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Introduction

The general model of constitutionalism adopted over the last 30 years in Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and two sub-national units in Australia has two constitutive features.

These are: (1) a formalized process of pre-enactment political rights review of legislation involving the executive and legislative branches of gov­ernment and (2) weak-form or “penultimate” judicial review (Gardbaum 2013).1 In previous work, I have characterized this second feature as decoupling judicial review from judicial supremacy.[128] [129] In this chapter, I aim firstly to clarify this charac­terization by exploring the relevant meaning of judicial supremacy (that the model rejects) in light of certain potential misunderstandings and alternative senses that could be given to the term. Then, in the belief that judicial review shorn of judicial supremacy is easier to defend than the standard version in which they are combined, I present the case for this part of the general model.

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Source: Bustamante Thomas, Fernandes Bernardo. Democratizing Constitutional Law: Perspectives on Legal Theory and the Legitimacy of Constitutionalism. Springer International Publishing,2016. — 327 p.. 2016
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