PoliticalDecisionandJustice

The conclusion of Section 11.3 leaves unanswered questions about the relationship between political decision-making and justice. This point is examined by tracing the changes in Arrow's theoretical stance between the 1950s and the 2000s.

11.4.1 The Will of Majority

In the 1960s, Arrow continued to insist that the consequences of political decision-making are regarded as the criteria of social welfare and obeying the socially agreed position is a moral obligation; yet, an individual need not obey it if doing so does not improve his or her welfare (Arrow 1967).

Arrow went a step further. In the 1970s, he considered that obeying social ordering is just and mentions his welfaristic idea in a paper that criticizes Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (Arrow 1973a). Rawls considered that the voice of the majority is not always just because it may violate one’s rights; however, Arrow opposed Rawls’ idea. According to Arrow, a public officer can improve social welfare by following the consequences of major­ity decision. Improving social welfare is just. Moreover, submitting to the will of majority means that recognizing and protecting others’ positive freedom. This is a moral obligation for individuals. Thus, even if one’s notion is not the same as the will of majority, he or she should submit to the latter (Arrow 1973a, p. 109; cf. Saito 2018, p. 251).

In conclusion, during the 1970s, Arrow thought that obeying social preference was a moral obligation for individuals and that it could stabilize society. He points out that, despite his theorem denying the existence of an ideal democratic decision-making process, there is some agreement in real society, and one should respect it.

11.4.2 Doubts about Democratic Decisions

Arrow (1996) stated that the presence or absence of information influences the degree of social responsibility assigned to individual decision-makers.

Glenn C. Loury, however, argued that Arrow’s assertion, when general­ized, means that those with more information should be entrusted with decision-making powers. Arrow himself affirms paternalism (Arrow 1996, p. 233), and, according to Loury, Arrow’s argument could be applied to the claim that decision-making on medical or educational policies should also be entrusted to individuals who have more information.^[133] In fact, Arrow refers to government regulations regarding national security, stating that those directly involved in the subject matter usually make better decisions (Arrow 1996, p. 234).

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When all these factors are considered, it is doubtful whether Arrow really believes that popular decisions are always preferable when it comes to voting or policymaking since there is an asymmetry of information. In an article on racial discrimination, Arrow (1994) acknowledged that dis­crimination is morally evil; however, discrimination is often affirmed through social practices or decisions that are made in a democratic man­ner. Thus, Arrow (2016) is extremely critical and pessimistic about the results of democratic decisions, as well as about democracy itself (pp. 180-181).

11.4.3 Social Welfare and Fundamental Rights

Arrow also changed his perspective on fundamental rights. In the 1970s, Arrow seemed to consider that improvement of social welfare occurs prior to the protection of one’s fundamental rights. It is found from Arrow's criticism of Nozick in the 1970s that he allowed the violation of one’s property rights and entitlement to improve social welfare.

In the 1990s, however, Arrow does not agree to the violation of one’s right in the market. Arrow refers to child trafficking as an example, insisting that this violates the fundamental rights of a child. According to Margaret Radin (1996), the market should not set any price on goods based on the violation of an individual’s personality; nevertheless, it does some­times set the price of such goods, as during child trafficking and prostitu­tion. Such goods “contest” the setting of any price and point to a market failure (Arrow 1997, p. 765). Arrow partly agrees with this opinion but does not clarify the reason. It can, however, be interpreted that he con­sidered that there are two types of goods, only one of which can be purchased in the market.^[134]

Second, Arrow insists that the consequence of a vote should not violate certain individual rights. The individual mistakenly prefers a social state in which goods that should not be sold are sold, and thus, may form his or her individual ordering. Hence, social ordering, which is an aggregation of individual orderings, is not always considered to possess an ethical meaning.

As mentioned earlier, Arrow accepted the condition of unrestricted domain in the 1960s and 1970s and regarded the consequences of social decision as a criterion of social welfare. Accordingly, if most individuals judge child trafficking to be ethically acceptable, Arrow may have accepted this judgment and obeyed it. During the 1990s and afterward, however, Arrow rejected some types of individual ordering on ethical grounds. In Arrow's words, “[j]udicial decisions and votes are not to go to the highest bidder. Individuals cannot waive certain legal rights” (Arrow 1997, p. 765).^[135] In short, during the 1970s, Arrow insisted that obeying social preference was a moral obligation, but during the 1990s and afterward, he left room to ethically reject social preference. Arrow began to admit that such social preference is not always desirable, and it is clear that, in the 1990s, he believed that if the consequences of the market or a vote go against one's fundamental rights, one should not obey them. Arrow changed his opinion and asserted that one's right is superior to social welfare. He, therefore, became a non-welfarist.

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