RWANDA

Rwanda is populated by three ethnic groups; the Hutu are the largest group, followed by the Tutsis and the Twa, who are a small minority. Mentioning Rwanda tends to evoke images of extreme violence among these ethnic groups since the eve of independence, especially the horrific genocide of 1994.

Rwanda was a Belgian colony until it gained independence in July 1962, with Gregoire Kayibanda, the chairman of Party for the Emancipation of the Hutu People (PARMEHUTU) as its first president. Tutsi refugees, who had fled the country as a result of earlier ethnic violence, especially in 1959, began to conduct guerrilla attacks in 1963–64, and the government retaliated against Tutsis who remained in Rwanda. Periodic massacres of Tutsis continued through 1973, when a military coup established a single party government led by Major Juvenal Habyarimana and the Movement for National Revolution and Development (MRND), which supposedly extended membership to all Rwandans. But the unrest continued and a full-scale civil war broke out on the first of October 1990 between the MRND government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). “In response, the government adopted a new constitution in 1990 that recognized the multiple-party system, and the Arusha Peace Agreement was signed between the government of the Rwandan Republic and the RPF in 1992–1993” (Gahamanyi 2003: 253). However, opposition to that Agreement continued, including among elements within the MRND, culminating in the assassination of President Habyarimana on April 6, 1994, which marked the beginning of the genocide of Tutsis as well as Hutus deemed to be traitors for supporting the “enemies” of the Hutu majority.

That Transitional Government had to deal with the huge and delicate problems of recovery and reconstruction of the whole country, at a time when more than half the population had fled. A particularly delicate task was how to deal with the hundreds of thousands of Rwandans accused of participation in the genocide in a balanced and constructive way when the country lacked any level of human or institutional capacity in the administration of justice and related fields. Another major political issue was how to reintegrate Hutus in the government and army in the aftermath of the genocide. This process seems to have been reasonably successful, but perhaps a brief overview of the post-independence constitutional development of the country would be useful in evaluating the post-genocide phase in broader context.

The Constitution of November 1962 abolished the monarchy and established the republic on a parliamentary system in which the National Assembly could have a vote of no confidence in the president at any time. The constitution incorporated the rights provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but expressly made them subject to Rwandan law. The 1962 Constitution was amended in June 1963 to provide for universal suffrage in presidential elections and again in May 1973 to designate “democratic socialism” as the economic system; it extended the length of the presidential term in office from four to five years and to a maximum of three successive terms, and abolished the age limit (sixty years) for candidates in presidential elections.

The Constitution of December 1978 was enacted to incorporate changes that came as a result of the coup of July 5, 1973 which suspended the 1962 Constitution. The MRND (the Movement) was founded in 1976, and every Rwandan was deemed to be a member of it from birth. The 1978 Constitution also expressly established a one-party system under a presidential regime headed by a single person, required that only an MRND candidate could run for president, and permitted an unlimited number of consecutive presidential terms of office. The constitution abolished the Supreme Court and replaced it with the Supreme Judicial Council, which had to approve the president’s appointment and removal of judges. The president was the chairman of the Council and had complete control over its actions. The keynote speeches of the president and the bylaws of the Movement became more important than the constitution and the laws of the country (256).

In response to the civil war with the RPF, as noted earlier, and international pressure to democratize, the 1991 Constitution “was meant to guarantee democracy, eliminate the one-party system, and show a commitment to human rights. It established a virtually unlimited multiparty system; the only constraint on this new system was that monarchists remained banned (Article 7)” (257).

The 1995 Basic Act, which is the current constitution of Rwanda, incorporated the 1991 Constitution, the Arusha Peace Agreement of 1992–93, the RPF Declaration Relating to the Establishment of Institutions of July 1994, and the November 1994 Protocol Agreement concluded by all the political forces except the MRND on the establishment of national institutions. The Arusha Agreement was in fact a collection of texts, like the Nsele Cease-Fire Agreement, which provided for the establishment of the rule of law, based on national unity, democracy, pluralism, and the respect for human rights; the formation of a national army integrating government and RPF forces; and broad-based power sharing in the transitional government (259). To implement these principles, the Agreement superseded many sections of the 1991 Constitution but left unchanged the provisions on civil liberties, which were already reasonably good, if enforced. The Protocol Agreement on the Rule of Law sought to secure equality of all citizens before the law, and guarantee equal opportunity and nondiscrimination. It provides for the inalienable right of refugees to return home, and that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights are the basic principles of democracy. There is also the Protocol Agreement on Broad-Based Power Sharing, which defined the institutions required for the transition, instituted specialized committees, organized the various branches of government, and developed a political code of ethics binding on all political groups involved in the transition (260).

The RPF Declaration of July 17, 1994, also incorporated into the 1995 Basic Act, “reaffirmed the RPF’s commitment to the principles of establishing the rule of law, forming a national army open to all Rwandans, and power sharing in the transition government” (263). Another element of the Basic Act is the Protocol Agreement between the Political Powers which “confirms the partnership between the RPF and the other Rwandan political forces. It adopted the RPF’s July 17 declaration and distributed assembly seats evenly among the participating parties (thirteen seats each)” (264). Moreover, subsequent amendments to the Basic Act include the Basic Act Revision of January 1996, which allowed people without legal training to serve as judges on the lower courts because the genocide depleted the available lawyers and judges. The amendment was also intended to facilitate the operation of military tribunals to try those who participated in the genocide, both military and civilian. Retroactivity of law was also established to cover “acts and omissions which were not punishable at the time they were committed... if they were considered criminal in the light of the general legal principles recognized as such by the law of nations” (265).

Despite the tragedy of the genocide, difficulty of the transitional process, and the complexity of the present constitutional structure, Rwandan constitutionalism seems to be developing well. The president Paul Kagame and prime minister Charles Muligande, appointed in April 2000, were both democratically elected to their respective offices in August 2003, the first presidential elections since the 1994 genocide. Paul Kagame was reelected in the first round with 95.05 percent of the popular vote, and the other two candidates received 3.6 percent and 1.3 percent. Elections of the National Assembly were also held in September 2003. As indicated with other countries, the point of this review to provide a sense of the development of the constitutional democratic process, without attempting to offer an accurate political assessment of the situation.