Methods

The ground which we must briefly cover under this heading has already been well tilled. To the question, ‘What methods should one use to increase knowledge or understanding?’ the answer must be, ‘It depends upon the question being asked.’ Some questions, such as those of Weber, required the methods of historical and social analysis.

In rather different contexts, if for example claims about the Turin Shroud were to be regarded as religious claims, the tech­niques of chemical analysis would be a precondition of answering some ques­tions. The psychology of religion as a branch of psychology has its own contribution to make, but again always depending upon specific questions being asked. However, there are some general points about method as such which can be illustrated by a brief discussion of one of the most stimulating contributions to the psychology of religion which has been published this century. I refer to Freud’s The Future of an Illusion.

Freud’s writings in this and other essays illustrate well both the strengths and the potential pitfalls of developing and using a specific method and applying it to the study of religion. Freud was clearly intrigued by religious belief and practice and in a number of works including The Future of an Illusion set down his reflections on the matter. By that time (1927) he had fully developed his psychoanalytic method of treating illness, and with it a fairly elaborate theory of human nature. His puzzlement about religion was based on his observations of what people do and say. His resolution of that puzzlement was to apply a theory developed in the context of the study and treatment of mental illness to this area of human experience also.

Effectively he regarded religious behaviour as analogous to neurotic behaviour. His characterisation of religion as an illusion’ is not, he insists, its classification as ‘error’ (although the onus is firmly on the believer to show that it is not), but it is to claim that religion is based on wish-fulfilment—on what we want to be true. Now there is much of interest in such a claim and undoubtedly human beings are prone to believe what, in some sense, they want to believe. The particular twist in Freud’s account is that we are not in this case aware of these deep-seated, uncon­scious, wishes. This is an interesting and important view about which much might be written, but our present task is to focus upon some general features of the application of this method to the study of religious belief and practice.

There is no doubt that there are those whose religious belief and practice are based upon what they want to believe rather than what they have other reason to believe. As such, Freud’s observation is clear and accurate. However, what is also true is that Freud may face the same danger as that which Tawney signalled in Weber’s case (see p. 36 above)—he seems to want to apply a single method of enquiry and explanation which may well have great significance in one context, as if it were ‘a key to unlock all doors’. That is to say, it may well be correct to infer that Mr Enderby’s religious belief and Miss Crimpel’s religious devotions are, in Freud’s sense, ‘illusions’, without wishing to imply that this is the appropriate account to give of the belief of Thomas Aquinas, or of Franz Jaggerstater (see Zahn) or Billy Graham and so on. Now in each of these cases if there is a clear ‘explanation’ to be given the explanations will be severally different, but that is just the point. The difficulty and indeed implausibility of Freud’s view is that in the end there is only one explanation and that is the same explanation for everyone.

The other major point which is illustrated by the example taken from Freud could equally well apply to all such general theories of religion which are derived from the application of a single method of enquiry. In each case, whether we think of Freud, or Marx, or Durkheim, or whomsoever, the method either boasts or conceals a particular theory of human nature. The first and most obvious point is that if we accept Freud’s or Marx’s respective definitions of religion (and we cannot consistently accept both!) then we are ipso facto accepting the correlated theory of human nature which underpins that definition. We should certainly ask for consider­able evidence and argument before taking on board such a major intellectual structure. The second point of course is that very often what is offered by religious belief is a theory of human nature which is quite clearly seen as an alternative to the non-religious diagnoses of the human condition. We must not allow the adoption of a method in any way to mask or hide that deep point of difference.