The Ottomans

Of the rival emirates that emerged after the Seljuk defeat, the Ottomans were destined to achieve dominance and establish an empire that lasted for six centuries. Having been granted lands at Sogiit in Western Anatolia bordering on Byzantine territory, the Ottomans attracted to their ranks large numbers of gazis (warriors eager to expand the frontiers of Islam) since this region offered the best prospects of success against the Christians.

It would be wrong, however, to conclude that unre­lenting enmity towards Christians was a constant feature of the Turkish expansion into Anatolia. We have already seen how Christian mercenaries helped the Seljuks crush an uprising of disaffected heterodox Muslims. More than once Turkish troops, with the approval of their rulers, fought for Byzan­tines who sought their aid against other Christians. Many Turks, even at the highest level, married daughters of Christian families. In areas that were overrun by the Turks, Christians, as ‘People of the Book’, received the privileged treatment afforded them by Islamic law. Thus, provided they were not captured fighting against Islam, they were guaranteed life, liberty and sometimes property too. If they did not convert to Islam they had to pay a poll-tax and contribute financially to Muslim armies and accept a number of other discriminatory measures but they were free to practise their religion and were exempt from military service.

Since our primary concern here is with religion in Turkey we shall not dwell upon the conquests, marriage settlements and other means by which Otto­man boundaries were expanded to cover a vast empire with its capital in Istanbul but we shall instead examine the place of Islam in the organisation of the Ottoman state.

When working at its best the unique Ottoman sys­tem of government made a considerable contribution to the effectiveness of control over a vast empire and won the admiration of such astute analysts as Machiavelli. Many historians have portrayed this system as comprising two rival institutions keeping one another in check: the ‘Muslim Institution’, consisting of the ulema who ensured that the serial was observed, and the ‘Ruling Institution’ containing the personnel who formulated and implemented government policies, waged war and maintained security. This traditional analysis tends to obscure certain important realities such as the constant struggle for power waged between rural and urban interests and the often parallel struggle by certain tarikats and other unorthodox Muslims against the Sunni establishment. To understand these realities it is necessary to look more closely at some of the important power groups within the empire, noting the effect religion had upon each of them.

At the top was the Sultan, the ‘Shadow of God upon earth’ and, after the assumption of the caliphate, the ‘Representative of the Prophet’ too.

The group most obviously concerned with ensuring that the sultan kept strictly to the path of Islam was the ulema. They based their claim to exercise authority upon their expert knowledge of the Qur’an and serial which they gained by study under a miiderris (teacher) at a medrese (an institute of higher theological education, normally autonomous and situated within a mosque complex in a city). Most medreses were funded by a vakif, an Islamic charitable foundation, so tuition, accommodation and food were provided free, thus giving the chance of advancement to intelligent and pious sons of Muslim families. Islam dominated the curriculum; students were taught—mostly by rote learning—Qur’anic studies, Islamic law and juris­prudence, Arabic and calligraphy and a few other subjects. Upon graduation a student received from his miiderris an icazet—a certificate of competence— and he was then eligible to follow a career as a member of the ulema in law, teaching or administration. In all three of these branches knowledge of the Serial was of the greatest importance.

A medrese graduate who chose a career in law could expect to be sent first to some small town or district as kadi, a post whose duties included not only those of judge and public prosecutor but also involvement in food distribution, road maintenance and the conscription system, ensuring that the orders of central government were implemented, and keeping a watch on other state officials and reporting irregularities. In addition to his daily wage, which was based on his grade, the kadi received a fixed sum from the parties involved in the cases he tried. The promotion path took a successful kadi to increasingly prestigious places. To progress beyond certain levels he had first to go back to a medrese and spend time teaching at an advanced level.

It may be remarked here that another of the $eyhiilis- lam’s tasks was to issue fetv as—formal opinions on questions put to him. Throughout the empire muftis at lower levels issued/etpas in their own areas. As the Ottomans upheld the Hanafi legal school and appointed only hanafi judges, only fetvas issued by Hanafi muftis were admissible in Ottoman courts. The work ofinterpreting the $eriat fell to themiiftis, while the kadis had to see it made effective. The muftis did not go so far as to claim the right to new interpretation since, unlike the religious authorities in Iran, they accepted that there was no longer any room for innovation in establishing religious precedent. (In the words of the traditional saying, ‘the door of ictihad—religious innovation—was closed’.) This left scope for the sultan to introduce legislation (kanun) based on accepted custom and the requirements of the state to deal with matters on which the $eriat was not explicit. He could not issue laws contrary to the $eriat and the ulema were ever watchful to prevent him strengthening his own position at their expense.

A major rival to the ulema in the struggle for power within the empire was what many historians have dubbed the ‘Ruling Institu­tion’. Its ranks were filled mostly by men who were technically slaves owing complete allegiance to the sultan. The reason for this odd arrangement lay in the severe limits the $eriat imposed on the rights a ruler could exercise over free-born Muslims. To get round this problem ‘slaves’ were appointed to serve the sultan in the standing army, the bureaucracy and the palace. Over this category of person the sultan had the power of life or death. The source of these slaves was originally the sultan’s share (one fifth) of prisoners captured in war. But in time a levy system known as dev$irme provided most of the new male recruits for the ruling institution by taking a proportion of the boys from Christian families, mostly in the Balkans, and sending them to Turkey to be trained for the sultan’s service. The most promising were sent to palace schools to be groomed for high government office. After intensive training there followed by a period of personal service to the sultan in the palace, they were sent at about the age of twenty-five to gain experience in battle or in administrative posts in the provinces. Progress thereafter took the most successful through the various ranks of officialdom right up to that of Grand Vizir, second only to the sultan himself and with precedence over the $eyhill- islam.

The system of filling vacancies in the ruling institu­tion with the children of subject peoples of a different religion was designed to ensure their dependence upon and loyalty to the sultan and prevent the rise of powerful families within the palace establishment. But as well as maintain­ing the allegiance of those engaged in ruling the empire the sultan also had to beware of alienating the people who were ruled, the important subject class. These produced the revenue needed to keep the empire going: tradesmen, merchants, craftsmen, peasants, shepherds and so on. They themselves had organisations that were forces to be reckoned with. For example, among Turkish craftsmen and small traders the trade guild called ahilik (brother­hood) was a particularly influential body of which sultans had to take note. It not only set standards of workmanship and strict ethical conduct based upon Muslim principles for its members at recognised grades from apprentice to master craftsman, it also played a conspicuous part in maintaining order in the community, particularly in areas where the central government’s control was weak. Early Ottoman sultans accepted formal positions in this brotherhood.

Many members of the subject class belonged to tarikats. The tarikats continued to reflect the Sunni-Shi‘a schism and often the urban-rural divide too. Some attracted royal favours and even royal members. Others became associated with rebellious elements, taking part in the disturbances that broke out periodically in echoes of the Babai uprising of Seljuk times. Shi'a tarikats were the most disaffected, as the Shi'a detested the Sunni rule of the Ottomans, and in the early sixteenth century many Shi‘a tribesmen and peasants threw in their lot with the Safavid Shah Ismail of neighbouring Iran. Acting decisively against this internal and external threat to Ottoman supremacy, Selim I moved first against the Shi‘a of Anatolia, putting 40,000 of them to the sword, then routed Shah Ismail at the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514. Although he went on to enhance his prestige as the most powerful Muslim ruler of his day by establishing Turkish rule over Syria, Egypt and the Hejaz—thus assuming guardianship of the holy cities of Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem—Selim is still execrated by Shi‘a Turks for his ruthlessness towards them. His victory over the Shi'a was also a victory for the $eyhiilislam and the ulema in their bitter struggle against the Shi‘a tarikats.

Within the subject class non-Muslim communities were granted considerable autonomy under what was known as the millet system. In effect the sultan authorised the religious leaders of the different communities to run their affairs—not only spiritual but also judicial and educational—and accept responsibility for their conduct. From the fifteenth century there were separate millets for Orthodox Christians, Armenian Gregorians and Jews. More millets were recognised in the nineteenth cen­tury. Ottoman tolerance towards non-Muslims attracted 100,000 Jews to major Turkish cities in 1492 when they fled from persecution in Spain and Portugal.

While the Ottomans recognised religious differ­ences, they did not distinguish between members of any religion on racial grounds. So, Turks, Arabs and Kurds were all treated as members of the Islamic community. Muslims actually constituted under half the total popu­lation of the Ottoman Empire at its height, and they did not form a separate millet but were subject to direct rule. Unlike non-Muslim subjects they were liable for military service (members of millets paid a poll-tax instead), so in this respect could be considered less privileged than members of millets, though non-Muslims were deemed inferior and suffered other disadvan­tages.

Nationality was, however, important when certain Western European powers gained special privileges for their citizens who were living in the Ottoman Empire conducting business. Under the capitula­tions system, these people became subject to the jurisdiction of their own consular courts and were exempt from local taxes. Naturally this arrange­ment gave these foreigners considerable advantages. In time the capitulations system became the subject of scandalous abuse and had an increasingly harmful effect upon the Turkish economy.