Beyond Homo oeconomicus

Despite differences in theoretical approaches, one thing in particular unites most contemporary economists: the renewed interest in the problem of anthropological premisses in economic discourse.

Contemporary economic theory tries to overcome neoclassical main­stream precisely in defining the discipline’s ontological assumptions. Nowadays there is a tendency to admit that individuals may be endowed with bounded rationality, endogenous preferences, incomplete information, multiple selves and heterogeneous motivations. And precisely because of this, it is acknowledged that there is no sense in reducing economics to a pseudo-psychology of optimizing behaviours. Since man is a finite and limited being, his conduct is impossible to understand if abstracted from the institutions, cultures, values, ethical norms and, ultimately, the social relations that go into his make up.

This awakening of scientific courage originates from a dual set of factors. On the one hand, it appears that anthropological reductionism is largely responsible for economics being unable to grasp the enormous problems afflicting our society: the increase in economic and social inequalities, environmental decay, the tendency for democracy to hollow out, the spread of oppression in politics, the increase in social marginalization, lost sense of interpersonal relations, mass unemployment, exploitation, and alienation.

The current trend is comparable to intellectual migration. And as with most migrations, this too appears to be moved by push and pull forces: by dissatisfaction with the existing scientific system and by the hope that opening up to a wider philosophical horizon will fortify research. Needless to say, any attempt to exceed the limits of mainstream reductionism will be successful only if it is not restricted to correcting one aporia or another: it must show that it is able to come to grips with reality.

But there is more to it than this. Traditional economic theory tends to ignore anything that is not objectively observable in human conduct— emotions, beliefs, values, symbolic representations, which are all thought to be of little significance in understanding economic actions. Only the results of actions are believed to be of interest to economic science. This philo­sophical position is often justified by the view that the economic agent reigns sovereign in a market economy and is therefore free to express any type of preference of which the economist may be unaware. Therefore, once the simplest hypothesis has been formulated, namely, that an individual tends to maximize his objective function, there is no need to worry about the motivations or the dispositions underlying his choices.

From this derives an unjustified minimalist justification of consequen- tialism as an ethical-political doctrine. Unjustified because Occam’s razor, while being a valid heuristic instrument, cannot be used to build the foun­dations of ethics and politics. In point of fact, this justification makes an attempt surreptitiously to push a strong and far from obvious philosophical position.

But now the emperor has no clothes. No longer does anyone believe that the choice of individualism is dictated by considerations of empirical significance or analytical convenience or that it is only methodological individualism. We have finally come to understand that the posit of individualism is, after all, an ontological assertion and, as such, must be justified on philosophical grounds. But on this ground it has never been validly justified by modernist economic orthodoxy.

Lastly, the anthropological reductionism of mainstream theory is viewed with suspicion by an increasing number of economists, not least because it carries with it a certain amount of responsibility for political and economic choices which are more or less implicitly justified by it. And it is now evident that precisely political and economic choices, and not ‘nature’, nor least of all, ‘human nature’, are responsible for many of the evils of the contem­porary world.

Scientific research entails responsibilities and risks which, particularly in the case of social sciences, come under ethics and politics. Nowadays, nobody believes that ‘analysis’ can be separated from ‘visions’. We know that economic theories are not neutral instruments of pure knowledge. They are not neutral, since fact judgements cannot be separated from value jud­gements, but always express particular points of view which conceal (often quite ably) particular interests. They are not of pure knowledge because ideas change people’s minds and, consequently, the world. Theories on man’s behaviour contribute to his construction.

This is why we are pleased to see Babel developments in contemporary economic science. We do not know where this scientific revolution will lead us. But we do know what we are leaving behind. And we believe that overcoming Homo oeconomicus reductionism is a necessary step in anti­cipation of the reconstruction of an economic science of which we must not be ashamed. In the words of the sage:

A man who is a mathematician and no more than a mathematician [... ] harms no-one. An economist who is no more than an economist is a danger for his fellow men. Economics is not a thing on its own; it is the study of an aspect of the life of man in society [... ] The economist of tomorrow (and sometimes of today) will certainly be aware of what to ground his economic advice on; but if [... ] his economic knowledge is detached from any background of social philosophy, he runs a real risk of becoming a cheat, capable of implementing enterprising stratagems to find his way out of difficulties, but incapable of staying in contact with those fundamental virtues on which a sound society is founded. Modern economic science is subject to a real risk of Machiavellianism: the treatment of social problems as mere technical issues and not as an aspect of the general quest for the Good Life. (Hicks, 1941, pp. 6-7).