From Social Satisfaction Maximization to Welfare: Walras’s Specific Conception of Individuals

At this stage of our contribution, it is time to investigate more thor­oughly the determinants of individual behavior in Walras's economics. We noted that in relation with their moral personalities, Walrasian agents were “reasonable and free.” This does not mean however that Walras accepted what he called the approach of “spiritualism”:

According to spiritualism, man deliberates, decides and only acts according to his free will, his acts can only be imputed to him and he is personally liable for them.

To this “spiritualist” approach, Walras opposed his own “rationalist” conception:

For rationalism, in contrast, man deliberates, decides and only acts partly accord­ing to his own will and in a complete freedom; but he also decides in relation with the social conditions which influence his own will and in relation with an unavoid­able necessity; his acts are partially imputable to him personally but they are also imputable to the community or the social collectivity which he is a member of; therefore, he is personally responsible for his acts but he is also collectively and commonly responsible [italics added] (Pour le rationalisme, au contraire, l'homme delibere, se resout et agit, pour une part seulement, en raison de sa volonte propre, et dans une liberte absolue, et, pour une autre part, en raison des conditions sociales dans lesquelles sa volonte s'exerce, et sous l'empire d'une necessite inevitable; ses actes lui sont, en partie, imputables personnellement, mais ils sont aussi, en partie, imputables a la communaute ou a la collectivite sociale dont il est membre; il en est, en partie responsable personnellement, mais il en est aussi, en partie, responsable en commun ou collectivement [italics added]).

Within this approach therefore individuals provide the foundations of society but society also influences individuals (Walras, 1896/1990: 82).

It is however necessary to go further if we wish to understand how the agent's individual will and social conditions of life are combined by Walras to generate economic behavior. Walras first clearly rejects what he calls Tindividualisme absolu, soit materialiste, soit spiritualiste” (Walras, 1896/ 1990: 82). His “rationalism” implies a conception of the society and the economy where it is impossible to consider the “ocean” as the mere “sum of the life of the water drops which it includes” (Walras, 1896/1990: 83):

We must call an individual a man considered independently from the society which he belongs to or each moral person living out a destiny which is independent from all other ones.

And we must call general social conditions the society considered independ­ently from the men who constitute it or in other words the social environment of individual activity. But it is easy to argue that these two first terms imply the introduction of two other ones.

The first is the state which is the natural and necessary agent representing the institution of social general conditions. This definition of the state implies that it is supposed to represent the set of all moral persons who live out connected and interdependent destinies.

Finally we must call specific personal positions the natural and necessary result of individual activity when it takes place in the environment of social general conditions.

(Il faut appeler individu l’homme considere abstraction faite de la societe a laquelle il appartient, ou chaque personne morale envisagee comme accomplissant une destinee independante de toutes les autres.

Et il faut appeler conditions sociales generales la societe consideree abstrac­tion faite des hommes dont elle est formee, autrement dit, le milieu social de l’activite individuelle.

En effet, il faut appeler Etat l’agent naturel et necessaire de Tinstitution des conditions sociales generales. Ainsi defini, l’Etat representera Tensemble de toutes les personnes morales envisagees comme accomplissant des destinees solidaires les unes des autres.

Et enfin, il faut appeler positions personnelles particulieres le resultat naturel et necessaire de Tactivite de Tindividu s’exerqant dans le milieu des conditions sociales generales.) (Walras, 1896/1990: 134)

This quotation from Walras’s Etudes d'Economie Sociale needs to be clarified. We first find again the notion of “personne morale.” Let us come back once more to Walras’s methodological foundations in his Cours d'Economie Sociale. The division of labor and the existence of a “personne morale” are the two “natural facts” “which provide simultan­eously the dual foundation of all the humanitarian facts” (Walras and Walras, 1870/1996: 118).

Division of labor defines what Walras called “l’homme physiologique” (Walras and Walras, 1870/1996: 121) and concerns the division of labor as “the first and unavoidable condition of his existence and subsistence” (120).

Division of labor is thus a natural necessity and not the result of some form of rational choice. How can we then characterize the notion of “personnalite morale”? Moral personality implies three human psy­chological faculties: sensibility, intelligence and will. These faculties generate enjoyable and esthetic love for sensibility; understand­ing and reason for intelligence; freedom for will (Walras and Walras, 1870/1996: 123).

Let us here focus on reason and freedom. For our author, freedom is not a philosophical but a scientific concept:

We shall mention freedom as the chemist mentions atoms and molecules without assuming for it the metaphysical value of mind as well as the meta­physical value of matter (Nous parlerons de liberte comme le chimiste parle d'atomes et de molecules sans plus affirmer pour cela la valeur metaphysique de l'esprit que l'on affirmera la valeur metaphysique de la matiere).

Now, observation and experience show that two elements explain the contents of human freedom. The first was already stressed: in relation with their moral personalities, Walrasian agents were “reasonable and free”; and this reasonable and free will is related to what Walras called the “positions personnelles particulieres.” The second is related to social education and learning and to the influence of the social context, namely to what is called the “conditions sociales generales” by Walras.

This characterization of human behavior is somewhat surprising since it explicitly refers to two different causes that are entirely distinct and not to one which could be identified as individual and rational choice theory. This clearly means that Walras rejected pure methodological individualism. To better understand the reasons of this rejection, let us consider successively both these causes.

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