A Hybrid Strategy for Well-Being

Now, let us leave the dichotomy between welfarism and non-welfarism, and try to assess Pigou’s overall welfare idea in the light of another modern viewpoint in the theory of well-being.

Suzumura (1999) has argued that subjective satisfaction is not a pertinent index for people’s well-being; however, the state of affairs seems more complicated. As Pigou stated, maximum satisfaction is not necessarily associated with maximum good, because some kinds of satisfaction, even though we prefer another kind, may do more good. However, Pigou men­tions that there remains some ambiguity regarding that view (Pigou 1922,7). Suppose we have two options: a classical concert or a drinking spree, then it is objectively considered more desirable to prefer the enjoyment of the former to that of the latter. However, if a certain person dislikes the former and loves the latter, is it still better for them to go to the concert, rather than on a drinking spree? Are we to contend that certain preferences or actions, regardless of actual preference, are judged as categorically good or right?

Pigou (1922, 7) gives the following answer: As long as the person does not recognize beforehand that the concert is good and the drinking spree is bad, to prefer the latter is good. However, if he recognizes this and still prefers the latter, his choice should be judged as wrong (still, this reasoning presumes that the consequence of his choice will not affect others. Essentially, Pigou assumes that if a choice affects others, the choice should be somehow regulated). Unsubstantiated as it may seem, Pigou’s argument makes some important and interesting points regarding the modern ac­count of well-being.^[35] In the theory of well-being, what is generally identi­fied with well-being should matter.

According to Griffin and Sumner’s classification, the former comprises hedonism, desire, or preference satisfaction, while the latter includes needs, function, capability, and perfectionism (there are more concepts besides these that can be classified into either category). Viewed in terms of this classification, Pigou’s position regarding well-being will prove to be interesting. His account of well-being can be placed in both categories, since his concept includes mental states, desire satisfaction, and need satisfaction approaches.

4.3.1 Mental States Approach

Pigou’s early writings state that intrinsic good is limited only to ‘states of conscious life’. However, Pigou’s concept of good should be separ­ated from the classical utilitarian concept (Bentham or Sidgwick), since he admits that his notion of good includes multiple elements, such as pleasure, happiness, character, virtue, ethical personality, etc., which is evidently contrary to the classical view that the only good thing is pleasure. Still, both concepts can be placed in the same category in the sense that intrinsic good is only a mental state and every other thing can merely be instrumentally valuable.

4.3.2 Desire Satisfaction Approach

As demonstrated by his concept of economic welfare, Pigou sometimes takes a desire-satisfaction approach to well-being (interestingly, Sumner (1996, 114-16) features Pigou in the context of desire satisfac­tion). To be certain, he evidently recognizes that satisfaction of a certain degree of desire does not necessarily assume any correspond­ing degree of goodness. However, to put it the other way around, with a certain qualification, the correspondence between desire and good can be admitted.

4.3.3 Need Satisfaction Approach

As has been already argued, Pigou stresses the importance of the need satisfaction criterion, in various forms. For instance, ‘more urgent needs’, ‘needed even more than... wanted’ (Pigou 1937, 21, 23), ‘satisfaction of primary needs’, ‘individual’s needs’, ‘a normal working man’s need’ (Pigou 1912, 11, 401), ‘for urgent needs’ (Pigou 1935, 120-1), ‘to meet the min­imum needs of all’ (Pigou 1952, 210), ‘objective needs’ (Pigou 1955, 80), ‘various competing needs’ (Pigou 1932, 759), ‘spiritual needs’ (Pigou 1951, 287), and ‘reasonable needs’ (Pigou 1914, 55). We can regard the following statement as summarizing this point.

Moreover, while there is a presumption that people, if their choice is left free, will spend their money more effectively than if they are interfered with, this presump­tion is sometimes wrong. What they want most is not always what they need most. They may not, for example, be inclined to spend as much money on hygienic housing or on education as in their own interest they ‘ought’ to do. (Pigou 1952, 158; italics in the original)

Thus, although his basic principle is welfarism, Pigou has adopted the three different approaches to augmenting people’s well-being: the mental states, desire satisfaction, and need satisfaction approaches.

Next, relying on Griffin’s exposition (1986), let us reconstruct Pigou’s strategy for well-being enhancement as follows.^[36] First, since his argument employs both desire and need criteria, and the latter is given priority over the former, Pigou’s theory appears as ‘quite attractive’.^[37] Additionally, from his contention that ‘[i]f a citizen can afford to attain to it in all departments, the State cares nothing that he would prefer to fail in one’ (Pigou 1932, 759; emphasis added), it is understandable that he does not admit mere desire or preference satisfaction, but pursues the enforcement of the minimum (need satisfaction) somewhat paternalistically from an objective perspective.

However, following the earlier argument, although preference for the classical concert is generally regarded as better than that of a drinking spree, to prefer the latter may admittedly be right depending on certain individuals’ particular preference (e.g. drinking lovers). The former case is objective in the sense of being generally recognized, while the latter is subjective based on a particular individual’s predisposition. In general, the need-satisfaction approach regards the essence of well­being as endowing people with objectively valuable things regardless of their subjective preferences. Still, Pigou admits the ultimate super­iority of the subjective approach over the objective one but with certain qualifications. These qualifications are probably being well-educated, healthy, well-fed, and well-situated, that is, independently mature,

Table 4.1 A hybrid Strategyfor well-being

which can be summarized into his notion of ‘the capacity for enjoy­ment’. This capacity, he claims, largely depends on circumstantial and educational conditions, and hence, can be trained and enhanced for one to be considered mature.

To summarize this, suppose there are two characters: a person and the omnipotent observer (or, what we call the ethical observer). At first, the person satisfies their preference (say, for example, drinking) and obtains a certain happiness. However, from the perspective of the omnipotent observer, the person has not been educated nor well enough conditioned. Therefore, to modify their preference, the omnipotent helps the person detach themselves from such a seemingly degrading practice, and under­take some educational training.

Coincidentally, the structure based on the reinterpretation of Pigou’s work seems to correspond to Griffin’s theory of prudential good for individ­uals. Griffin (1986, ch. 3) also shows the process: from bare desire to objective needs and finally to informed desire. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that Pigou’s well-being concept traverses both the subjective and objective spheres, and moreover, that it encourages the cultivation of people’s internal capacities and tastes (we may call it a three-layered welfare strategy). In terms of modern well-being theory, Pigou’s theory may be interpreted as one of the preceding examples of ‘hybrid’ theories regarding subjectivism and objectivism in welfare account (cf. Sumner 1996, 54).

If this reinterpretation of Pigou’s welfare theory is valid, what evaluation can be conferred on his welfare theory? For instance, a modern philoso­pher, Sumner (1996, ch. 2) asserts that one of the most essential aspects of sound welfare theory is that of being subjective; hence, any objective theories would be ultimately refused because, based on the notion of ‘life satisfaction’ (i.e. the entire assessment of one’s total life), any value should be reducible to each subjective satisfaction or recognition of one’s life faring well. Mill also admits that happiness is ultimately subjective. Alternatively, with a critical remark, such as ‘utility is simply the subjective vindication of individual advantages’ (Suzumura 1999, 121), we can take another approach (non-welfarism). Although we are somehow capable of understanding each other’s condition objectively, if the condition is ultim­ately found to be unsatisfactory and we thereby feel our lives are not faring well, what assessment should we confer to the objective approach? How can we demonstrate its validity? This is the point that Pigou’s discussion makes - whatever non-welfarist approach we employ, if the final and overall outcomes were unsatisfying according to people’s perception, the significance of the approach would be considerably diminished, although not completely.

4.4