THE CONSTITUTION OF 1973, as we have seen from the previous chapter, was birthed afresh to redress grievances long fostered against military and centralised rule under Ayub.

This Constitution mandated parliamentary democracy based upon universal suffrage, and direct elections as the form of government. In what is now the fourth decade of this Constitution’s existence, radical discontinuity imposed through recurrent military rule and executive consolidation has reshaped the structure of government anticipated by its drafters.

From this chapter onwards, a topical rather than linear account of constitutional development in Pakistan is presented. However, the haziness that attends the project of describing governmental structure, what many consider to be the core attribute of constitutionalism, requires that the identification of the major disjunctive events of these last few decades be undertaken at the outset. The first major event was the sei­zure of the state by General Zia in 1977, his suspension of the Consti­tution until 1985, when it was restored in an altered, quasi-presidential form. Zia sought legitimacy, importantly, in the promotion of Islam and thereby reshaped the political sphere, including by way of divid­ing the electorate on the basis of faith. In almost direct emulation, in 2002 General Musharraf resurrected the Constitution in a form similar to that earlier contrived by Zia. As opposed to Zia’s Islamic reforma­tion, Musharraf’s choice of legitimating rubrics, including anti-Islamic militancy, anti-corruption and a technocratic developmentalism also impacted the realm of electoral politics. As discussed in this and the following chapter, the mimetic cycle between these military rulers was not exclusive to them but also influenced the actions of civilian politi­cians who either shared power with, or defiantly sought to insulate their power from, military actors.

A set of constitutional revisions enacted in 1985 went to the bone of parliamentary structure by including the President amongst the institutions of Parliament’s composition.

Importantly, the recurrence of military takeovers has impacted on— but not displaced—the electoral arena of representative politics. In all episodes of military rule, regimes have sought legitimation through elections and the establishment of assemblies so that the political arena has not itself been closed down for very long. Rather, the elaborate regulation of political parties and politicians has been aimed at redraw­ing the political terrain to bring it into alignment with central control. Resort to such mechanisms is not the exclusive preserve of military regimes, and governing parties have also engaged the apparatus of the state in seeking to curtail or bar the activities of rival politicians and parties. However, through challenges to such mechanisms of control, the judicial elaboration of foundational political rights has slowly defined a protected realm of recognition and immunities for political actors.

As a formally more autonomous political sphere takes shape, the nature of political contests is also changing. For instance, the conduct of elections is increasingly challenged and subjected to judicial review While the drive to make elections conform to principles of fair play is an important one, it is looked at here in the context of another per­ceptible shift in political practice. This is the marked narrowing that has happened in terms of the class of persons who contest and win electoral office, as well as the limitations of any meaningful political programmes and choice for the poor in particular.

I.