Solution of Bicameral Conflicts
6.4.1 Detailed Provisions
Resolving conflicts in bicameral parliaments remains one of the key pillars of an effective Parliament. The table “Solutions of cameral conflicts” (Table 6.5) outlines various mechanisms of solutions that can be achieved.
6.4.2 Remarks
Legislative disagreements in bicameral systems can principally be resolved by two models: Either the unitary chamber (House of Representatives, National Assembly,
Table 6.5 | | Solution of bicameral conflicts
| Vetoing powers and mixed commissions | Budget and tax laws | Countries |
| Suspensive veto of “Federal Council” (“Bundesrat”): art. 42 par. 4 B-VG a; exceptionally approval by “Lander” (art. 42a B-VG) | Tax frame laws, tax laws and budget laws excluded from veto (art. 42 par. 5 B-VG) | Austria |
| Parity of participation in essential legislative matters (“symmetrical bicameralism”; sec. Chap. 1, Table 1.3), but limited participation in other matters (art. 78); “Consultative Parliamentary Commission” as mixed commission of deputies and Senators (art. 82) | Special procedures in finance and budget matters (Chap. II Rules of Procedure) | Belgium |
| “asymmetrical bicameralism”: proposal of a “joint committee” (“commission mixte paritaire”) may be accepted or rejected by a chamber, but finally the National Assembly may prevail (art. 45 par. 2, 3) | Special voting procedures for organic laws, constitutional amendments (art. 46), budget laws (art. 47) and financing of social security (art. 48) | France |
| Solution of disagreements between “Bundestag” and “Bundesrat” depends on nature of statute: “bills of objection” (“Einspruchsgesetze”) may be overridden by the Bundestag in a Mixed Joint Commission (“VermittlungsausschuB”); “bills of approval” can only be voted by consent of both chambers (art. 77, 78) b | Germany | |
| Equal bicameralism (“bicameralismo perfetto”): art. 70 par. 1 (only rudimentary regulation) | Italy | |
| Both houses may amend bill proposals but finally the Lower House of “Oireachtas” may prevail after a fictitious period of 180 days: art. 20 par. 3 | Ireland | |
| No express regulation of disagreement in constitution | Netherlands | |
| “Asymmetrical bicameralism”: Senate can endorse the bill, veto it or propose amendments: art. 80; veto must be overruled by an absolute majority or simplified majority after 2 months (art. 90 par. 2) c | Spain | |
| In case of disapproval by House of Lords the Commons may accept amendments; evoke the Parliaments Act Procedure or seek a compromise d | United Kingdom |
Table 6.5 (continued)
| Vetoing powers and mixed commissions | bgcolor=white>Budget and tax lawsCountries | |
| “Asymmetrical bicameralism”: Senate may accept bill, amend it or reject it within 30 days; Sejm may overrule amendments or veto of Senate with absolute majority of MP’s: art. 121 par. 3 | Poland e | |
| The Chamber which first adopts a bill may finally prevail after a rejection of the other Chamber: art. 77 par. 4, 5 f | Romania g | |
| “Equal bicameralism”: Federal Assembly (“Nationalrat”) and Council of States (“Standerat”) have equal competences: art. 156 par. 2; in case of disagreement a committee will strive for consensus; if still an disagreement exists a conciliation conference will propose a mediation proposal; also an extraordinary procedure exists h | Switzerland | |
| In case of conflict “mediation committee”, State Duma may finally overrule veto of Council of Federation (see Parliament, Table 1.3) | Mediation committee to propose solutions | Russia |
| Symmetrical bicameralism: Conference Committee may solve disputes between chambers (see Parliament, Table 1.3) | Conference Committee to solve conflicts | USA |
| Symmetrical bicameralism: approval by both chambers: (see Parliament, Table 1.3) | Canada | |
| Symmetrical bicameralism: Senate can approve, amend or reject bills; if after renewed reconsideration of House of representatives no consensus is reached Gov General may dissolve both Chambers; after that if disagreement continues he may convene a Joint Committee to solve the conflict: Part V, 53 par. 5 (see also Table 1.3) | Joint Committee to solve conflicts | Australia |
| Symmetrical bicameralism: Bills are sent for consideration to the other house which may approve, amend or reject; if disagreement continues, President may summon a joint meeting of both houses to propose a solution; Parliament may decide with an abs majority: art. 108 par. 1-4 | Joint Committee to solve conflicts | India |
Table 6.5 (continued)
| Vetoing powers and mixed commissions | Budget and tax laws | Countries |
| Equal participation in legislative process; in case of lasting disagreement a Mediation Committee may propose solution: Sec. 70 par. 3; 71 | Mediation Committee to solve conflicts | Pakistan |
| Asymmetrical bicameralism: Senate may approve, amend or reject bill; veto of Senate can be overruled by Diet with a 2/3 majority: art. 59 par. 2 | Also a Mediation Committee may be requested to solve disagreements: art. 59 par. 3 | Japan |
| Symmetrical bicameralism: only approval by both houses: Sec. 81 | Solution by joint sittings of both houses of National Assembly: Sec. 137 par. 3 | Thailand |
| Bills must be approved by both chambers; if veto 2/3 majority must be reached in each chamber: art. 81 (“symmetrical bicameralism”) | Argentina | |
| Amendments by the other chamber can be approved by abs majority: of originating chamber: art. 163.6; in case of disagreement between the chambers plenary of “Plurinational Assembly” (both chambers) can decide with abs majority of members: art. 163.7 (“symmetrical bicameralism”) | Bolivia | |
| Bills must be approved by both chambers; if rejected by other chamber dismissal of bill: art. 65 (“symmetrical bicameralism”) | Brazil | |
| Veto of one chamber can be overruled by another chamber with 2/3 majority; (“symmetrical bicameralism”) | Mixed Commission may find solution in case of disagreements: art. 70,71 | Chile |
| Amendments may be proposed by 2/3 majority in the reviewing chamber and accepted with the same majority in the originating chamber: art. 72 par. 1 lit d; if no agreement between both chambers no reintroduction in the same legislative session; approval of both houses after 2 review procedures needed: art. 72 par. 1 lit.d; (“symmetrical bicameralism”) | Mexico | |
| In case of differences Prime Minister may call a mixed committee of equal members of both houses to propose a solution; if disagreement persists People’s Nat Ass has the overriding vote: art. 138 par. 6, 8 (“asymmetrical bicameralism”) | Algeria |
Table 6.5 (continued)
| Vetoing powers and mixed commissions | Budget and tax laws | Countries |
| Senate may adopt, amend or reject the bill; Nat Assembly may overrule veto of Senate with an abs majority: art. 29 c.1.; if this fails a joint parity commission may seek a proposal; if the latter is not adopted by both houses the final vote of national Assembly prevails: art. 29 c.2. (“asymmetrical bicameralism”) | Cameroon | |
| If no consensus of both chambers is reached Prime Minister may call a “Mixed Parity Commission” (“Commission Mixte Paritaire”) to propose a solution; if disagreement continues after a new reading in both houses vote of National Assembly is prevailing (“asymmetrical bicameralism”): art. 150 par. 2 | Special voting procedures for organic laws: art. 151; involvement of “Constitutional Council” | Congo |
| No conciliation procedure expressly entrenched for ordinary laws, but for financial and appropriation bills a “joint committee” may be installed; the proposal needs the consensus of both houses: art. 59 par. 2,3 (“symmetrical bicameralism”) | >Joint Committee for conciliation in financial matters | Nigeria |
| If bill is amended or rejected by one Chamber a complicated Mediation Procedure takes place depending on the legislative subjects: Sec. 73 (“symmetrical bicameralism”) | “Mediation Committee” of members of Nat Assembly and Nat Council seeks a solution and must be approved by both houses or bill lapses | South Africa |
a The Austrian system is structured by “asymmetrical bicameralism”, see Chap. 1, Table 1.4 b Short description at Weber (2019), p. 92
c The Congress as democratically elected unitary chamber thus prevails against the chamber of territorial representation, Weber (2019), p. 95
d The whole procedure is a “matter purely of custom and tradition” as Loveland (2014), p. 179 puts it
e This type of solution of conflicts also applies to the Czech Republic where the veto of the Senate can be overruled by an absolute majority of Parliament (art. 47)
f One may speak here of a “split or reverse symmetrical bicameralism”
g The Bulgarian Constitution provides for 2 readings, the Albanian Constitution for 3 readings, see Weber (2019), p. 97
h Regulation in the “Parliaments Act”
Commons) prevails by overriding the veto of the upper House or second chamber which here is described as “asymmetrical bicameralism” or both chambers have equal power of participation in the legislative process which necessitates a mediating committee to propose a solution for the bicameral conflict (“symmetrical bicameralism”). Equal or symmetrical bicameralism is not only known in Europe (Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, partly Germany for “Bills of Approval”) but also practiced in USA, Canada, Australia, Asia (India, Pakistan, Thailand), Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico) or Africa (Nigeria, South Africa). The dissolution of conflicts may also be made dependant on the subject matter (e.g. for financial matters, USA, UK) or be more differentiated according to the matters prescribed (for a sophisticated model see e.g. South Africa).
There is no a priori legitimate model for solving legislative dissensus between Houses of Parliament but the equal participation of legislative matters in strongly regionalized states (e.g. Italy, Belgium) or large federalized states (e.g. USA, Canada, Australia, India, Nigeria, Brazil) may better respect and protect territorial, economic and cultural differences thus contributing to the vertical distribution of powers and strengthening democracy (see Chap. 1: Unicameral or Bicameral Parliaments and also Chap. 16: Budget, finance and central banks, in particular Table 16.7).
6.5