Religion and Ideology

Bertrand Russell, in his History of Western Philosophy, claimed that there are many structural similarities between Christianity and Marxism.¹ If we call Marxism a political ideology, this indicates an interest­ing relationship between a religion and an ideology.

The term ‘ideology’ is sometimes used in a very wide sense. But since we are interested in a restricted field of human reactions, one in which we can compare such entities as conservatism and Judaism, it will be more useful for our purposes to adopt a more narrow concept. If we go back to Karl Mannheim’s distinction between ‘total’ and ‘partial’ ideology—as most writers on ideology do—it is clear that the more interesting concept in our context is that of partial ideology. To define a partial ideology, we must first decide how to single out an ideology from other products of human endeavour.

There seems to be a considerable agreement among writers on ideology that ideologies consist of certain interrelated theoretical convictions, evaluations and norms. Various scholars have then tried in different ways to delimit precisely the class of such phenomena that should be labelled ‘ideology’. Let us consider, in order, various delimitations relating to truth—value, adherents, function and content.³

As I have already mentioned, one influential Marxist concept of ideology restricts the theoretical aspects of ideologies to false convictions. A similar way of thinking is reflected in a modern dictionary in which ideologies are presented as ‘selected or distorted ideas about a social system or a class of systems’.⁴ Most convictions which we label as ideological may indeed be false, but it is hardly reasonable in our context to include statements as to truth or falsity in the actual definition of an ideology. We have at least to leave the door open for the possibility of true ideological ideas. Can we talk about an ideology embraced by only a single person? This would seem to conflict with all common usages of the term. If we are to call a set of ideas an ideology, they must be held in common by a group of people. This we will therefore accept as one defining characteristic of an ideology.

Ideologies are said to have many important functions for the group of people among whom they prevail. One such function pointed out in the classical literature (Marx and Pareto) is that of justification.⁵ Ideologies justify actions and attitudes. They reinforce social rules, and defend a social order that promotes the interests of the group or class. Even certain cognitive structures can be justified by an ideology. Related to the function ofjustification is the integrating function that has been pointed to by many Marxists. The ideology can be the factor that actually creates the group, as, according to Marx, does the class-consciousness of the proletariat.⁶ Many specifically political functions are in fact ascribed to ideologies, such as securing the existence of a political organisation, or a legitimate political authority or leadership.

Is it meaningful to point to any given common con­tent of ideologies? E. Schill speaks of ideologies as ‘comprehensive patterns of cognitive and moral beliefs about man, society and the universe in relation to man and society’.⁷ This gives us a wide concept of ideology. A more narrow one will be obtained if we see the content of ideologies in C.J. Friedrich’s terms, as ‘reasonably coherent bodies of ideas concerning practical means of how to change, reform or maintain a political order’.⁸ I think the wider concept is to be preferred here, since it allows us to see such interesting ideas as Marx’s concept of man, or the various powerful Utopias, as parts of an ideology.

In our discussion, we have come across such terms as ‘coherent’, ‘interrelated’, and ‘system’ applied to ideology. This points to an important feature of such systems as Marxism, liberalism and humanism. The theoretical aspects of the system sustain or back the evaluations and norms it contains. Marxist ethics acquires its force from theoretical ideas about nature and society; and what could any liberal political or moral ideal amount to without the theory of the freedom of decision? The relationship can also work in the other direction. Some powerful practical norm or strong evaluative pattern in a society can help to keep alive a given theory. When speaking of the ‘interrelatedness’ of parts of an ideology, we shall be referring to a relationship between its theoretical and evaluative or normative parts which can be vaguely described as supportive.

Let us now sum up the discussion, and stipulate a definition of an ideology: an ideology consists of interrelated theories, evalu­ations and norms about man, society and the universe in relation to man and society, which are held in common by a group and have a socio-political function.

This concept of ideology is vague. To avoid this, a very long discussion resulting in numerous precise concepts would have been necessary, and such an enterprise would not have been worth the effort for our present purposes. The criteria guiding our definition have been useful­ness, and the actual usage of the term. Marxism, in our terminology, is an ideology as are conservatism, liberalism and humanism. Existentialism is a borderline case because of its individualistic character, but it often has sufficient of a group function to count as an ideology. In Western societies there exist widespread ideologies, influential among ordinary people, which have no recognised label. One interesting study of such ideologies is to be found in Robert E. Lane’s well-known work, Political Ideology (1962). The ways of life studied by Charles Morris are also aspects of general, usually unnamed ideologies.⁹

The attentive reader will perhaps already have noticed an apparent problem in our definition. We have selected it to enable us to study the relationship between religion and one of its neighbours, but according to it many religions must count as ideologies. This is a quite deliberate complication, and, as will soon become clear, it has certain advan­tages.

It is necessary at this point to devote a few words to the concept of religion. We will not, however, enter the great debate about the definition of religion. What we shall point to is a core activity in all religions, namely relating in prayer or meditation to the ultimate power that governs the universe.

We are now in a position to draw up a map that may facilitate our orientation in the common terrain of religion and ideology. This we will do in the form of a cross-table, containing six cells.

The element of an ideology which we have called its socio-political function can be seen as a variable assuming three values, which we will call ‘strong’, ‘weak’ and ‘lacking’. In the same way, we can think of the devotional-transcendent element as also varying from strong to lacking. The appearance of the table will then be as in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Religion and Ideology

When different existing ideologies and religions are placed in this matrix, some interesting relationships become apparent. All the cells will be of interest except C3: an intellectual entity that lacks both a socio-political function and a devotional-transcendent element is by our definitions neither an ideology nor a religion.

Let us start with Al. Many ideologies have both a strong socio-political function and a strong devotional-transcendent ele­ment.

Moving on to Bl, we again come across some important ideologies. Take, for example, conservatism. Its theoretical aspects include religious ideas, and religious practices are also considered important even if they do not play a foreground role. The same is true of classical liberalism, and I do not think it unfair to refer to this group the ideology of most parties in present-day Western democracies that call them­selves Christian.¹⁰

The socio-political function of, for example, a con­servative ideology is of course a strong one, but we notice an important difference as compared with the Al systems. In an ideology like political Islam or Zionism, the theoretical aspects of the ideology—theories about the revealed transcendent reality—lend very strong support to the various moral and political rules and practices. In fulfilling a given social practice you are acting as the servant of God, and doing his will. In an ideology like conserva­tism, the situation is different. Theories relating to the growth of a society, for example, are of importance in the shaping of practical social and political rules. We have here the back-up constituents of an ideology. But the backing they provide does not, for better or worse, lend them the same psychological force. Neither ideological martyrs nor political fanatics are common among the adherents of Bl ideologies. This is an internal difference between the two types of ideology, and it does not mean that Bl ideologies do not have a strong socio-political function. The personalised difference between the two types of ideology is roughly that between Joan of Arc and Margaret Thatcher, or between Ayatollah Khomeini and Ronald Reagan. We will return to this difference when considering type Cl.

Cl ideologies are entirely lacking in the devotional- transcendent element. A clear example is Marxism, in its Leninistic form. However, many modern secularised, democratic political ideologies can belong to this group, including liberalism and the social democratic ideologies. Religious elements often play no role whatsoever for the function of these ideologies, and the socio-political function is pronounced. This, however, is not always the case, as has been observed by Bell and in the debate on the ‘death of ideologies’.¹¹ Consequently, modem democratic ideologies with no religious elements are sometimes better classified under B2.

To refer now to the issue of force, we can easily see that there is a difference between the various ideologies belonging to this group. Marxism, in its different forms, possesses a remarkable force of the same type as do the religious ideologies. This is perhaps what people mean when they say that Marxism functions as a religion. But let us try to go a step further, and ask what constitutes this similarity. As we have already said, the transcendent-devotional element of an ideology can back the rules of that ideology by giving them the status of the will of God. But another element can also lend force to a religious ideology. As a rule, a religious ideology offers an integrated, holistic view of the universe. Man acting in society is part of a vast system, and his work is integrated in a meaningful develop­ment. To act according to the ideology is to act according to the internal rules of the universe. It is quite possible also for a non-theistic system of religious metaphysics, such as Buddhism, to constitute an element in a forceful ideol­ogy. In fact, political Buddhism is gaining in importance on the ideological scene. To return to Marxism, it is obvious that as clearly as it denies the first trait of religious ideologies—theories of a God—it shares the second—an integrated, overall view of the universe. It is a plausible hypothesis that the likeness in force can be explained by this common trait. It also explains structural similarities. Both ideologies contain metaphysical theories of the same general type. The Marxist theory of a socialist society can be compared to Christian eschatology etc. It was similarities of this kind that Bertrand Russell was observing in the passage referred to above. It is perhaps worth making one further observation concerning force. The elements of an ideol­ogy that lend force to some of its rules seem to some extent to be independent of the content of those rules. In South Africa, Christian ideas of God seem to be able to strengthen both the apartheid laws, and the struggle against these.

Let us now go on to column A2, and ask whether any ideologies in the defined sense could be characterised in this way. It looks as if the Christian religion in many Western societies is precisely an ideology of this kind. The devotional-transcendent element is strong. It has a socio­political function, and to some extent colours social life. This function, however, is weak and cannot be compared in any way with the political function of the Catholic Church in Poland, or the role of Islam in Arab societies. From the standpoint of the non-religious Western ideologies, religion in its A2 form can be tolerated, actually regarded as positive. The force of religious convictions can even be used to strengthen parts of the non-religious ideology. The secularisation of Western societies seems now partly to involve a movement of Christianity from A2 to B2. The question of whether Christianity in a given society is an ideology of type A2 or B2 is one to be decided by sociological research. Such an enterprise would presuppose operational definitions of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’—a problem we cannot deal with here, but which it is perfectly possible to solve. Secularisation in the direction A2 to B2 is a different process from the movement from Al to A2, which can also be called secularisation. We can notice, finally, that even if the socio-political function of Christianity as a whole is often weak, the mechan­ism of force is still at work and can become apparent in certain issues, for example the problem of abortion.

In cell C2 we encounter non-religious political ideologies which function largely as decorative elements in pragmatic politi­cal movements. In the history of religions we sometimes speak of a deus otiosus. In the same way we could speak about dormant ideologies. When it comes, however, to the empirical question of how far the ideologies in prevailing Western societies have acquired this character, it is wise to be careful. The empirical grounds for generalisation and prognosis are weak.

Moving now to C, we are leaving the realm of ideologies. Nothing, in our definition, can be an ideology without at least some socio-political function. But we are not leaving religion. Some people, indeed, would say that we have now come to the core of it. In Cl we find the ‘inner religion’, and certain forms of mysticism. The devotional- transcendental element is strong, but the relationship between the religious man and his God does not greatly affect his life in society and has nothing to do with his political convictions, if any. The function of the religious group is devotional, and nothing else. Christianity may perhaps be like this, but hardly a religion such as Islam. The political and social aspects of the Islamic ideology are too firmly tied up with its theology. I have said that Christianity can perhaps exist without a socio-political function. There is reason to emphasise the word ‘perhaps’. In most cases a devotional practice seems to have social and political consequences, which takes us back to A2. Let us consider an introvert form of Christianity, like that of the Quakers. It functions, surely, as a forceful political ideology, and not only in questions of war and peace. From the standpoints, however, of the non-religious political ideologies belonging to Cl, it sometimes seems as if A3 is regarded as the ideal form of religion. This is the form of religion that can be tolerated in most Marxist societies; and, according to non-religious liberal ideologies, a private religion of this kind can be seen either as a positive source of satisfac­tion for the individual, or as a form of superstition which must be given the freedom to exist. As we have said above, liberal and, say, social democratic ideologies are of course also open to religions tending towards cell 2, in so far as they have a socio-political function of a non-dominant kind. But when religions are ideologies of the Al type, embracing in their concept for example civil law, as in the case of Islam, the concept of freedom of religion becomes problematical. In Communist societies like Russia, the Church has officially accepted a role that accords with A3 but in practice seems to function more like A2.

Are there any religions to be referred to B3? This is a question that cannot be answered without a closer discussion of the definition of religion. It is certain, however, that the conventional, disengaged adher­ence to a traditional church in many Western countries is a mental activity belonging to this type. The devotional-transcendent element is weak. God probably does not exist. There is no harm in sometimes saying a prayer, but it is surely of very little importance. In daily life and in politics, religion plays no role whatsoever. How far this kind of thinking characterises ordinary people in a secularised Christian society is a question that remains to be investigated.

What I hope has become clear from this survey is that the field common to religion and ideology is not easily described. There are no clearly defined entities to be characterised and compared. A religion such as Christianity assumes many different shapes and functions when seen in the context of the political ideologies, and a complex network of similarities and dissimilarities is evident between the doctrines and functions of religions and ideologies. We find patterns of ideas, rules and attitudes that display similarities and dissimilarities in their content and function, and we can describe certain aspects of this intellectual reality by using such concepts as religion and ideology, and by using more specific labels such as humanism and conservatism. Clear comparisons between the content of different ideologies, philosophies, theologies etc. can only be made if we restrict ourselves to specific authors, or to certain normative textbooks. And even such sources require careful analysis. It is not, for example, certain that similar theories in different ideologies and refigions are supposed to answer the same questions, or play the same role in the totality of the view. Against this background, I have no desire to offer the usual brief summaries of the more common ideologies and philosophies. In order, however, not entirely to neglect a presentation of the content of different modem views, I will outline some characteristic ideas from ideologies that are sometimes seen as alternatives to religion, and discuss their relation to different religions.

The first of these ideas is taken from existentialism, and it says that an objective, impersonal attitude never gives us any true knowledge regarding the situation of man. We have to be personally concerned, make an unguarded choice, and live ourselves into the reality of human existence. True knowledge is knowledge from the inside. Kierkegaard says

For an objective reflection the truth becomes an object, something objective, and thought must be pointed away from the subject. For a subjective reflection the truth becomes a matter of appropriation, of inwardness, of subjectivity, and thought must probe more and more deeply into the subject and his subjectivity.¹²

This idea provides to a large extent the basis for subsequent existentialist authors. Kierkegaard was a Christian theologian, and he surely saw it as a Christian idea. It has been greatly used in later Christian theology, but it is also central to such atheist authors as Sartre. To compare existentialism and Christianity is a complicated task. Existentialist ideas like this can in fact be incorporated in the theology of various religions.

Then we have an important ideological standpoint clearly opposed to that just described. According to this view, the only factual basis of private and social actions must be the results of strictly objective empirical science. We are now on the ground of behaviourism, turned into an ideology. Skinner is here the standard example, especially in his programmatic book, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1972). This idea, the implications of which cannot be discussed in this context, is incompatible not only with existentialism but also with most religious standpoints. It can, however, be rendered more precise in such a way as to become compatible with Marxism, even if Skinner would have denied this.

One fundamental Marxist idea which plays a promi­nent role in many modern discussions is that the socio-economical circum­stances of a society are causally primary to its intellectual, cultural and political development. Modified forms of this idea can be combined with refigion— both Christianity and Islam—as has also been done both in practical and theoretical terms.¹³ In a weak form, involving little more than the assignment of great importance to socio-economical factors in history, it has become commonplace.

The ideologies that we call materialistic have in common the idea that some form of matter is primary, ontologically and causally, in the universe. If something other than matter exists, then it can be causally explained from matter and the laws governing matter. This ideo­logical element has been alive since antiquity, and acquired a powerful form through Marx. It is still a clearly anti-religious element in our culture, but it can be incorporated in various secular ideologies, for instance secular liberalism.¹⁴

A powerful idea of quite another kind which has been incorporated in modern ideologies, both secular and religious, stems from psychoanalysis. This is that every human being has a powerful uncon­scious, which to a large extent governs his actions and thoughts.

I think it will now suffice to take one more example, and one from the evaluative field. Let us take the idea that most men live in a corrupted state. This can be found in Marxism, and the reason given for the corruption is the predominance of the class structure of human societies. The actual idea of such corruption, however, is easily recognisable also in differ­ent forms in the Christian theology. A clear difference is also evident in this respect between Christian and Muslim anthropology.

This list of isolated ideas in no way negates the possibility of comparing and choosing between overall systems. It is intended simply as a warning against excessively general comparisons, and a reminder of the floating limits of religions and ideologies. This last thesis will be illustrated once again in the next section, when we move on to make some preliminary remarks on the problem of making a reasonable choice between different religions and ideologies. The main aim of this section is not to solve the general problem of such a decision but simply to point out some further traits that can characterise both religion and ideology.

To a certain extent, we grow up into a religion or ideology. Or at least we unconsciously acquire, through our social environment, a certain way of thinking and reacting. This, however, does not contradict the fact that we are able as grown-up, rational human beings to choose between different stand­points in the field of religion and ideology. The problem at this point is that some ideologies and religions affect even the rational standards for such a choice. The rationality is defined by the ideology. This is the case in the moral field, when the good is defined as what is in accordance with the will of God, and his will is regarded as being known only within a given religion. The same situation exists regarding a decision as to the theoretical aspects, if the ability to arrive at the truth is restricted to a given class, or to those in receipt of special gifts from the Holy Spirit. The mere statement that a rational choice is possible—in principle for all men—in the field of religion and ideology seems to involve the repudiation of certain ideologies and religions.¹⁵ For my own part, I regard such a repudiation as reasonable. A rational choice will then involve four steps. The first is to compare the content of the evaluative parts of the ideologies concerned with our own moral convictions and experiences. We may perhaps find that a democratic ideology is to be pre­ferred to a totalitarian one, or that a pessimistic view of man’s moral powers is more realistic than an optimistic one. The next step is to look at those theoretical parts of the ideology or religion which can be tested by scientific methods within the disciplines of social, economic or natural science, and historical research. An ideology or religion which is open to scientific research, and does not contradict obvious scientific results, is then to be preferred to one which does. The third step is the most difficult. This is to test the metaphysical aspects of the views entailed—such as theories about tran­scendental realities, or the ultimate source of order in nature and society. There is no agreement among philosophers whatsoever as to the possibility of a rational metaphysics, or about the rational standards of any possible metaphysics. I cannot deal, here, with this philosophical question. My con­viction, however, is that a rational metaphysics exists, but that some basic choices in metaphysics are of a more personal nature than can be contained within scientific reasoning. The final step in the procedure is to study the internal relationships between different parts of the religion or ideology. Do they mutually support each other, or are there tensions—or even contradictions—within the system? Obviously, a choice of the kind now hinted at deserves ideologies and religions that are clearly formulated and explicit. In spite of its obvious dangers, the intellectual comparison we mentioned above therefore has some value.

These brief remarks point to a similar decision­making procedure for religions and ideologies, a fact that again underlines their close relationship. Perhaps, indeed, it is inadequate to call them neigh­bours. ‘Members of the same family’ would be more adequate.

Notes

1. Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy (New York, 1945), Ch. IV.

2. See for example J. Plamenatz, Ideology (London, 1970), pp. 23ff.

3. My way of delimiting the concept ideology here is influenced by discussions

with Professor Robert Heeger of Utrecht. See for example R. Heeger, ‘Vad ar en ideologi?’, Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift, 1972, pp. 307—25.

4. H.M. Johnson in International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences 7, 1968, p. 77.

5. K. Marx, F. Engels, Werke XIX, p. 190 (Berlin, 1969). V. Pareto, Oeuvres Completes (Geneva and Paris, 1956), III § 1043, IV § 2173 and § 2440.

6. See K. Marx, F. Engels, Werke III (Geneva and Paris, 1958), p. 70.

7. International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences 7, 1968, p. 66.

8. CJ. Friedrich, Man and his Government, an Empirical Theory of Politics (New York, 1963), p. 90.

9. Charles Morris, Varieties of Human Value (Chicago, 1956).

10. Conservatism here means the stream of ideas going back to Edmund Burke (1729-97). Classical liberalism is the political ideology of for instance J. Locke (1632-1704) andJ.S. Mill (1806-73).

11. See Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York, 1960).

12. S. Kierkegaard, Samlade Varker, utg af A.B. Drachmann, J.L. Heidberg og H.O. Lauge, VII:159f. (Copenhagen, 1901-6).

13. The dialogue between Marxists and Christians has resulted in a great number of books and articles which cannot by listed here. See further J. van der Beat, The Christian-Marxist Dialogue. An annotated bibliography 1959-69. WCC 1969 and for an analysis Peter Hebblethwaite, The Christian-Marxist Dialogue and Beyond (New York, 1977).

14. Different types of materialism will be discussed in the paragraph on atheism below.

15. See my article ‘Nagra problem vid livsaskadningsanalys’, Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift, 46 (1970).