Vague Identity
In ‘Can there be vague objects?' [42] Gareth Evans interprets the question of whether there could be vague objects as a question concerning whether there could be borderline identity statements: true statements of the form V a = b.
As Evans formulates it, the claim at hand involves applying a propositional borderlineness operator to a statement; it is therefore a claim one can perfectly well understand on the present theory of vagueness, although it is not the sort of thing a linguistic theorist can straightforwardly make sense of. Note that if Evans' characterization of vague objects is correct, then it may be possible to define a vague object in terms of the propositional notion of vagueness and the identity relation, eliminating the need for a primitive notion of a vague object.Care must be taken here to distinguish Evans' thesis from the following linguistic claim: there can be sentences of the form ‘a = b' such that it is borderline whether they are true (i.e. it is borderline whether they express a truth). The latter is possible even if there are no vague objects: it could, for example, be vague which precise object the name ‘Princeton' refers but not (as) vague which precise object ‘Princeton Borough' refers to, so that it is borderline which proposition ‘Princeton = Princeton Borough' expresses. In particular, it is borderline whether this sentence expresses a false proposition (stating the identity of two distinct geographical regions) or a true proposition (stating the identity of two identical geographical regions). So, it is borderline whether this identity sentence expresses a truth, even on the assumption that all the relevant objects are precise. 
that there are no vague objects? That is, could there be vague objects even if there were no vague identities?
The question may be terminological to an extent: I would venture to say that we have little pretheoretic grip on the notion of a vague object, so the answers to such questions will be partly shaped by whether there is a reasonably systematic theory that brings together the various theses people associate with the idea.
But I think we can at minimum agree that the existence of vague identities is at least one way for there to be vague objects, if not the only one.16.3