Index

Accounting firms, 148, 160-61, 208, 219-20, 275n.24, 280n.l0. See also Auditing

Acquisitions, of firms, 216, 277n.l5, 280n.6. See also Firm-market boundary

Adverse selection, 114-16, 174, 193, 207, 231-32, 235.

Affected interests principle, 241-42 Albert, Michael, 266n. 10

Alchian, Armen, 101-4, 106-8, 122-23 Alienability, right of, 135, 151, 246-47 Alienation, 28-29, 46, 244, 267n.24. See also Commodity fetishism absence of, in market socialism,

51- 52, 56, 62, 63, 182, 261, 281n.4 in free enterprise systems, 29, 50-51 Alternatives, 85-92, 277n.6. See also

Exploitation

lack of, under market socialism, 180 no-real-alternatives condition, 86-89, 162

Arneson, Richard, 277n.l0

Asset specificities, 116-21, 137-40, 169.

See also Quasi-rents human, 158-61, 164

Assets, valuation of, 199-200 exploitation through, 219-21

Auditing, 208

of cooperatives, 219-21, 235

of corporations, 148

Banks, under market socialism, 48, 54, 199, 222

Barzel, Yoram, 109-10, 133-35

Behavioral assumptions. See Opportunism; Rationality

Board of directors, 94-95, 98-99, 137, 141, 148-50, 208-12, 245 monitoring of, 149, 275nn.25-27, 280n.l0

Bondholders. See Debtholders

Boss, the, 98, 136

Brenkert, George, 85

Buchanan, Allen, 264n.l2

Burden of proof. See also Economic systems

of critics of economic systems, 19-21, 27-29

of defenders of economic systems, 21

Bureaucracy. See Hierarchy; Organizations

Business cycle, 18, 41, 53, 156-57

Buyouts, leveraged. See Debt financing

Capital, human, 158-61, 164. Seealso

Asset specificities; Unions

Capital providers, 98-99, 109, 134-36, 141-46, 207, 243. See also Classical capitalist firm; Cooperative; Corporation

in Mondragon, 167-68

Capital requirements, large. See Corporation

Capital reserve fund, 47, 62, 63, 99, 175, 199, 202-3

Capital, social ownership of, 212-13.

forms of, 8-10, 44, 234-54

in the worker control-state ownership model, 47-50, 175-76, 218-19, 260

Capital usage fee, 278-79n.24

and exploitation, 218-21

Capital usage fee (cont.)

and new investment, 53, 97

and social ownership, 47-49, 53, 59, 62-63, 99, 175

CapitalismZsocialism dispute, 1-5, 232-33 economic issues in, 15-16, 23-26, 231-33

philosophical issues in, 13, 16, 25-26, 59, 64

Capitalist economic system. See Free enterprise system

Capitalization, of decisions, 135-36, 196

Central contracting agent, 98, 106, 108-9, 130-34, 271n.9. See also Classical capitalist firm; Cooperative

Central planning. See Planning Ceterisparibusclauses, 110-11, 264n.l9 Classical capitalist firm, 216, 249, 253, 278nn. 18,21

capital provision in, 94, 98, 134-35, 200-201

central contracting agent in, 130-34, 194 defined, 94-95, 98, 127, 272n.5 director of the firm’s product in, 133-34, 194

explanation of, 106-11, 126-36 monitoring in, 106-9, 122-23, 127-35, 188-92, 194

residual claimancy in, 98, 106, 108-10, 132-36, 196-97, 201 ultimate decision-making authority in, 98, 135, 141-46, 201

Coase, Ronald, 101-2, 137

Cohen, G. A., 58-59, 67, 85, 268n.3

Commodity fetishism, 50, 56 absence of, in market socialism,

52- 54, 62, 63 evils of, 53

Competition, 83, 122-24, 140. See also Efficiency; Free enterprise system; Markets

competitive process, 38-39, 73 perfect, 73-74

Contribution. See also Entrepreneur; Exploitation; Inequality; Workers of the capitalist and the worker, 57-58, 67-68, 70

distinguished from the value thereof, 69-70

economic value of, 70-74, 76-80,

87-88, 157, 176, 178, 184, 275n.32, 277n.9, 282n.l4

Cooperative, worker, 99, 165-69, 253-54, 266n.l7, 271n.7, 277n.ll. See also Equity ownership;

Investment; Market socialist economic system; State; Workers capital provision in, 198-203, 207,

211-13, 236-40, 243, 246-48, 279n.28

central contracting agent in, 193-95, 210-11

director of the firm’s product in,

193-95, 210-11

equity ownership of, 234-46, 281n.7 expansion and contraction of,

181-84, 235, 250

as a form of social ownership, 9, 46,

63, 93-94, 175, 240-41 formation of new, 186, 222, 250-51,

253

managers in, 175-76, 193-98,

206-15, 278n.l7

mandated under market socialism,

96 monitoring in, 187-96, 206-15,

235-36, 279n.l

residual claimancy in, 99, 175, 177, 181, 184-85, 191, 193, 201, 204, 207, 211-13, 234

self-management in, 46, 49, 51, 62,

63, 175, 236-38, 244, 260, 279n.28, 281n.4 stability and instability of, 236-37,

239, 271n.4

ultimate decision-making authority in, 98-99, 167, 175-77, 181, 184-85, 189-91, 193, 201, 207, 212, 216, 247, 280n.6

valuation of assets in, 199-200, 202 workers’ councils in, 165, 206-14, 245-47

Corporation, closed, 95, 125-26, 152.

See also Board of directors

Corporation, highly leveraged, 145-46 Corporation, multidivisional, 125, 151-52, 216

Corporation, open, 136-53, 196. See also Free enterprise system

as a bulwark against exploitation, 138-40

capital providers in, 141-46, 272n.4 capital requirements of, 136-40, 146

defined, 94-95, 98-99, 125, 136-37 entrepreneurship in, 147 equity ownership in, 141-51, 185, 207, 212-14

liability to execution of debt, 143-46, 151

management in, 146-50, 215 monitoring in, 147-51, 230 residual claimancy in, 140-52, 185 ultimate decision-making authority

in, 95, 98-99, 141-46, 216 Councils, workers’. See Cooperative Counterfactual conditionals, 122-23

Debt financing, 126, 239, 247-48, 252-53. See also Quasi-equity ownership

in the open corporation, 145-46, 216, 230, 272n.4, 274n.21, 274-75n.22, 282n.l0

Debt, liability to execution of, 135-36, 142-44, 153

as negative residuals, 144 Debtholders, 143, 212, 221, 238-39

contrasted with equity owners, 99 Decision control, 148-49, 152 Decision management, 149, 152 Decision-making authority. See Ultimate decision-making authority

Demsetz, Harold, 106-9, 122-23, 149, 275n.26

Depreciation fund. See Capital reserve fund

Desert, 67, 197-98, 224, 260, 278n.22, 282n.l4. See also Reciprocity

Director of the firm’s product, 98, 133-35. See also Classical capitalist firm; Cooperative; Corporation; Entrepreneur

Dreze₁Jacques, 277n.ll

Economic growth, state control of, 48, 53, 218, 241-42, 249, 255. See also Investment

Economic issues in the capitalism/social­ism dispute, 16, 23-26, 231-33, 263nn.l,8

Economic systems, 4-5, 22, 196-97, 232-33, 266nn.10-11. Seealso Free enterprise system; Market socialist economic system; Socialism complete defense of, 29-30 criticisms of, 27-29, 31, 232,

264nn.ll,14, 264-65n.24 differences between free enterprise and market socialist, 93-97 and exploitation, 97, 99-100, 169-71, 173-75, 217

limited defense of, 23-24, 31, 38-42 stout defense of, 30-31 type-defining features of, 23-31, 93 well-motivated, 32, 232-33

Economics.

Efficiency, economic, 266n.l0. See also Exploitation; Free enterprise system; Markets; Transactions cost efficiencies and inefficiencies connection with exploitation, 91-92 and evolution of organizations, 103-6, 110-11, 215

Ofhierarchies, 101-2, 131 presumption of, 105, 122 as a social virtue, 42-43

Ellerman, David, 236, 238-43, 281nn.5-7, 285nn.5-8

Empirical data

on bailouts, 222-23

on capital consumption, 204-5 on debt-equity ratios, 274-75n.22 on income differentials, 177-78 role and relevance of, 124, 167, 169

Employment relation, 126, 149, 154-56, 158, 163. See also Workers

Entrepreneur, 98, 162, 182-84, 246, 249, 253. See also Central contract­ing agent; Director of the firm’s product; Market mechanism; Profits

in the classical capitalist firm, 109, 111, 133-35

contribution of, 76-77, 81-84 in the corporation, 141, 147 in market socialism, 186-87, 194-98, 211, 236, 239, 243-44

Equality of material condition, 13, 26, 27, 59, 62, 242, 249, 254, 259. See also Inequality

explanation for, in a market socialist system, 60-61, 63, 255-57

Equity ownership, 95, 141-46, 148, 191, 201, 254. See also Corporation; Exploitation; Quasi-equity owner­ship

of cooperatives, 234-46, 281n.7

as a cushion for debtholders, 145, 212, 221, 239, 248, 250, 252, 257

vs. debt financing, 145-46, 272n.4, 274n.21, 274-75n.22, 282n.l0

defined, 98, 136, 273n.l2

in Mondragon, 167, 238-39 transactions cost efficiencies of, 144, 205, 212, 214

Estrin, Saul, 50-51, 61, 186, 250-53, 267n.20, 277n.l2, 282n.9

Evolution. See Organizational forms Exchanges. See also Contribution;

Markets

fair, 74, 76-77, 79-82, 84, 88-90, 265nn.l0,ll, 270n.l4

on the leading edge of markets in transition, 76-77, 83-84, 157 Exploitation, economic, 87, 90-92, 134-35, 180, 258-60, 268nn.32,2, 268-69n.5, 269n.l2, 270nn. 17,20. See also Alternatives; Employment relation; Expropriation hazards; Quasi-rents; Reciprocity

abolition of, 59, 62, 63

in the absence of alternative organiza­tional forms, 168, 217, 232-33

in the absence of equity ownership, 141-46, 201-5, 211-13, 223, 253-54

as the appropriation of quasi-rents, 120-21, 127-28, 278-79n.24

of capital providers, 144, 198-205, 219-21, 279n.27

ofcustomers, 186, 250, 280n.ll determinants of, 170-71, 259-60 of equity owners by managers, 146-47, 150, 230, 239, 244

and the firm-market boundary, 138-39

forcing, as a condition of, 85, 268n.31, 270n.l7

in a free enterprise system, 183, 188, 276n.37, 280n.ll

and full state ownership, 243-44 general conditions for, 111-17, 169-70, 174-75

through holding companies, 252-53 ofmanagers, 195, 197, 210, 237, 239, 243-44

Marxist charge of, 17, 19, 20, 57-59, 65-68, 85-86

through organizational forms, 100, 174-75, 231-33, 254, 277-78n.l6 of quasi-equity owners, 247-48 oftaxpayers, 202-4, 211-13, 228-31, 244, 280n.ll

theories of, 65-66, 70, 84, 85-86, 87-90

of workers by managers, 194-96, 213-14, 231-32, 237

of workers in free enterprise systems, 154-55, 162-64

of and by workers in market socialism, 176-79, 181-83, 187-91, 231, 235

Expropriation hazards, 124, 128, 137-40, 161, 189, 216-17, 247

Externalities.

Firm-market boundary, 102, 140, 189, 215-17, 277n.l5

Forcing. See Exploitation

Franchise arrangement, 217

Free enterprise system, 17, 188, 212, 236, 241-43, 248, 258-61, 280n.ll. Seealso Exploitation; Labor Markets; Markets

defined, 5-7, 93-96, 264n.l3, 270n.2 efficiency of, 39, 41-43, 73, 186, 217 inequality in, 59-61, 268n.35 new investment in, 224, 229-33, 253 organizations in, 97-99

Frequency (of transactions), 117-18 Fundamental transformation, 117-18, 120-21, 158, 169

Good society, visions of the, 13-16, 49, 91-92, 95, 261, 263n.9. See also Vices; Virtues based on reasonable hopes, 14, 29, 91, 233, 263n.l, 264n.23 relationship between economic systems and, 15-16, 27-32, 232-33, 264n.l3

socialist, 26-27, 49, 63-64, 91, 94, 181, 237, 241-44, 249, 252-53, 256, 259, 267n.26, 281n.4

Good will, 200, 219-21

Hahnel, Robin, 266n.ll

Hayek, F. A., 18, 31, 36-39, 264n.l4 Heilbroner, Robert, 35, 265n.2 Hierarchy, 101-2, 127, 177, 254, 280n.7 efficiencies of, 130-32, 138 inefficiencies of, 140, 216

Holding companies, 250-53 Holmstrom, Nancy, 268n.31

Honore, A. M., 43-44 Horizon. See Time horizon

Hume, David, 276n.3

Inequality, 47, 59, 60, 249-50, 252, 259-60. See also Equality of mater­ial condition

of workers’ income under market socialism, 176-81, 183-85 Injustice, distributive. See also Redistribution

and exploitation, 19, 80, 90, 92 Innovation, 103

Input providers (suppliers), 98, 107, 108, 127, 130-31, 142, 271n.l0

Integration, vertical, 102, 120, 137-38 Investment, state control of, 41, 48-49,

53- 54, 62, 166, 176, 267nn.20,21. See also Economic growth; Organizations; Political officials cooperative control of, 235, 238, 240-41, 276n.4

exploitation through, 222-25, 228-29,257-58

mechanism of, 221-23, 280n.l2 motivations for, 48, 53, 63, 218-19, 255

Irrationalities, social. See Social irrationalities

Jay, Peter, 246-50, 282n.8

Jensen, Michael, 274n.l9, 279nn.25,27

‘Junk bonds,” 145

Justice, theories of distributive, 16, 19, 26, 90, 157, 180, 259-61

Kornai, Janos, 266n.l5

Labor markets, 243, 247.

Labor theory of value, 57, 269n.6 Lange, Oskar, 39

Lavoie, Don, 265nn.5,6

Law of one majority, 245

Lawyers, disparaging remarks about, 79, 104, 121, 159-60, 170, 189, 223, 231, 263n.6

Leading edge, of markets in transition. See Exchanges; Markets

Leasing, of capital goods, 142. See also Rental

Lehn, Kenneth, 275n.26

Liability to execution of debt. See Debt Limited liability, of corporations, 143, 151

Luck, 38, 109, 278n.22

Maintenance rules for capital goods, 235, 279n.26

and exploitation, 202

and social ownership, 47, 49, 62, 63, 99, 175, 198

Managers, 94-95, 98-99, 243-44, 247-48. See also Classical capitalist firm; Cooperative; Corporation; Entrepreneur; Exploitation; Monitor(ing); Workers

Market mechanism (process), 38-41, 49, 53, 63, 73-75, 138, 157, 166

Market socialist economic system, 253-61, 267n.22, 270n.l. See also Cooperative; Economic systems; Exploitation; Socialism differences between free enterprise systems and, 93-94, 96, 99-100, 196-97, 217, 231-33 differences between Yugoslavia, Mondragon and, 165-69

Market socialist economic system (cont.) equity ownership in, 234-38 Estrin’s model, 250-53, 282nn.9-ll full state ownership model, 9, 243-45 Jay’s model, 246-50 opportunism in, 172-75 ownership rights in, 44-49, 198-200, 212-14, 218-19, 233

worker control-state ownership model, 46-49, 62-63, 99, 166-69, 234-36, 245-46, 248, 253, 255-60, 281nn.l,2

Markets, 266n. 15. See also Exchanges; Prices

chaotic, 78-79, 275-76n.36 competitively efficient, 73-74, 76-79, 80-84, 90, 157, 162, 256

for cooperative shares, 237-38 for corporate control, 150, 214 costs of, 137-39

efficiencies of, 40-42, 73

vs. firms, 101-2 ideal, 72-74, 80-81 inefficiencies of, 41, 73 labor. See Labor markets for managers, 209-10 in a socialist system, 40-41,46, 62, 63, 166

stagnant, 78, 79, 82-84, 87, 90, 162-63, 253

stagnant, in market socialism, 181-87, 237

stock. See Stock markets

in transition, 76, 83-84, 90, 157, 162, 269-70n.l3, 276n.37

Marx, Karl, 17, 48, 50-53, 56-58, 60, 263-64n.l0, 266n.l6

Meckling, William, 274n.l9, 279nn.25,27

Mergers, 216-17. See also Firm-market boundary

Milgrom, Paul, 272n.l7

Miller, David, 55-56, 267n.20, 268n.2, 270n.l6

Mises, Ludwig von, 18, 31, 36-39 Mnookin, Robert, 104

Moe, Terry, 226-29, 272n.2 Mondragon, cooperatives in, 9, 129, 167-69, 180, 191, 201, 230, 238-39

Monitor(ing), 273n.7, 274nn.l6,17

and the assumption of opportunism, 172-75

in the classical capitalist firm, 106-9, 122-23, 127-35, 188-92, 194 in the cooperative, 187-96, 206-15, 235-36, 279n.l

in the corporation, 146-51, 230 defined, 98, 107-8, 129-30, 132-33 of political organizations, 228

Moral hazard, 115-16, 120, 134, 148, 232, 235, 239

dynamics of, 173-74, 193 in the small cooperative, 207 of state control of new investment, 222-24,257

Nove, Alec, 35

Opportunism, 119-21, 231, 257, 259, 272n.l7, 279n.2. See also Shirking assumption of, 112, 170-75 defined, 112-113, 172-73, 271n.ll, 272-73n.6

and the need for monitoring, 107-8, 127, 134, 147, 150, 230, 274n.l6 propensity for, 113-15, 129, 171-75 by workers, 114, 128, 160, 187-88, 191, 193, 205

Organizational forms, 33, 124-26, 168, 188, 232-33, 254. See also Classical capitalist firm; Cooperative; Corpo­ration; Exploitation; Transactions cost efficiencies and inefficiencies and economic roles, 98 Cvolutionarytheoryof, 102-6, 110, 122-23, 140, 217, 271n.8, 272n.2

Organizations, non-profit, 274n.l7 Organizations, public (state), 95, 251, 281n.6

differences between private and, 225-26, 272n.2

monitoring in, 228 structural inefficiencies of, 225-30

Ownership. See Property rights

Partnerships, 125-26, 151 residual claimancy in, 142, 152-53 limited, 141-42, 274n.l4

Planning, central, 10-11, 31, 44, 71, 101, 254. See also Investment problems of, 36-38, 260, 265nn.5-7 repudiation of, 34-36, 41, 265nn.l,2,8

Planning, indicative, 282nn.9,ll

Planning, of new investment. See Investment

Political officials, 225-29, 244-45 monitoring of, 228, 279n.4 role of, in investment decisions, 221-23

time horizons of, 213, 225

Portfolio problem. See Risk bearing Power, 273n.l3

as an explanation for exploitation, 155-56

as an explanation for hierarchy, 131, 273nn.l0,ll

political, 225-26

Prices, 38, 46, 166, 269-70n.l3. See also Exchanges; Markets

Production for exchange vs. production for use, 52

Profits, pure (entrepreneurial), 83, 141, 256, 269n.9. See also Residuals and the entrepreneur’s contribution, 76-78, 197, 244, 270n.l5, 278n.22 and the market process, 38, 73-74, 81, 151, 162-63

Property rights, 7, 11, 166-67, 232-33, 241, 254, 266n.ll. Seealso Cooperative; Free enterprise system; Market socialist economic system; Residuals

full liberal ownership, 43-44, 46-47, 94

full state ownership, 9-11, 12, 18, 44-46, 93-94, 95, 243-45, 281n.6

management and income rights, 44, 46-49, 51, 59, 61, 62, 99

Public choice, theory of, 256, 280n,13 Pure rental firm. See Rental

Quasi-equity ownership, 246-50

Quasi-rents, 118-21, 169, 204, 279nn.27,5. See also Asset specifici­ties; Exploitation

ofcapital, 138-41, 160, 198, 213-14 offirms, 200, 204-5, 212, 219-20, 235, 253, 278-79n.24

ofworkers, 127, 154-59, 164, 184-85, 213-14, 220

Rachels₁James, 282n.l4

Rationality, bounded, 111-12, 117, 121, 169-70, 272n.l8

Rawls_jJohn, 263n.9

Reciprocity, failure of. See also

Exploitation

in the cooperative, 177-79

in the employment relation, 154

as a necessary condition for exploita­tion, 57-59, 66-70, 84-86, 88, 259, 268n.3, 270n.l6

Redistribution, 60, 65, 242, 256-57, 268n.35. See also Injustice

Reiman_jJeffrey, 85-86, 268n.31 Rental

ofcapital goods, 47, 142-44, 201-3 pure rental firm, 142-44, 199, 274nn. 19,20, 279n.25

Residual claimants, 46, 51, 243, 244, 250. See also Classical capitalist firm; Cooperative; Corporation; Partnerships

conflict ofinterest with debtors, 143 current vs. future, in the cooperative, 211-12

Residual rights of control, 130-31, 166-67, 266n.l2, 272n.8

Residuals, 94-95, 134, 143-44, 185 in a market socialist system, 60, 194, 220, 230, 256

Risk bearing, 141, 145, 147-48, 152, 236, 238, 247

Roberts_jJohn, 272n.l7

Roemer_jJohn, 264n.l2, 268n.32, 268-69n.5

Schwartz_jJustin, 268n.31

Schweickart, David, 67, 266n.l8

Secession of units in cooperatives, 216-17

Securities analysts, 150 Self-management. See Cooperative Shareholders. See Equity ownership Shirking, 170, 271n.l4, 272-73n.6, 278n.l7. See also Monitor(ing); Opportunism

by managers, 108, 134, 191, 195, 210

Shirking (cont.)

and the need for monitoring, 51,

106-8, 129, 147, 187, 193, 210, 236, Simon, Herbert, 111

Social choice, theory of, 280nn.8,14

Social democracy, 7-8, 263nl, 268n.35 Social irrationalities, 157-58, 241-43,

249, 258. See also Good society in free enterprise systems, 54-55,

254

and market socialism, 41, 62-63, 218, 222, 229, 257

Socialism, economic system of, 7-11,

233, 244-45, 254-55, 261,

266n.l3, 267n.20, 268n.36, 270n.2. See also Cooperative; Economic systems; Market socialist economic system

Marxian, 8-11

the meaning of, 4, 7-11, 26-27, 237,

240-41, 248-50, 252, 282nn.8,9 and private property rights, 44-46,

236, 249

wage labor in, 45

State, the, 270n.20. Seealso Cooperative;

Exploitation; Investment; Market socialist economic system; Organizations; Property rights as capital provider, 44-48, 198-203, 218-19

as a representative of society, 48, 212-13, 218, 244-45, 255 responsible for correcting social irra­tionalities, 53-55,257-58

State ownership of capital, 9, 44-46

Stock markets, 79, 95, 185, 207. See also

Markets

in Estrin’s model, 251-52 function of, 150-51, 182, 213-14 in Jay’s model, 246-49

Stockholders. See Equity ownership

Taxation, 61, 242

Taxpayers. See Exploitation

Team production. See Monitor(ing);

Shirking

Thurow, Lester, 35, 265n.2

Time horizon, 168, 213, 244, 253

of the classical capitalist, 108, 135-36,

201

in the cooperative, 201-5, 234-35, 238-39, 247

Transactions cost efficiencies and ineffi- ciences, 102-6, 161, 184, 188-89, 273-74n.l5. See also Classical capi­talist firm; Cooperative; Corporation; Equity ownership, Exploitation; Fundamental transformation; Hierarchy of corporations vs. classical capitalist firms, 140, 215

as explanations, 104-6, 110, 122-25, 273n.l4, 275n.33

of policies and procedures, 103-5, 158-61, 272n.3

of rentals, 142-44, 201-2

Transactions costs, of firms vs. markets, 101-2

Transactions, features of. See Asset specificities; Frequency; Uncertainty

Type-defining features. See Economic systems

Ultimate decision-making authority, 95, 98, 243, 244-45, 251, 271n.9, 273n.8. See also Classical capitalist firm; Cooperative; Corporation

Uncertainty, 116-17, 183, 272n.l8 political, 225, 227

Unions, 158-59, 184-85, 243, 275n.34

Value, economic. See Contribution;

Quasi-rents

Valuation of assets. See Assets

Vices, social, 13, 22, 25, 27-33, 64. See also Alienation; Commodity fetishism; Economic systems; Exploitation; Inequality; Social irrationalities

of free enterprise systems, 18-21, 27-29, 61-62, 96-97

ofsocialist systems, 18, 31, 34-38, 268n.36

Virtues, social, 13, 15, 23-25, 62, 64, 260-61, 264n.l8. See also Economic growth; Efficiency; Equality of material condition; Investment conceived as the absence of vices, 21, 33

Williamson, Oliver, 111-12, 115, 273n.l3

Winter, David, 267n.20 Workers, 98, 99, 243. See also

Cooperative; Employment relation; Markets

exploitation of, in a free enterprise system, 153-64, 276n.37 exploitation of and by, in market socialism, 176-79, 181-83, 187-91, 231, 235

quasi-rents of, 127, 154-56, 158

Yugoslavia, cooperatives in, 9, 165-67,

204-5, 222-23, 240

Zoneofacceptance, 109, 130, 272n.l2