Conclusion

This entry has reviewed the economic approach to property law. Owing to space limitations, the scope of the discussion was necessarily limited. In particular, it was primarily in the context of real property and focused on a few fundamental principles, including the role of property rights in promot­ing efficient exchange and investment, and on optimal ownership regimes in the presence of externalities, economies of scale and transaction costs.

Acknowledgement

I wish to acknowledge the comments of Bob Ellickson, Derek Johnson, Dean Lueck, Kathy Segerson, C.F. Sirmans and an anonymous reviewer.

List of cases

Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970).

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).

Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).

Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 494 P.2d 701 (Ariz. 1972).

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