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Introduction

The introduction of devolution transformed the constitutional landscape of the United Kingdom by establishing a layer of sub-national government which was tailored to fit the prevailing conditions in each of the home nations, but since it was established in 1999 the economic and political circumstances have fundamen­tally changed with the onset of a deep economic recession and with a referendum for an independent Scotland in prospect for 2014.

In a number of ways we will see that devolution, notwithstanding its asymmetrical shape, has been designed to deliver enhanced levels of democratic and legal accountability, at least for the devolved parts of the UK. However, the absence until recently of any major dis­pute over funding allocation has been one of the most remarkable features of devolution. In part this feature can be attributed to the arrangements for its intro­duction at an administrative level as the responsibility for functions shifted from central government at Westminster to the newly-formed executives in Edinburgh and Cardiff, with a strong emphasis on achieving seamless continuity in the deliv­ery of policy. From the standpoint of ordinary citizens dependent on the state, there was little perception of any change. Perhaps an even more compelling reason for the acceptance of the existing system was that the so-called ‘Barnett Formula' already provided a financial settlement which took account of local circumstances in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This formula had already been applied for more than 30 years and delivered relatively generous levels of funding to the devolved parts of the UK. With the exception of the variable tax rate included in the Scotland Act 1998, the approach of the then government was to accept this block-grant settlement as the baseline.

As the political situation changed, particularly with the electoral success of the SNP in Scotland and the implications of the economic recession, the sleeping dog has well and truly woken up and begun to bark.

After considering the main features of accountability as part of the multi-layered constitution, this chapter argues there is a wider meta-narrative framing the discussion which encapsulates the policy of successive governments—a conflict between the accepted approach to devolution where funding is largely handed over without strings attached and the approach to local government which has been faced with precisely the oppo­site trend in the form of severe legal constraints and more recently funding cuts at the hands of central government.[1100] But first it will be argued from a general con­stitutional standpoint that certain accountability mechanisms have been radically modified and that accountability has been compounded by multi-layered consid­erations through the introduction of devolution. Nevertheless, there has been only limited attention to establishing direct financial accountability at the devolved level. Second, it will be argued that in regard to the allocation of funding, although there may be negotiation between central and devolved government over fund­ing levels, no special parliamentary procedures were introduced to scrutinize the proposed allocation of resources under the Barnett Formula to the devolved admin­istrations. The next concern is to consider in the light of the recommendations of the Calman Commission and Holtham Commission whether there is a convincing argument from the standpoint of constitutional accountability for the replacement of the Barnett Formula with a needs-based alternative supported by an independ­ent grants commission. While the politicians have yet to agree on an answer to the problem of block-grant funding, the Scotland Act 2012 has to some extent addressed the correlation between taxation and spending by changing the capacity of the Scottish Parliament to impose taxes at the level of devolved government. In identifying the meta-narrative it becomes clear that devolution was designed to bring government closer to the electorate in the devolved nations by allowing scope for policy preferences to be expressed. The relatively generous financial set­tlement produced a flexibility that can be starkly contrasted with the suffocating controls imposed on local government.[1101] Against a background of economic con­traction rather than expansion, it is argued that the rules of the game are having to change as assumptions about the nature of the modern welfare state are in danger of being undermined by the disparities caused by geographical variations in policy delivery. In turn, these trends exert further pressure on the integrity of the UK as a nation state.

B.

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Source: Bamforth Nicholas, Leyland Peter (eds.). Accountability in the Contemporary Constitution. Oxford University Press,2014. — 425 p.. 2014
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