Austria and Switzerland, 1900s-1950s: Schmidt's apologetic history of religion
How did Schmidt manage to arrive at such a potentially revolutionary discovery? Basically, he identified the potential outcome of his research by eschewing the null hypothesis (e.g.
no religion in primeval times) and choosing beforehand the expected result on the basis of a confirmationist position (Zimon 1986: 248). As early as 1895, in fact, he privately remarked that ‘the proper study of [comparative religion] puts in an even stronger light the supernaturalness of our Holy Religion, as well as the excellence of Her essence and outward validity' (Schmidt to Janssen, 5 March 1895; from Dietrich 1992: 113-14; originally in Bornemann 1979: 279). To confirm the ‘outward validity' of his own religion, Schmidt successfully established an independent and ‘complete research infrastructure' in which ethnological data gathered from fellow missionaries all over the world could be studied, showcased and discussed (Schmidt himself never engaged in field research):1. a research journal (Anthropos, established in 1906);
2. two monograph series on ethnology and linguistics (respectively, 1909 and 1914, then combined in 1951 to create the Studia Instituti Anthropos);
3. a museum (the Pontificio Museo Missionario-Etnologico in 1927, originally hosted at the Palazzo Laterano, Vatican, and later relocated in the Musei Vaticani complex);
4. an institute (the Anthropos-Institut, founded in 1931 near Vienna);
5. a workshop on the comparative history of religion from an ethnological perspective (‘Semaine d'Ethnologie religieuse'; for all points see Dietrich 1992: 112).
The creation of such impressive scholarly apparatus might seem a necessary step to foster a scientific environment. Indeed, Schmidt was being gradually co-opted within academia as a Catholic ‘scientific expert' in matters such as ethnology and racial policy (Connelly 2007: 821), first at the University of Vienna, Austria (1921-1938), and then, as he had been arrested in 1938 after the Anschluss for mere internal dissent and rescued by the intervention of Mussolini and Pope Pius XII, at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland (1939-1951) (Spottel 1998: 143; cf.
Ries 2005: 191-2 for an apologetic account). In scientific research, it is usually held that the assembly bonus effect rewards similar disciplinary organizations by allowing the members of the research group to overcome individual cognitive limitations and provide a mutual and critical peer review. Indeed, despite the public imagery of the scientist as a genius working in splendid isolation, science is - and must be - a collective effort. I will insist on this fundamental point in the final chapter. What I would like to note now, however, is that if a defective epistemology is used to support such organizations, for instance, by promoting confirmatory positions and eschewing negative feedback and continuous revision, the result is but a mere mimicry of scientific research, resulting in the creation of what Noretta Koertge has defined as ‘belief buddies', that is ‘people who share a firm commitment to the stigmatized knowledge claims and who help collect supporting evidence and arguments but are very reluctant to encourage criticism' (Koertge 2013: 179). In this sense, Schmidt's compartmentalization provides a clear example of the downsides and shortcomings of the Anthropos complex. Schmidts control of dissent, his strict adherence to a theologically dogmatic and pre-established set of goals (to which we will return in a moment), his manipulation of ethnological data, and his unwillingness to confront criticism are all the hallmarks of pseudoscience (Zimon 1986; cf. Boudry, Blancke and Pigliucci 2015).Overturning the Humean foundations of academic enquiry on the subject, Schmidt wrote that the recovery and gathering of what he took to be the ‘rational proofs of the natural foundations of religion' was a theological necessity (Schmidt 1931: 34; from Dietrich 1992: 114). Indeed, the very adoption of the Kulturkreislehre responded to a three-fold necessity, that is, achieving three distinct goals on three intertwined extra- epistemic socio-cultural and geopolitical levels:
1.
European culture: to strengthen the Catholic faith against the advance of secularism;2. Christian apologetics: to defend Catholicism against those who considered it to be scientifically backward while, at the same time, criticizing godless modernity;
3. international comparative religion: to attack strategically from within the discipline those scientific theories sympathetic to Darwinian evolution (‘monkey enthusiasm', in Schmidt 1964: 45; from Spottel 1998: 139) in order to uphold the supernatural core of religion itself (Dietrich 1992: 112, 114).
This three-fold goal coalesced around Schmidt's industrious publication of his 12-volume The Origin of the Idea of God (in German, Der Ursprung der Gottesidee), a colossal work whose writing spanned four decades (1910s-1950s) and which can be considered as the theological counterpart of Frazer's pro-science, encyclopaedic Golden Bough. For obvious reasons of space, I cannot list every modification or update of its whole structure across forty-odd years of continuous reworking. Suffice it to say that the first six books were organized as following Schmidt's organization of degeneration, from Naturvolker (‘peoples living in a natural state', i.e. hunter-gatherers) to Kulturvo lker (‘peoples living in a cultural state', whose cultural organization included, more or less sequentially, pastoralism, totemism, farming and various mixed forms of religion/culture; Zimon 1986: 249; for a compelling history of this untenable anthropological distinction, see Smail 2008). Surprisingly discarding any archaeological or palaeoanthropological data or document, Schmidt intended to reconstruct the ultimate origin of religion by studying and comparing certain modern-day huntergatherers deemed particularly ‘primitive', such as Pygmy peoples in Africa and SouthEastern native Australians. The only key to access the deep past was thus provided by the alleged equivalence between present-day Naturvolker and prehistoric ancestors.
The developmental scheme Schmidt devised was built by assuming a priori the historical accuracy of the Biblical Genesis. Having ascertained the presence of High Gods of the sky, or Supreme Beings, retaining a principal role even in most polytheistic or henotheistic19 present-day hunter-gatherer societies, Schmidt argued that, on a theological basis, such primitive peoples were obviously incapable of conceiving of such a ‘sublime' idea (Henninger and Ciattini 2005: 8169).
Consequently, Schmidt posited that present-day Naturvolker had been cognitively prepared for the reception of a perfect, primeval monotheism (Urmonotheismus) in the guise of a divine concession. Interestingly, the mechanisms by which, according to Schmidt, monotheism - and thus religiosity tout court - was born were two: the primordial revelation itself, obviously as ultimate cause, and causal and teleological thinking, which acted both as proximate means of religious intuition and maintenance (before 1930, personification, that is, anthropomorphism, was also added; Zimon 1986: 250). Working backwards, the first stage of human society (Urstufe) was imagined by Schmidt as a perfect condition announced by a divine revelation (Uroffenbarung) which disclosed the flawlessness of monogamy, nuclear family and patriarchal respect and submissiveness. The cradle of this first-ever culture/religion complex ( Urreligion ) was identified in Asia, with subsequent diffusion all across the globe; for instance, Indo-Europeans and Hamito-Semitic tribes civilized respectively Europe and Africa by subduing previous, degraded cultures (Zimon 1986: 247-8). In any case, diffusion soon entailed degeneration: cultural decay and moral deterioration ensued, resulting in the development of a series of culture areas or stages in which religion preceded, provided and s upported ethics and culture (Dietrich 1992: 115). A possible synthesis might follow this chronological sequence:0. Uroffenbarung: primordial, divine revelation;
1. Urstufe/Urreligion: as a consequence of (0), primeval, perfect human religious organization is implemented;
2. remnants of the Urmonotheismus: hunter-gatherers as the oldest civilization and living fossils of the oldest religion (1);
3. Primarkulturen: degenerative development and diffusion of (2) into three degraded ‘primary cultures':
a. agricultural matriarchy;
b. hunting and androcentric totemism;
c. pastoral nomadic patriarchy (Zimon 1986: 248; Spottel 1998: 140; Henninger and Ciattini 2005: 8169).
The passage from stages (2) to (3) was possible thanks to orthogenetic Elementargedanken, i.e. inborn ‘elementary ideas' theorized by anti-Darwinian, anti- Ratzelian (but still nomothetically oriented) ethnologist Adolf Bastian (1826-1905). These hypothetical core ideas were the parallel output of the psychic unity of humankind, and further divergence was due to geo-historical diversification. Following Bastian, these basic concepts were identifiable by the comparison of multiple less- civilized, and thus less-culturally stratified, Naturvolker (Brandewie 1982: 155; Sharpe 1986: 180; cf. Smith 1991: 118-19). Stages (3.a) and (3.b), sometimes mixed by Schmidt into a single ‘totemistic-matrilinear mixed civilization', were characterized as ‘a hotbed for sorcery and secret societies, for a trader mentality, urbanization, materialism and godlessness, for the decline of authority, for hate, violence, decadence and sexual vices' (Spottel 1998: 140, based on Schmidt and Koppers 1924: 299 and Schmidt 1955). Stage (3.c), finally, was evaluated as the positive opposite, as Herrschervolker (‘ruling peoples'), bringer of a religion-civilization complex able to revert or contain the ongoing decadence, with Christianity as the teleological apogee able to cure this decay once and for all (Dietrich 1992: 115; Spottel 1998: 140).
Degeneration did not stop there, as modernity brought about some of the worst cultural developments possible: evolutionism, Communism and psychoanalysis. Schmidt ranted aggressively against a ragbag of topics and authors, including Tylor, materialism, Marxism, ‘“excessive evolutionism”, determinism, promiscuity, animism, magic, mass psychology, and “the destruction of individualism”' (see Schmidt 19191920: 548; Schmidt 1926-1955, I: 72; Schmidt 1935a: 134; cit. in Andriolo 1979: 142; on Schmidt's role in the Catholic crusade against psychoanalysis, see Desmazieres 2009). In this context, the worldwide, primordial stage of Urmonotheismus became the antiSemitic wedge by which Schmidt tried to renew the Christian accusation of deicide as original guilt ( Urschuld) and overthrow the theologically sanctioned Jewish uniqueness as the chosen people recipient of the Covenant with God: ‘the first Jews were but a population of monotheists among the others' (Schmidt 1914: 348; from Conte 1988: 128).
Moreover, Schmidt considered the Jews as guilty of partaking in the modern spread of secularism (Conte 1988: 124; Connelly 2007).In the end, Schmidt's biased ‘ethnotheological' approach was dissociative and accommodationist, in the sense that it worked by isolating items useful for his interpretation, thus breaking the original integrity of the studied cultures to promote a ‘positive theological interpretation', with the aim of creating a downward spiral of religious degeneration, a sort of scala religionum whose careful organization was thought to provide moral and strategic reasons to support theocratic policy (Dietrich 1992: 119). Interestingly, just as Dutch phenomenology became a sort of evolutionary taxonomy emptied of its epistemological content, by adopting a Kulturkreislehre devoid of any evolutionary processes, Schmidt ‘was left with a frame of reference which lacked a historical perspective' (Andriolo 1979: 135; cf. Zimon 1986: 246). Thus, notwithstanding his ‘phobia' of evolutionism and his rejection of any nomothetic approach, Schmidt bit the bullet and resorted to specific evolutionary models, i.e. orthogenesis and degeneration, to explain the development of human cultures and religions (Andriolo 1979: 135; cf. Evans-Pritchard 1965: 103-4).