Pertinent Classifications

As per the 2011 Indian Census, tribes constitute 8.6 per cent of the Indian population (Census of India 2011a). The classification of certain Indian communities as tribes and others as castes has been contested and has fuelled both scholarly debates (Bates 1995 and Ghurye 1932) and contentious politics (Middleton 2013).

To highlight the scholarly debates pertinent to these classifications, it can be noted that Crispin Bates has outlined the sometimes arbitrary manner in which colonial anthropolo­gists differentiated between castes and tribes (Bates 1995); the concept of an Indian tribe­caste dichotomy has also been criticised by the Indian sociologist G.S. Ghurye (Ghurye 1932). The concept of ‘Scheduled Tribes’, which draws upon colonial era classifications, was propounded by the government of newly-independent India (Singh and Vyas 1989) and allows for a tribe to claim special protections and enjoy access to affirmative action programmes in the Indian state to which it is considered indigenous - it is important to note that if a tribe is displaced or rehabilitated into another state, it may lose this status (Rycroft 2014). The term ‘Adivasis’, which is used in some regions in contemporary Indian parlance to denote tribes, is derived from Sanskrit and literally means ‘original dwellers’.

The politics of nomenclature in relation to Indian tribes continues to be fractious. Some of the words used in India for tribes - like ‘vanvasi’, ‘vanyajati’, and ‘girijan’ - are under­stood to be politicised terms that either deny the indigeneity of India’s tribals or relegate them to the status of forest and mountain people (see Srivastava 2008). The term ‘vanvasi’ has been linked with the cultural-nationalist politics of the ‘Sangh Parivar’ - a right-wing Hindu nationalist organisation that premises its work on the Hindu majority population of India being indigenous to the sub-continent. It is used by the Sangh Parivar to refer to tribes/Adivasis, since the term vanvasi connotes a forest-based lifestyle rather than being an original inhabitant (Outlook India 2002). Given the plethora of terms used to denote tribes and the value-laden assumptions that go with them, sociologist Andre Beteille has advocated, citing K. S. Singh (cited in Beteille 2000:169), the use of the term ‘Samudaya’, i.e., community, in place of the others that are currently in use. According to him, such a term would refer to the collective living that tribes do enjoy without restricting other groups from employing the term if they perceive that it is an adequate descriptor of their lifestyles. It can be noted however, that such a term would be de-politicising and consequently (and arguably) disempowering for those communities that claim the status of tribes in India today.

28.1.1 Governing Classifications - a Focus on the PVTG Sub-Classification

To demonstrate the power of governmental classifications as pertaining to tribes and to highlight the processes that can lead up to them, I now present a case of the sub-classifica­tion of tribes.

Currently, 75 tribal groups in India have been classified as ‘Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups’ or PVTGs, due to performing poorly as per various development indicators (Sahani & Nandy 2013). Echoing the controversies surrounding the creation and naming of the cat­egory of ‘tribes’, the PVTG sub-category is argued to be similarly arbitrary; some tribes are classified as PVTGs in one state and not in another. Moreover, this tribal sub-category was earlier termed as the ‘Primitive Tribal Group’ (PTG) sub-category (Sahani & Nandy 2013). Currently, the classification of a tribe as a PVTG, i.e., identified as primitive or particularly vulnerable allows its members to access special government benefits, subsidies, protections, and often jobs, all of which are targeted at improving the socio-economic condition of the tribe in question.

The Draft National Tribal Policy that was formulated in 2006 by the Indian Ministry of Tribal Affairs (Draft National Tribal Policy 2006) discusses the groups that had been then referred to as PTGs, in its Section 12. It is important to note that this policy has still not been adopted¹ (it has been reported that comments on certain recommendations that were made in regard to it are being awaited²). As per the Draft National Tribal Policy, the follow­ing criteria can be used for the classification of tribes as PVTGs: (1) pre-agricultural level of subsistence, (2) dwelling in isolated and remote habitations, (3) small population, (4) near­constant or declining demographics, (5) low levels of literacy, and (6) economic and social backwardness. The Draft National Tribal Policy does discuss the problem of semantics in relation to the erstwhile practice of naming such groups as primitive. It had advised that a switch from referring to Primitive Tribal Groups (PTGs) as Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups (PVTGs) be made - this was subsequently followed upon.

The original PTG sub-category was created in 1973 on the basis of a recommenda­tion of a report of the Dhebar Commission, which was the first official pan-Indian exer­cise in understanding the problems of tribes in independent India and in recommending what could be a viable way to ensure that their situation could be improved. The Dhebar Commission noted that it had observed four different layers amongst scheduled tribes - at the bottom it had identified a group of tribals “in an extremely underdeveloped stage and at the topmost level amongst the tribals... a layer that can very well afford to forgo any further help. We feel that this lowest layer needs the utmost consideration at the hands of the Government” (as cited by Bhuria Commission 2004:2). Initially, 52 tribal groups were identified as belonging to this lowest layer of development and were subsequently categorised as PTGs. In 1993, an additional 23 groups were added to the PTG sub-category making up the total of 75 tribal groups that continue to constitute the sub-category today. The Bhuria Commission which was appointed in 2002 to re-examine the issues that the Dhebar Commission had studied 42 years previously, added to the discussion on PTGs by recommending that certain groups that were included in the PTG sub-category should be re-classified as ‘heritage groups’ (Bhuria Commission 2004:2). This recommendation of the Bhuria Commission was taken up in the Draft National Tribal Policy of 2006 - it further divided PTGs into two categories based on the relative isolation of the groups, one of these being the ‘heritage group’ category of PTGs. The PTGs that were classified as ‘heritage groups’ were described as those that are “insulated from the surrounding populations and are placed in isolated ecological environments” - examples being the Jarawa, Sentinelese, Shompen, Cholanaicken, etc. The second category included those tribes (such as the Birhor, Chenchu, Jenu Kuruba) that are “located on the fringes of ‘mainstream’ population and have some contact with them” (Draft National Tribal Policy 2006:15).

The strategy of advancement will be group-oriented in the case of heritage groups; it will be a mix of group oriented and area-development in the case of the second category. The first approach will aim at conservation of the eco-system, life styles and traditional skills of the group, while the second approach will place equal emphasis on economic programmes. The underlying principle and approach will be to enable a PTG to move forward in its own chosen direction and at its own pace. No attempt will be made to disrupt its moorings.

(Draft National Tribal Policy 2006:15)

A scheme of development for PVTGs has reportedly been in effect since April 2015 (Government of India 2015). It calls for state governments to prepare a ‘Conservation-cum- Development (CCD) Plan’ applicable to each PVTG in the state. Amongst the develop­ment-oriented measures are those aimed at enhancing livelihood, employment, healthcare, educational, housing, and other opportunities for members of PVTGs. The term Adim Janajati is commonly used as a parallel Hindi term to refer to PTGs/PVTGs. It has been criticised for reasons of being a recent neologism and for its purported connotations of a primevalness that mainstream tribes or Adivasis cannot access - it has been described as: “an attempt to articulate a notion of pristine aboriginality that can be set apart from the Adivasi” (Sen 2012:339). It should also be noted that the language used to justify the act of creating the PVTG category, emphasised a focus on supporting the tribes later classified as PVTGs in tandem with querying whether some tribes need any support at all.

28.1.2 Asking to be Classified - the Demand for an Officially Recognised Tribal Religion

From a celebrated history of protest against colonial rule (Behera & Verma 2022), to the demand for a separate tribal state within independent India (Munda & Mullick 2003), to protests against mining on tribal lands (Borde & Bluemling 2020), tribal politics can be called an integral part of the democratic fabric of India.

However, it is interesting to note that a major strand of the mobilisations aimed at gain­ing official recognition for a tribal religion in India, namely, what can be termed the Sarna Movement (Borde 2019), was initiated by and has involved the transgression of a taboo that is commonly found across tribal religions in India - he taboo being the prohibition of the presence of women in sacred groves/sacred natural sites, which are the loci of tribal religiosity in India (Kandari et al. 2014 and Malhotra et al. 2001). The taboo has been noted amongst the tribes of east-central India (Sinha 2006) where the Sarna Movement was centred, but is also found amongst tribal and other communities in various parts of the country (Malhotra et al. 2001 )³.

It is important to note, from the outset, that the tribal women, who began entering the sacred groves where their presence was traditionally prohibited, were not aiming to take a stance vis-à-vis the official recognition of a tribal religion in India. Their presence in these places, initially contested (and sometimes violently) (Borde 2016) can be said to have been subsequently co-opted by the movement for a ‘Dharam Code’ - more details in relation to this are presented subsequently.

Tribal women started entering the sacred groves where their presence was prohibited, via trance states during which they would claim the goddess of the sacred grove had possessed them. Amongst the members of the Oraon tribe, the goddess is known as Sarna Mata and instances of possession were most common amongst the Oraon women, which is why the movement these women sparked off that led subsequently to the reforestation and revitali­sation of sacred groves as places of worship, came to be termed the Sarna Movement (sacred groves are also known as Sarnas amongst the Oraons). Instances of spontaneous possession amongst the Oraon women began in the mid-1990s. I started conducting fieldwork at the sacred grove in the village of Boreya, Ranchi District, Jharkhand, in 2008 - by this time articulations in relation to the importance of a ‘Dharam Code’ for tribes were already in evidence. In relation to the Sarna Movement, these, however, were mostly made by the male politicians (also tribal) who were involved in the Sarna Movement. It can be argued that the interest of these politicians lay in the collective worship ceremonies that tribal women had begun organising in sacred groves each Thursday. To discuss these ceremonies a little more - instead of the spontaneous possession by Sarna Mata that was reported to have been occur­ring previously, these ceremonies, which were instituted later as the Sarna Movement gained momentum, provided a context for controlled possession states that would apparently be triggered by hymn singing and sometimes the beating of a drum. Political interest in these ceremonies can be attributed to the fact that they constituted relatively large and regular gatherings of tribals with an expressed interest in both tribal culture and tribal land (both of these have been politicised in the various tribal political movements mentioned earlier). However, it is also important to note that the ceremonies themselves were politicised. The transformation of the spontaneous possession of tribal women into a structured ceremony can be called the result of the work of several generations of tribal politicians - their work spanning the decades from the run-up to India’s independence from colonial rule to the contemporary era. One of the most prominent amongst these politicians was Kartik Oraon, the founder of the Akhil Bhartiya Adivasi Vikas Parishad, a pan-Indian tribal organisation focusing on pertinent development and socio-cultural issues. He initiated a practice of hold­ing weekly prayer meetings called Parha Prarthana Sabhas at which Adivasis would pray, solve legal disputes, and discuss rural development issues. These prayer meetings would be held in Dumkurias, which are the traditional village dormitories for Oraon youth, and Akhras, which are the village meeting grounds. However, the practice of holding these prayer meetings died out with his death in 1981. However, the cases of women’s spontane­ous possession by Sarna Mata in sacred groves some years later instigated the revival of this religious institution. Young tribal leaders of the time gave the phenomenon of possession by Sarna Mata a new context. They incorporated the possession trance into the earlier Parha Prarthana Sabha structure and started what is now famous as the Sarna Prarthana Sabha, i.e., the previously described weekly Thursday ceremonies. Instead of holding the meet­ings in Akhras or Dumkurias, they began to hold them in Sarnas or sacred groves and the presence of women in them was allowed in the context of this structured ceremony (Borde 2016). This is not to say that there has been no backlash by traditionalists and also those opposed to assertional displays of tribal religiosity - indeed, on the contrary, the presence of women in sacred groves has been repeatedly opposed, and once violently while I was present (see Borde 2016, 2019). Currently however, there is a Mahila Prakosht, or women’s cell, integrated into the management of the Sarna Movement in Jharkhand.

The Sarna Movement can be called one of the major driving forces behind the demand for a Dharam Code; and it can be argued that it has been most successful at convincing tribals that they must assert that they are not Hindus when called upon to officially declare their religion. This is evinced by the 2011 census. As previously mentioned, in it, 7,937,734 chose the option of declaring that their religion belongs to the ‘Other religions and persua­sions’ category. There was also the option of mentioning the specific religion one might follow under this category - and 4,957,467 people chose to write ‘Sarna’ to express their affiliation to the beliefs and practices associated with tribal religiosity as it has been largely constructed by the Sarna Movement (Census of India 2011b). Importantly, Sarna is the only officially acknowledged version of tribal religiosity in India - it has been recently given recognition by the government of the state of Jharkhand (Singh 2021), the state which is the epicentre of the Sarna Movement. The government gave official recognition to Sarna as the religion of the tribals in the state by sending a resolution to the Union Government supporting the demand for a religious code for tribals - it stated that the tribal religion thus demanded should be called ‘Sarna Adivasi Dharam’ (Kukreti 2020). However, it is important to state that Sarna is not likely to be accepted as the name for the tribal religion which tribals all over India want recognition for. As a religious affiliation, Sarna is specific to the tribals of east-central India and furthermore, it claims adherents largely amongst the members of the Oraon tribe. At a protest event at Jantar Mantar in New Delhi, which I attended and which was the official venue for protests in the national capital, a tribal man from Rajasthan had an altercation with an Oraon woman from Jharkhand who had made a speech saying that the Sarna religion should be recognised. He argued that tribes all over India did not affiliate with the religion known as Sarna; and that she should not make such speeches (Participant Observation 2019)⁴. Indeed, the question of nomenclature is again an important one here. As previously stated, there had once been a column in the Indian census that would allow followers of tribal religions to be counted as belonging to this category. Since this column was removed there have been several petitions to have it reinstated. So far these have not met with success for the expressed reason that the petitions demanding recognition for tribal religiosity have referred to it by varying names - the names reflective of the distinct beliefs and rituals of often the specific tribe making the petition. The leaders of the tribal movement for a Dharam Code (amongst whom leaders involved in the Sarna Movement are prominent), have expressed cognisance of this problem and are attempt­ing to counter the fragmentation of the demand for the recognition of tribal religiosity, by organising seminars that bring together representatives of diverse tribal groups from differ­ent parts of the country and discussing the commonalities in their religious beliefs.

According to one such leader (Interview 2019)⁵, there had been significant progress in unifying the self-understanding of tribal religiosity. He reported that the practice of diverse tribal groups self-identifying as belonging to diverse religious categories had decreased. In the census of 2001, there were more than 100 different religious groups to which people listed in the ‘Other religions and persuasions’ category expressed affiliation. In the census of 2011, the number of religious groups under this category that people expressed affiliation to had decreased to 83. He also reported that a consensus had been reached vis-à-vis the name under which the claim for tribal religious recognition would be made - the claimed tribal religion would be called either Prakriti Dharam, i.e., Nature Religion or Adi Dharam, i.e., Original Religion. In a subsequent interview with another such leader the following year (Interview ibid.) I heard, however, that recognition for tribal religiosity would be claimed under the name of the religion termed ‘Tribal’. Nevertheless, there does seem to be some consensus on what tribal religion is and how it would be represented. Tribal leaders have been emphatic on the point that sacred natural sites and their worship are an important aspect of tribal religiosity. This has been coupled with discourses of ‘ecological ethnicity’ that emphasise the intimate entanglements between tribals and their natural environment (Parajuli 1998, 2002). The discourse of tribals as India’s eco-saviours was also articulated by one tribal leader from Rajasthan at the protest event I attended at Jantar Mantar in New Delhi: “the day there isn’t a tribal in India is the day there won’t be any other Indian in the country, because it is tribals who keep the air breathable by protecting the forests” (Tribal Leader from Rajasthan 2019, Interview op cit.). Such discourses have been criticised when applied to indigenous people in the context of their romanticisation by Euro-Americans (Grande 1999) - but the use of such discourses by tribal people who claim an indigenous identity can be called another thing entirely. The use of eco-religious vocabularies by tribal movements in India can be traced back to the inception of the movement for a state for trib­als within east-central India, i.e., the Jharkhand Movement (Munda & Mullick 2003). This too had placed an emphasis on the naturalistic and pantheistic elements of tribal religiosity, emphasising at the same time the significance it granted to sacred natural sites.

Ecological discourses apart, it is important to note that women are playing an increas­ingly important role in the leadership of the Sarna Movement and are consequently gaining prominence at the national level in the movement for a Dharam Code. At these political events, I did not hear any criticism of the fact that tribal women are transgressing a taboo by organising worship ceremonies in sacred groves. I did, however, find that some tribal leaders still believe that there is a tribal taboo against the presence of women in sacred groves, but did not condemn the fact that this taboo was being broken - their expressed attitude can be described as one of accepting that things change with modernity. They also did talk about the fact that the relationship that tribal religiosity had with Hinduism was complex and that there were points of intersection between them, emphasising nevertheless that official recognition for tribal religiosity was important (Interviews op cit.).

It can be argued in relation to the breaking of the taboo against women’s presence in sacred groves, that though this transgressive act by tribal women was initially contested, it has now been co-opted by the larger movement for a Dharam Code. Women can be termed the foot soldiers of this movement in east-central India, claiming space for tribal religiosity in sacred groves every Thursday and showing that they are indeed not Hindus. It is also important to note that the participating women often bring young children to these sacred grove ceremonies, which would consequently have implications for the inter-generational transfer of religious beliefs.

28.2