individual interests, 34, 41, 43-44, 122

‘subjugation’ thesis (Tribe), 74-75, 80,

127-28

third-party effect: see horizontality (indirect) (third-party effect)

Thomas, J

horizontality (bounded): see ‘bounded direct horizontality' (Thomas model)

horizontality (direct), 64, 69 horizontality (indirect), 51, 58, 59, 61, 62 institutional approach, 205 sovereignty, 13, 14, 122-24, 126 state action, 32, 33, 43

public character of private actors, 34 transplant problem, 58, 76 ‘vulnerable valuable interests diagnosis', 42, 44-45, 86, 128, 205

trade unions: see labour and employment rights, constitutionalisation of

transplant problem (indirect horizontality), 47,

57-61, 63

presumptions

equal applicability of rights framework in private and public contexts, 58 equality of non-state/private parties, 58 Tomlinson, 220-21

unilateral enforceability of rights against state vs mutual rights and obligations of private parties, 58 views of

Collins, 57

Thomas, 58, 76, 77-82

Uber, 104 n74, 137-38, 142-43, 153-55, 167-69, 194

see also platform work

UK

collective bargaining, 166-70

collective laissez-faire in, 143

Lee v Ashers, 225-26

unpaid domestic labour, overview

features of

as facet of social reproduction, 173 inclusion of goods and services, 173 feminist views on, 175 institutional approach

effectiveness, 180 justification, 179-80 modalities, 208

as reinforcement of

exit difficulties, 190-91 pre-existing differences in institutional power, 190

as violation of rights to livelihood, 190, 208 non-discrimination, 177, 190, 208 property, 177, 190, 208 protection from forced labour, 177, 188-89, 190, 208

see also unpaid domestic labour (context/ historical review); unpaid domestic labour, remedy (equal property rights upon separation) unpaid domestic labour (context/historical review), 181-85

increasing acknowledgment of direct and indirect contribution to the economy, 176

public/private divide

as basis for non-remuneration of domestic work, 182 exceptions to the unwaged and gendered character of domestic work, 183 gendered nature/as on-going phenomenon, 181—89

Hibbs, 184

justice requirement, non-applicability to civil society institutions, 151, 173-75,176, 179-80, 181-86, 187, 198,208

production vs reproduction, 181 state vs non-state, 181 traditional view of domestic work

female as unwaged private support of male public wage-earner, 182-83 housework/care work as ‘nurture’, 175-76, 182

as part of the wife’s job not eligible for remuneration, 175-76, 182

UN/ILO publications

‘Care Work and Care Jobs for the Future of Decent Work’ (ILO), 184

‘Promoting Women’s Economic Empowerment: Reorganizing and Investing in the Care Economy’ (UN Women, May 2018), 176

‘Redistributing Unpaid Care and Sustaining Quality Care Services’ (UN Women, 2016), 176 ‘Why Care Matters for Social Development’ (UNRISD), 184 views of

Anandhi, 183

Benhabib, 181

Chandrasekharan, 183

Federici, 181, 183

Folbre, 184

Fraser, 182

Fredman, 96, 182

Hochschild, 184

Hoskyns and Rai, 184

Hughes, 181

Kleingeld, 182

Kotiswaran, 179 n15

Lucy, 181

McKenna, 183, 190

Mies, 183

Okin, 181

Olsen, 183

Parkman, 190

Pateman, 181, 182

Satz, 175, 181

Silbaugh, 190

unpaid domestic labour, remedy (equal property rights upon separation), 190-97, 208

advantages, 208 applicability domestic relationships departing from the traditional norm, 191 exclusion (for present purposes) of on-going relationships/remedies other than property rights, 175, 190 marriage contracts: see marriage contracts

application, examples Colombia, 195-96 India, 194-95 New Zealand, 192-94 see also New Zealand

UK, 195

application, methods direct horizontal application of constitutional rights, 195-96, 198

existence of a constitution without applicable direct horizontal right, 194-95, 196, 197 interpretation of existing legislative frameworks, 192

limitation to a legislative framework, 192-94, 198

statute/judge-made law, 179, 192 compatibility with state’s positive obligations towards domestic relationships, 179, 180 institutional approach

benefits (facilitation of relationship with private law), 192

purpose/criticisms, 191

justification, 208

as recognition of unpaid domestic work as equal contribution to the domestic relationship as remunerated outside work, 190

relevant factors distinguishing ‘relationship property’ and ‘separate property’, 192 length of relationship, 191 marital home, 191

views of

‘A Practitioner’s Toolkit on Women’s Access to Justice Programming’ (UNHCR), 191

Shanley, 179 n15, 184, 191

US

abstract freedom, 18

collective bargaining (Wagner Act), 145, 163 default vertical approach, origin in, 4—6, 32 horizontal approach (ubiquity of the state), 55-56

institutional approach, leanings towards, 97-101

labour rights/collective bargaining (Wagner Act), 145

Reconstruction era, 6, 17

state action doctrine, 5, 35-36, 39, 42-44 see also US Constitution/bill of rights US Constitution/bill of rights

Thirteenth Amendment (proscription of slavery and involuntary servitude), 7, 49

applicability to acts of private parties, 97-98, 100

applicability to racial discrimination not amounting to slavery, 7

as direct horizontality, 49

Indian Constitution compared, 26 ‘involuntary servitude' as institution, 98-99 Fourteenth Amendment (due process clause) applicability to federal regulation of private conduct, 7

limitation to exclusively sovereign acts,

11- 12

Michelman on, 9

positive obligations theory and, 9-10 constitutional jurisprudence as dominant default verticality influence, 4-5, 32

extending common law rights to state action/making the domain of rights gapless, 15 see also individual responsibility key concepts, 5 views of

Chemerinsky, 15 McAffee, 5 see also Civil Rights Cases (US)

Van der Walt, J: see ‘bounded direct horizontality’ (van der Walt model) vertical approach: see default vertical approach

women: see domestic relationship; family; feminist perspectives/ constraints on women; India (institutional approach) (constitutional horizontal rights provisions); India (institutional approach) (constitutional horizontal rights provisions), jurisprudence (Constitution 17 and ‘untouchability’) (Sabarimala Case); marriage, applicability of the institutional approach/issues; unpaid domestic labour