ISLAM AND SECULARISM

For the purposes of the following discussion, I take secularism to mean a principle of public policy for the institutional separation of religion and the state, while accounting for the fact that religion and politics cannot be separated.

In Senegal, the mediation of the role of Islam in public life apparently involves the leaders of the three main sufi tariqas in the country, the Mouride, Tijaniyya, and Qadiriyya. Despite the fact that the French colonial administration increased the power of the Mouride brotherhoods to the detriment of the Tijaniyya brotherhoods, as explained below, in the mid-1960s the Tijaniyya Muslims outnumbered the Mouride Muslims by two to one (Creevey 1985: 716). But with fewer members than the Tijaniyya, the Mouride tariqa apparently enjoys stronger social, political, and economic influence in recent years, primarily because of its centralized, well-organized institutional structure (Ross 1995: 231). As can be seen in the city of Touba, the seat of the Mouride tariqa, this Sufi order has established a governmental system within a religious movement.

The term marabout refers to those who enjoy religious authority and leadership because of their religious piety and superior knowledge of God. In the Sufi communities of Senegal, the marabout acts as an intermediary between God and the masses of their followers who are perceived to be dependant on the marabouts for spiritual development and well-being (Behrman 1970: 15–16). The allegiance of mass followers and their dependence on the marabouts have traditionally extended to worldly affairs as well as religious matters. Revered as “saints” who enjoy supernatural powers, marabouts were often rewarded materially by their followers. During French colonialism the marabouts cooperated with the French colonial administration, and the power and influence they cultivated in that way continued into the postcolonial era (Behrman 1970).

The consistent policy of French colonial administration of West Africa, including Senegal, consisted of several elements. First, where it had economic interests or prospects of future expansion, the French administration actively opposed the creation of an Islamic state. Another element of French colonial policy was to encourage “Senegalese Muslims to accept the compatibility of foreign rule and Islamic culture” (Robinson 1988: 416). Thus, the administration sought to contain and isolate the Tokolor and Tijaniyya religious leaders, who were deemed to be extremists or fanatical, especially in western Senegal, where peanut production was at its peak. Conversely, the French administration actively sought out Islamic leaders who opposed jihad and the idea of an Islamic state, and supported their efforts to expand their followings, especially in western Senegal. This aspect of the French colonial policy tended to favor the leaders of the Qadiriyya and the Mouride tariqas.

One reason for the stability in the relationship between the state and the marabouts (both past and present) might be “the highly conformist nature of the version of Sufi Islam which was carefully cultivated by colonial officials and further encouraged by the independent state” (Villalon 1995: 226). By heavily relying on and supporting specific conformist Islamic leaders, while openly exiling other more militant ones, the French colonial administration promoted the idea of secularism among the Muslim population of Senegal, and actively discouraged the notion of an Islamic government (Robinson 1988: 434–35). While this policy was of course intended to serve French colonial objectives, it also turned out to be conducive to the stable constitutional development of independent Senegal. In contrast, the British colonial administration was apparently too worried about Islamic resistance in Sudan and Northern Nigeria to attempt promoting a secular view of the state in those two situations. That concern is understandable in view of the precolonial history of both regions, but the post-independence consequence of that British colonial policy has been a continuation of precolonial notions of an Islamic state and the attempt to enforce Shariʿa in those two situations. The divergent impacts of British and French colonial policies confirm the theoretical point noted earlier that colonialism was critical in shaping the postcolonial state and influencing the political culture of the societies it dominated. This does not mean that local Muslim populations were completely passive subjects of colonial authorities. Rather, such external influences can contribute to internal transformation when they become ingrained in the consciousness of people who are receptive to such influences by virtue of their history or the influence of their own religious or cultural values and institutions.

Continuing with Senegal for now, it is important to note that the political leadership of the country had to continue to cooperate with the marabouts precisely because French colonial sponsorship has made them too powerful to ignore (Behrman 1970: 107).

Interestingly for our purposes, the Conseil did not actively or explicitly oppose adoption of the secular constitution in 1961, but it reconvened in 1970 under the new name of the Conseil Superieur Islamique du Senegal, as a united maraboutic organization to mobilize opposition to the draft Family Code on the grounds that the draft contradicted Shariʿa, (Villalon 1995: 209, 227). The government succeeded in enacting the Family Code in 1972, presenting it as an affirmation of secularism and not a rejection of Islam (Creevey 1991: 361). The marabouts continued to actively encourage their followers to turn to them instead of the state in the area of family law. Exercising ability to adapt to changes around them that had ensured their economic and political success during the colonial period, the marabouts managed to retain their influence after independence, engaging the new modernizing forces and trends. In addition to representing the spiritual leadership of the country, the marabouts also tend to be the largest land owners and among the wealthiest citizens (Behrman 1970: 137). These factors forced the government to rely on them for tax revenues, investment decisions, debt repayment, and public acceptance of innovative technology in peanut farming.

Throughout the early years after independence, the marabouts were the commercial and agricultural elites of the country, exerting considerable pressure on the government in exchange for economic and political support (Behrman 1970: 138). But the country as a whole has also benefited from the leading role of the marabouts, who have actively supported the diversification of Senegal’s crop, adoption of modern agricultural techniques, and generally helped in stimulating the economy and redistributing wealth (Behrman 1970: 142). They have also played a positive political role by mediating between the population and the government, sometimes questioning or actively opposing government policy, but often facilitating government efforts, especially with regard to economic reforms (154–55).

As to be expected, the dynamic of the relationship between the marabouts and the government is changing over time, as the two compete with each for status and popularity among the greater population (Villalon 1995: 201). The underlying nature of the relationship apparently continues to be one of cooperation and collaboration for the benefit of the country. The marabouts’ support for the political regime legitimizes it in the eyes of the masses and helps the government to further its public policy goals. The state reciprocates by showing respect for the authority of the marabouts as well as advancing their material interests and providing public assistance for mosques and ritual celebrations (206). At the same time, “While the political elite finds itself regularly working through the marabouts, their ultimate goal is to be able to function without them. Marabouts, for their part, seek to ensure the state’s dependence on them. They thus alternately have incentives to cooperate or defect depending on the situation” (201). Increasingly, therefore, the goals of the state and marabouts are growing apart, with the state trying to eliminate the need for the marabouts as their link to the population, while the marabous increase their appeal to disciples in order to demonstrate to the state their capacity to exert influence over the population (211).

Most recently, however, it seems that the power of the marabouts is decreasing as Senegal becomes more democratized at the local and national level, with more citizens seeking more accountability from their representatives, both religious and political (Beck 2001: 601). In Touba, for instance, the local political council is endorsed by the Khalife-General of Mouridism (the chief local religious leader), as in many Senegalese cities. In a recent unprecedented challenge, local merchants opposed a drastic tax increase imposed by the religiously endorsed political council, implicitly challenging the authority of the religious leaders. As to be expected, the Khalife was able to retain power and legitimacy by mediating the dispute, encouraging the council to enact a lower tax and the citizens to agree to a tax increase.

In a sense, this recent incident represents the traditional exchange and mediation between the marabouts and political leadership. However, it also indicates a shift whereby both sides to the state-marabout relationship are becoming more accountable to the mass constituency (621). Given the slow pace at which Senegal is decentralizing power, it is difficult to predict how far this process will democratize religious and as political power in the country, but that is certainly an interesting possibility that will be considered later in this chapter. Thus, the relationship between the marabouts and the state remains one of both stability and dynamism, of mutual dependence of the parties, though that continuously changing in response to shifting economic and social forces within the country and beyond. It is also interesting to note that this tension, cooperation and mutual dependence between religious and political leaders seem to operate as part of a constitutional system of checks and balances. Senegal does indeed have a secular constitution with three distinct branches of government, but the brotherhoods in Senegal function as a fourth, unofficial branch of government that operates as a political check on the government, while being checked by it as well. Because the brotherhoods attained and retain their power over their disciples through spiritual guidance as well as social and economic interests, they are also able to exercise significant influence on public policy.

Moreover, Senegal’s economic and social crisis seems to have diminished the codependence between the state and the marabout (Coulon 1989: 152). Following Senghor’s retirement, the country did become increasingly democratic under Diouf and Wade, but it has also been plagued by economic and social crises. This resulted in the decreasing power of the marabouts as the centralized economic, social, and spiritual leaders, and a consequent decline in their influence as the intermediaries between the state and the general population. Ironically, this transformation seems to widen and deepen the crisis, and to promote a rise in orthodox Islam as a counter to Western hegemony (Coulon 1989: 156). “As more Muslims went to the Middle East and North Africa for Islamic education and the Senegalese economy lost ground, Islamic fundamentalism has spread, attacking both lax politicians and the Islamic brotherhoods” (Creevey 1991: 360). However, as orthodox Islam increases, the marabouts use it as a means of increasing their power within the government, offering a more liberal form of Islam (Coulon 1989: 156).

There seem to be two main streams of Islamic ideology growing in Senegal, a radical orthodox movement in Southern Senegal and a reformist puritanical Wahaby movement coming from Saudi Arabia and the Middle East. Both trends threaten the state-marabout relationship, but the second trend is particularly hostile to Sufi Islam and the relatively more liberal interpretation and practice of brotherhoods (Gellar 1982: 109, 114, 143). Islamic reformist movements begin as religious movements, but often develop a political component (Villalon 1995: 230). Moreover, governmental efforts to contain such organizations by providing their members jobs in education or state institutions, for instance, seem to be counterproductive by enhancing the political and social influence of these movements and encouraging them to pursue their objectives. On the other hand, popular resistance to the “Arabization” of Senegalese Islam is apparently forcing these recent Islamic reformist groups to align themselves more closely with popular sentiment in order to survive, resulting in the groups becoming “intertwined with maraboutic organizations, and consequently with the state” (233, 236–37). But this can happen in ways that enable the reformist voice to be included without dominating local brotherhoods, or threaten to take over the marabout structure, as seems to have happened with the Tijaniyya brotherhood in Senegal (238).

While the situation continues to be volatile and uncertain, it seems that earlier predictions of the rise of a conservative Muslim political party that would undermine the delicate relationship between the marabouts and the state are not materializing (O’Brien 1986). “The rise of radical Islamic reform movements, anathema to the existing political and religious leadership, does not pose a serious or immediate thereat to either government or the traditional brotherhoods. The traditional ties of cooperation and interdependence will most likely be maintained.” (Clark 1999: 165) Religious leaders in Senegal must be associated with economic and political power and change in order for them to maintain legitimacy. For instance, a reformist movement emerged from the Tijaniyya brotherhood, known as the Dahiratoul Moustarchidina wal Moustarchidaty (DMWM) (Villalon 1995: 238). The state attempted to contain this movement through official sponsorship, and the DMWM resisted. But as the members of this movement became disenchanted, the DMWM faded into the background. This episode seems to support the view that Senegalese Muslims tend to associate religious leadership with political power and economic resources, and to withdraw support for any new religious movement if it fails to associate itself with political power.

Nevertheless, while recent reformist Islamic trends have not revolutionized the state-marabout relationship, it may have evolutionized the relationship (Villalon 1999: 130). The evolution of the role of religion in the public sphere is shaped at least in part by the “generational pressures” of young urban intellectuals who are critical of the traditional state-marabout relationship, as well as the generational tensions within the powerful religious families themselves (131). As the relationship of the state and religious leaders continues to evolve, the threat of fundamentalist Islam may influence the direction of change. New political leaders, genuine democratic government, and a recent upturn in the economy will also influence the course and direction of the state-marabout relationship. Economic and social crisis is likely to reinforce the state-marabout interdependence, and provide both sides a good incentive to oppose more radical reformist Islamic movements.