INTRODUCTION
Federalism has both an institutional and a political dimension. Italy has developed the institutional dimension well, but it lacks the political dimension almost completely. Even though regionalism and subsequently federalism have been on the political agenda for decades, Italy’s advanced institutional setting is scarcely implemented by the political system, which still seems rather inadequate to cope with a fully fledged federal structure.
The practical outcome of such a discrepancy is a remarkable disproportion between “federalism in the books” and “federalism in action,” which increasingly disconnects political practice from normative reality and calls for the continual involvement of the Constitutional Court in settling “federal” disputes.Moreover, both federal institutional structures and federal political culture are developed far more in some areas of the country than in others, so that Italy appears to be a sophisticated federal system when one looks at some regions and a sturdily centralized one when one looks at others.
This chapter first depicts the historical and constitutional developments that led to such a paradoxical situation. It then moves to the current institutional framework, to its most recent developments, and to the reasons for its problematic implementation. In doing so, it focuses on a few examples that are particularly revealing of the state of the art, such as the financial arrangements between the national government and the regions, the (related) attempt of several municipalities to join the special regions, and some significant regional legislation that was recently passed (but struck down) in order to promote distinctive regional identities and by this means to make the case for more favourable treatment for regions with these distinctive identities. While comprehensive constitutional reform is not likely, some adjustments are to be expected in the near future. Regarding the next steps, it will be argued that in the current state of political flux, the response to federal problems and the only real inputs conducive to a more stable, long-lasting federal setting can be expected – once more – from constitutional adjudication rather than from amendments to the Constitution.