THE FIGURINE FROM BEREKHAT RAM
One of the earliest indisputable cases of a non-utilitarian object which was deliberately modified by human hands is an item from Syria, commonly called the “Berekhat Ram figurine” (found by Israeli scholars working in the occupied Golan Heights, and named after their name for the site).
The object itself would be totally unremarkable, being little more than a pebble of irregular shape (35 x 25 x 21 mm), were it not for a deliberate cutting which seems to form a collar separating the smaller upper part from the lower part. This may indicate that the object was very moderately modified to enhance a “figure” already inherent in the piece (at least in the minds of the creators). Certainly, the work of d’Errico and others confirmed deliberate “grooving” and “possible abrasion” which modified the pebble to its present form (d’Errico & Nowell 2000:
139).
In this sense, the piece itself is thus truly remarkable because it was found in association with Acheulean tools and lay in a deposit which was sealed by two lava flows, meaning that in geological terms it could be dated to ca. 250,000- 280,000 years ago (but in my own interpretation, it must be stressed that the object as known could be significantly older, perhaps by as much as 100,000 years). In genealogical terms, this antedates our earliest direct ancestors, the Anatomically Modern Humans who first appear outside Africa around 100,000 years ago, and who may originally have appeared some time shortly after the piece was created. The work must have been executed by Neanderthal man, or perhaps even by Homo erectus, a creature with a brain roughly half the size of our own and that of the Anatomically Modern Humans. As a similar item (perhaps even older, but less securely dated) has since been found, the figurine discussed here need not have been completely singular for the quarter of a million years which separate it from its nearest “relatives”, the familiar figurines of the European Upper Palaeolithic.
The identity of the maker would be extremely important as there is very little evidence that Neanderthals engaged in any practices which could be identified as “symbolic” before such practices were known among our own ancestors. In my opinion, the evidence allows us to conclude that although the Neanderthals were older, they do not appear to have been the first to engage in symbolic practices. Were the Berekhat Ram piece a Neanderthal product (rather than a Homo erectus creation), it would be very important in the biological history of cognition since the piece simply cannot have been either manufactured or influenced by representatives of our own species.
Whether it is a figurine or not is open to debate, but clearly someone used some tool to modify the object in a fashion which allows us moderns to imagine that the object might have been understood in the past as (at the very least) a step on the way to “representation”. D’Errico stresses that the modifications of the object “are inconsistent with a purely functional” interpretation (ibid.: 163), and that the purpose of the object may well have been to convey some kind of message - even if he hesitates to identify what it might have been intended to depict.
I would stress that this particular part of the argument is an artifact of the “New Archaeology” which tended to assume that any “economic” interpretation of material was legitimate, but that any “ritual” interpretation was either a nonstarter or open to debate. On the other hand, however, some of the more traditional archaeologists, such as Leroi-Gourhan, went so far as to claim that any “non-functional” usage could be automatically interpreted as religious. Obviously, with the advent of “post-processual” archaeology (which contrasts with the preceding era of the New Archaeology where it was assumed that everything had a social or practical function), it is no longer necessary to justify claims about “practicality”, but this does not resolve the problem of deciding the criteria which would allow something to be interpreted as representing “religion”.
Explicitly, d’Errico assumes that the only means of approaching the object is by means of a “step by step” process separating (1) “the possible symbolic value of the object”, (2) its representational nature” and (3) “the subject represented” (ibid.: 158).
Implicitly, he also includes the preliminary steps of (a) demonstrating an anthropogenic explanation of the marks on the object and (b) demonstrating a non-utilitarian (in the sense of non-economic, practical) function of the object. This is a sound methodology whereby each individual stage is separately analysed - effectively leaving no doubt about the “discourse” aspects of the analysis and leaving any possible “meaning” out of the discussion, without dismissing the concept that some message might originally have been present.Of fundamental import is the suggestion that the proposed base of the figurine was deliberately flattened “perhaps to allow the object to stand” (ibid.: 141). D’Errico does not claim to know that it is a figurine or a representation or a symbol or an icon. He stresses (a) that objects can be simultaneously “iconic” and “symbolic” in the modern world with different meanings combined in them and also (b) that using modern thought or ethnographic parallels cannot contribute to understanding the earliest efforts at representation. He thus cautiously suggests that this figurine is possibly “iconic” and related to “symbolling”. D’Errico stresses that it is doubtful whether “it will be possible to reach agreement about the subject represented”. It is significant that he adds, “One can even wonder if this is really important” (ibid.: 144). Thus, d’Errico is not concerned with interpreting an emic meaning, while allowing that it may have been present.
However, while allowing that a meaning may have been present, he does not claim to understand the cognitive level we can ascribe to our distant ancestors. What distinguishes d’Errico’s approach as a prehistorian is that he distinguishes between an innate biological human cognitive capacity and the historical development of cognitive capacity. While we modern humans are obviously born with a certain capacity, d’Errico stresses that this emerged historically. D’Errico’s work with Neanderthal material has likewise persuaded him that Neanderthals deliberately created (and presumably used) non-practical objects.
In this sense, the treatment of the Berekhat Ram figurine demonstrates that the origins of “symbolling” lie in the ages before the ancestors of the Anatomically Modern Humans - and that these were clearly different from the chimpanzees, who have never been seen producing material culture in the wild. D’Errico and Nowell conclude:In our view, there are two possibilities to consider. One is that the origin of symbolism is essentially a radical, qualitative change in human cognition.... either symbolism is the result of a biological change that occurred at a precise moment in human evolution, and from that time onward modern humans became symbol-users; or symbolling is the result of a cognitive change within a particular cultural system... Another possibility is that the emergence of symbolling does not correspond to an abrupt change but to a more gradual process... This scenario implies that at some point in time there existed hominid societies which were only “partially” symbolic or where the system of symbolling was less complex than that of modern
humans...
(Ibid.·. 145)
This represents a radical break with several different traditions as it severs the link between symbolism and modern humans, while also widening the gap between us and the chimpanzees. A similar figure which may be older has since been found, underscoring the importance of the thesis (Bednarik 2003).