Aspirations and policy goals: enforced and self-enforcing rules and policies

In constitutional economics, we can distinguish between different types of approaches, notably those that need to be enforced and those that are de­signed to be self-enforcing. Given the difficulties that enforcement agencies have in enforcing rules laid down and sometimes agreed beforehand, there is always a preference for self-enforcing rules.

Rules have a better chance of being self-enforcing if there is a close match between the functions of a particular unit and the means and responsibilities to serve this function, where the rules have the purpose of ensuring a proper use of the means and responsibilities with a view to performing the functions in question. The crucial issue then is to define that unit which is most appropriate for fulfilling a particular function. Very often in constitutional public choice, this question is not addressed head on. Typically, we start from the assumption that there is a state or a commonwealth, without exploring the question of which domain this commonwealth or state should actually oc­cupy, and in relation to what other public bodies. Therefore the following section begins with an in-depth discussion of the subsidiarity principle. It is shown, in particular, that the principle has a strong history in European thought, and that it therefore deserves to be relied upon systematically in constitutional economics.