4 THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT! A VIEW ON COGNITIVE THEORY AND THE FIRST-MILLENNIUM EXTISPICY RITUAL
ULLA SUSANNE KOCH, INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR
In the past decades scholars from fields such as anthropology, science of religion, and psychology have sought to understand — or “explain” as it is often put — religious and magical phenomena in the framework of “cognitive science”; inspired by the advances in areas of research within neuroscience and cognitive psychology.[17] At the same time, as this symposium illustrates, the study of the well-nigh ubiquitous phenomenon of divination has also blossomed in recent years.
However, most research of a more theoretical nature has been done within the study of contemporary, mostly African, divination systems.[18] Why could cognitive theory be relevant for divination? For one thing, cognitive theory is a way of getting past the sometimes more confusing than enlightening discussions of definitions. The very nature of divination is a topic that has often been discussed. It has been described as having, or uniting, traits which are characteristic of religion, magic, science,[19] or scholarship — or quite the reverse, it has been defined as something of a bastard phenomenon NOT quite belonging to the domain of religion, magic, science, or scholarship. Divination can also be described from a purely functionalist perspective, as a way of dealing with social or cognitive uncertainty, or a way of controlling the environment, for example, protecting the king, “making it so” by a performative magical act (Cryer 1994). These purposes it undoubtedly also served, but that does not explain its expressions or content, neither are these functions characteristic only of divination but are equally valid for a range of other cultural and/or religious phenomena. It could also be argued that divination is not only a way of reducing anxiety but could also equally well be a way of generating it. The reports of the astrologers to the Neo-Assyrian court amply demonstrate that assiduous observation of the earth and sky for ominous signs ensures no lack of new topics for worry. Furthermore, it has been posited that religion is “a manifestly practical enterprise” (Tremlin 2006: 112). It can be argued that the primary function of everyday religious practice is not to ease existential angst, to hold societies together, or to answer cosmological questions — it plays this and other roles — but “the central role that religion plays in peoples’or “the orderliness which it may ascribe to the universe” a number of researchers have allowed divination at least a tentative space within the objective sphere of Western science.” A. K. Guinan (2002: 18-19) stresses the importance of discussing divination per se, not “subsumed into these larger cultural categories” (i.e., magic, science, religion). Science and divination are similar in that they both are casuistic and paradigmatic in form “but [divination] cannot do what it claims.” This is of course an objection raised against magic of all sorts.
ULLA SUSANNE KOCH
lives is to get things done, to make things right, and to keep them that way.” I believe that to a certain extent this function at least holds true for divination. Among other things, divination has been interpreted as primarily a heuristic pursuit, as a form of sense-making involving a categorization of the universe.4 Divination analyzed from the point of view of hermeneutics, divination viewed as a semantic system, is certainly rewarding and relevant. The reading of signs according to a fixed semantic code is central to many divinatory systems, not least the Mesopotamian, and in Mesopotamian divination it cuts across such distinctions as signa im- petrativa and oblativa, provoked/induced and unprovoked omens. Both induced signs as well as signs sent outside the frame of a ritual setting were read according to a fixed code.5
Categorization and manipulation of symbols have long been of central concern for cognitive psychologists,6 and unraveling the semantic code utilized in a given divinatory system can yield insight into the social, ethical, and other normative bias of the culture from which it springs.7 The diviner holds the “hermeneutic keys” to the divinatory code.
The various hermeneutic practices used for instance within Mesopotamian divination as a means of revealing layers upon layers of meaning in the divinatory system are themselves worthy of study. Some, but not all, are explained and attested in the letters from ancient scholars as well as in commentaries and esoteric texts. However, this approach is in danger of neglecting the functions mentioned as well as the undeniable magical/religious aspects of many divinatory practices, as, for instance, extispicy. Divination is in fact so complex and multifaceted a phenomenon, that I believe it would be overly reductionist to explain it with reference to a single theory. Like “religion,” divination is what Boyer called an “impure object”8 exactly because it can not be explained or described by a single theoretical framework. However, I believe there is general consensus that whatever roots divination may have, and whatever purposes it may serve — be they epistemological, psychological, social, political, or religious — divination is certainly a practical means of obtaining otherwise inaccessible information: “divination is a way of exploring the unknown in order to elicit answers (that is, oracles) to questions beyond the range of ordinary human understanding.”9 Even this simple view on divination — as a means of gathering information — presents a very confused picture. The confusion is immediately apparent already from a cursory look at the evidence. The kind of knowledge concerned can pertain to the future, the present, or the past; the source can be intentional agents: gods, ancestors, spirits, or there may be no personified interlocutor as such; the privileged knowledge can be obtained by various means, ranging from such quiet pursuits as studying the sky or reading other environmental cues, performing an experiment using a special technique, to the more spectacular or even violent in the form of possession and ecstasy. Divination can involve elaborate rituals performed by specialists or it can be part of daily life accessible to Everyman.10Extispicy was one of the most pervasive and successful of the many Mesopotamian divi- natory practices.
With roots going back to the third millennium, it gained in importance over the millennia and became an important element in decision-making at the Neo-Assyrian court. This may have been because it was a practical means of obtaining privileged information concerning matters of immediate urgency to the individual or the state. In the following I try to apply elements from cognitive theory of religion to see if they can help shed light on a particular question posed by the Mesopotamian ritual of extispicy viewed in this light, namely why the only remedy for an unfavorable extispicy was to perform another? If necessary we know the diviner could repeat the procedure up to three times in a row, but in the worst case, when the answers were consistently against the client’s hopes and desires, he just had to wait patiently and not try again until after the stipulated term had expired.11 The gods did not like too-persistent questioning: “If the diviner constantly performs extispicy, he dies the death of transgression (arnu)”; three chances were all he had.12First we must test if asking again, perhaps rephrasing the question, really was the only option open to the diviner and his client. If we accept that extispicy was not countered by apotropaic or appeasement rituals, the next question is, why? That this should be so is in my opinion by no means self-evident. Alone from a purely theological point of view one could argue that in extispicy you ask the gods for their decision, but in other forms of divination the will of the gods is no less directly expressed — in astrology the gods themselves signal their intentions with their celestial manifestations. Why is it possible to counter the expressed will of the gods in one case and not in the other? It is necessary to take a look at the kind of information obtained by extispicy, was it somehow different from that gained by other kinds of divination? Did the divinatory technique itself play a role? And finally, what was the relationship to the structure of the apotropaic rituals themselves?
Is there any evidence that extispicy was countered by apotropaic rituals? One of the characteristics of divination is that it serves as a guide to action, often ritual action.
As put by Ann Guinan, “magic and divination operate from the same semantic foundation, but always bear an inverse relationship to each other”... “what divination reveals, magic can resolve” (Guinan 2002: 18). From the ethnographic record we know that very often the results of a divinatory session are indeed closely linked with specific apotropaic or appeasement rituals. Divination itself and the ritual actions responding to the information gained by divination thus form part of the same event frame13 but are not identical. Indeed, an Assyrian scholar stresses the role of the god Ea as sender of both omens and corresponding apotropaic rituals: “Ea has done, Ea has undone. He who caused the earthquake has also created the apotropaic ritual against it” (Parpola 1993: no. 56 rev. 9-12). It is often more or less automatically assumed thatapotropaic rituals were associated also with extispicy. For instance, Erica Reiner[20] suggested that one might expect all the major omen compendia to have had parallel apotropaic rituals, and she assumes that they existed for both astrological omina and for the omina collected in the extispicy series Barutu. Namburbis are of course well attested for “everyday divination” of the kind found in the series Summa izbu or Summa alu. Whereas the letters and reports from Assyrian and Babylonian scholars demonstrate that aversive action in the form of various rituals, including namburbis, was not uncommon in connection with astrological omina,[21] there is no similar evidence that apotropaic or appeasement rituals were ever performed in connection with extispicy. Aversive action in response to unfavorable extispicy is never explicitly mentioned in the scholarly correspondence of the Neo-Assyrian kings, nor to my knowledge are they attested to in texts from the second millennium.
Namburbis that explicitly mention extispicy do exist but are in fact quite rare. As far as I can tell there were actually two different types of namburbis directly connected with some aspect of extispicy:
1.
Prophylactic rituals performed to safeguard the diviner and the extispicy2. Apotropaic rituals performed to avert the evil portended by a failed extispicy
The prophylactic type of namburbi was quite rare, it included rituals for brisk trade and for bringing distant people near. The diviner could perform a namburbi before a divination session in order to prepare himself properly for performing extispicy, for instance, washing his leather bag[22] which contained the cultic implements of his trade such as cedar wood.[23] He could also perform rituals which safeguarded him from failure when serving an important client like the king. In the early morning before an extispicy, he could perform a namburbi to ensure that Shamash and Adad would stand by him in his “verdict,” that he may experience renown in extispicy (tanatti baruti amaru) and make himself famous (suma raba leqU).[24] The apotropaic type of namburbi with reference to extispicy is structured like any other nam- burbi used to avert evil omens. The namburbis seem to refer to phenomena that prevented the proper performance of the sacrifice and obstructed a reliable reading of the extispicy. This would include extreme anomalies of the entrails. The semantic code of extispicy involved the study of tiny variations on a theme; in general, serious malformations were of no relevance, or rather, they could change the whole session into something completely different and in itself ill-portending. I suggest that the purpose of these namburbis therefore was not to counteract an unfavorable extispicy as such but to protect against the evil portended by
to perform an incense offering or simply to raise a rod made of cedar. Compare the discussion by Starr (1983: 48). Cedar wood is already mentioned in connection with what appears to be a reference to extispicy in a Sumerian source, Poebel 1914: no. 76 col. vi 2-10: me-bi su mu-na-ab-d[u·,] mds-gid-gid a d.utu-se mu-un-zi-[x] gudd su-sikil-gim mds-gid-gid-e gis.eren d.utu-se mu-un-zi-zi-i u> ti-la ku-li-ni-im en- na us-a galfi-la gal-ni'--im “He made its rituals perfect for him, the diviner rises before father Utu, like a guda-priest with clean hands the diviner raises cedar wood to Utu again and again.” 18 Zimmern 1901: nos. 75-78.
technical problems connected with the performance of the divinatory ritual. For instance, a namburbi could be performed if the slaughter itself was somehow defective — if no blood ran from the veins when the neck of the sacrificial animal was cut, if important organs were missing, or if they were seriously deformed.19 This view is in agreement with Maul (1994: 432), who suggested that the namburbis were performed due to the “Schweigen des Samas,” that is, when the extispicy ritual failed to produce an answer. He does, however, assume that namburbis could also be used to counteract the evil omens of an unfavorable extispicy, and he suggests that a namburbi amulet20 and a universal namburbi21 with reference to extispicy illustrates this. I believe that neither the amulet nor the universal namburbi are actually directed against an unfavorable extispicy result, but like the rest are directed against a failed or flawed performance of extispicy. The amulet mentions ill omens stemming from “the evil of flawed, terrifying signs, evil and unfavorable (signs) from performing the ritual (lipit qati), or from the lamb having a disease (hiniq immeri) or from making the sacrifice (niqa naqu) or from anything else in performance of extispicy (nepesti baruti).” All this could well refer to evil portended by signs observed in connection with the performance of extispicy, not the extispicy result itself. In the namburbis the evil omens stem from flesh which is described as siru hatuti pardutu22 “flawed or terrifying” flesh, or as haliqti siri23 * missing flesh. Neither hatu nor pardu are normal terms for unfavorable signs found in the protases of extispicy omina or in the extispicy reports. Circumstances surrounding the performance of divination were themselves observed and interpreted as ominous signs, as we know was the case with the behavior of the sacrificial animal itself.24 This resembles the way we take omens from the act of catching the bride’s bouquet — something which is totally unrelated to the efficacy of the Christian marital ritual. The ill omen averted is thus not the result of an extispicy, and is not interpreted as such, but rather as an individual unfavorable sign which could be countered by an apotropaic ritual. The two known namburbi catalogs, one from late Uruk, the other from Assurbanipal’s library, include references to exactly these two types of namburbi in connection with extispicy and can therefore not be taken as evidence that namburbis associated with the extispicy series itself existed.25
Interestingly, the ancient Greek version of divination by the entrails of a sacrificial animal used in warfare also had no link with apotropaia. M. Flower suggests that extispicy was the last of the major divinatory practices to reach Greece from the Near East. The Greeks themselves
considered the art of divination to be either a homegrown idea or imported from Egypt, by the classical period extispicy was certainly a fully integrated part of Greek culture, whatever its origins.[26] From Xenophon’s Anabasis we have a description of how the generals of the famous army of 10,000 Greek mercenaries practiced divination from “bloody sacrifice” on the route into and out of Babylonia in 401 B.C. Since the mercenaries were under Spartan leadership the practices described probably are closest to Lacedaemonian customs rather than Athenian but we know that the practice of divination by inspection of the entrails, primarily the liver, was widespread in classical antiquity. (Pseudo-) Xenophon elsewhere describes how the Spartan king would perform sacrifices before every decisive step of a military campaign:[27]
• At home before taking off.
• At the boundary of the city-state (polis) before crossing.
• At the river.
• In the camp.
• At the front lines before joining battle.
• After the victory (of course).
Most of these are decision points to which any Assyrian king would nod his head in recognition. The rituals and sacrifices differed from Mesopotamian practice in many respects; for one thing they seem to always have been addressed to the god most closely involved or relevant to the situation at hand. En route, Xenophon and the other generals performed sacrifices almost every day and sometimes many times a day. At one point they were so low on livestock suitable for sacrifice and eating that they bought a draught animal simply to perform divination in order to know whether it would be a good idea to go out foraging (pillaging the locals, that is). At no time, even when facing the enemy or hunger, could anything avert an unfavorable sign. The Greek soldiers wait and starve, and their generals perform one sacrifice after the other, sometimes rephrasing the question, until they get a favorable sign in an offering.[28] As in Mesopotamia, the limit seems to have been three performances of divination a day in the context of warfare as described by Xenophon. Apparently, however, it was possible in other contexts to avert unfavorable omens by acts of expiation and sacrifice before performing a renewed extispicy (Flower 2008: 80-84).
Extispicy was not the only kind of Mesopotamian divination with no known associated apotropaia. There exist no namburbis that mention signs obtained by two other forms of induced omina: lecanomancy (oil divination) and libanomancy (smoke divination), and also none for the physiognomic omen series Alamdimmu and other omina concerned with the behavior or appearance of a person.29 Well aware that the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, Reiner suggested that the distinction between which omina required aversive action and which did not could be due to the character of the divination itself, whether it was “prognostic” or “diagnostic.” The assumption is that since a diagnostic omen would be more concerned with a cause in the past, it was perceived as not possible to change the result anyway, hence no reason for apotropaic rituals. A common topic of lecanomancy is the gender of one’s offspring, and no amount of ritual action could apparently change that. This may be so for the physiognomic omina: there is not much you can do about your features — there certainly is not much point in cutting off your nose, even if it has an ill-favored shape.[29] In general, the explanation is not valid and I suspect another explanation must be found at least for lecanomancy and libanomancy. Finding the cause or nature of the evil is often the first step to curing it, and aversive rituals are commonly connected with diagnostic divination. The link between ritual aversive action and divination has nothing to do with the temporal orientation of the divination, whether it is retrospective of prospective,[30] but the idea that the nature of the divinatory practice plays a role merits further investigation.
When we look at the range of questions asked in the first-millennium Mesopotamian extispicy queries, tamitus, and reports, we see that even though a wide variety of topics are represented, the knowledge sought after is always of relevance to the health and happiness of the individual, be it as a private person or as persona publica — as in the case of, for instance, the Assyrian kings — or it relates to the larger social environment. The purpose of the Old Babylonian diviner’s ritual is simply to decide the case of “the well-being of NN son of NN” (Starr 1983: 31). Even if we regard divination such as extispicy that can be classfied as relying on signa impetrativa from a functionalist point of view, as a magical confirmation of a proposed action (performative utterance),[31] it still supplies knowledge which falls within these categories. The standard topics for extispicy according to, for example, Multabiltu are the well-being of the king, the land, the camp, the patient, for warfare, for taking a city, healing the sick, rain, and “undertaking an enterprise or whatever else.” The tamitus[32] give a more detailed picture. The questions were always very meticulously formulated to minimize ambiguity. Basically, there were two types of questions. The first type are questions concerning a special situation or undertaking; the second type regards a specified period of time, detailing any imaginable calamity and asking whether it would occur within that period. These examples stem from the tamitus:
FITNESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL
• Safe night-watch.
• Personal safety for one year “at the command of god, goddess, king, noble, and prince.”
• Lunar eclipse (Sin).
• Ambition to be a temple administrator (temple personnel).
• Outcome of river-ordeal — to some degree dependent on the “mind of his accuser” and the river.
• Hunting.
• Horse appropriate for god.
• Risk of flooding.
• Marriage (acceptance by father-in-law).
Lisdorf 2007: 59. Lisdorf suggest that divination is used as recourse when the “life model” (i.e., ideal circumstances in life according to norms of a given culture) clashes with reality; cf. also Turner 1961: 16. For summaries of purposes of Babylonian extispicy, see Koch-Westenholz 2002: 140ff., with previous literature.
• Male offspring.
• Survival of pregnant woman.
• Taking a second wife.
• Recovery from illness.
• Faithfulness of servant.
• Truthfulness of wife.
• Sending a messenger.
• Reliability of physician.
Fitness of Organization
• Military campaign (enemy, advisors, divine assistance).
• Safety of city from enemy action.
• Safety from enemies for people leaving the protecting wall of the city.
• Safety of watch from enemy attack.
• Safety of fort from the enemy.
• Damming a river.
• Mutiny.
As mentioned, on a very general level, what is of interest are matters to do with the physical and social well-being of the individual and his/her immediate social and physical environment.[34] Very often the first category is of course implicitly contained in the second. When keeping watch, personal safety is also involved; when the king goes on a campaign he may well fall in battle himself; defeat of the army can have terrible consequences for the community and its members individually. So far this kind of information is fully in accordance with what we would expect from any “successful divinatory practice” and is not essentially different from what other Mesopotamian divinatory practices supplied (Sprensen, in press). Knowledge of this kind is what Boyer has termed “strategic social information” (e.g., Boyer 2001: 173). The ability to process strategic social information can be argued to be a prerequisite for successful human interaction and ultimately survival, and therefore could be an example of an adaptive cognitive faculty as argued by Boyer. To succeed as a social animal it is necessary to read others, to read the “signs, signals, and minds” of others, and “to pair implicit knowledge with explicit information” (Tremlin 2006: 33ff.).
The intention and will of others are of vital importance but can be hard to define and identify. What is significant depends entirely on context and experience. Strategic information has two important features: it is often obtained through indirect sources (so indeed why not divination?), and generally it is of lasting value (Tremlin 2006: 115ff.). Cognitive science operates with two fundamental “mental mechanisms,” the Agency Detection Device (ADD) and the Theory of Mind Mechanism (ToMM). ADD is eager to spot intentional agents in the world and ToMM normally works in unison with ADD supplying agents with minds, but at the same time, may supply minds even where no agent is identified. ToMM is seen, for instance, in perceptions of deceased persons as having wishes and emotions even though manifestly dead.35 In view of this we would expect many of the tamitu questions to imply the action and/or intention of human-like agents. Indeed, in many cases agents are mentioned, either individual humans (wife, servant, temple personnel, father-in-law), groups (typically the enemy), or superhuman agents as gods (Sin or the River). The advantage of framing an intangible threat in terms of intentional agents is that it moves possible countermeasures from the physical to the social domain and thereby facilitates representations of possible control. This matches the well-known picture from Babylonian apotropaic and other rituals including surpu and maqlu, where misfortune, ill health, etc., are described as the result of malevolent or angered human or superhuman agents. Sprensen suggests that a divinatory system that transforms threats to individual into previously undisclosed interactions between intentional agents is especially strong-lived (Sprensen, in press, p. 324). Even though intentional agents are represented in extispicy queries, this cannot be said to be very evident from the queries, it is a little more apparent in the tamitus (see list above). Intentional agents often figure in extispicy omen apodoses: witches, demons, oaths, kings, or angry gods. However, the transformation of threats to the social domain is perhaps clearest in the extispicy ritual itself and I suggest that exactly this transformation is what makes the kind of information extispicy supplied different.
The extispicy ritual itself was presented as a dialogue. The diviner asked (sa°alu) and the god answered (apalu), preferably with a “firm yes.” In the queries the question is formulated thus: “Does your great divinity know it? Is it decreed and confirmed in a favorable case (of extispicy) by the command of your great divinity, Shamash, great lord? Will he who can see, see it? Will he who can hear, hear it?” The Akkadian phrase is not necessarily to be understood as a question, but either way the implication is that the god has access to the answer and can make it known to the questioner.35 36 * The closing formula of queries sums up: “Be present in this ram; place an affirmative answer (anna kena), favorable, propitious omens of the flesh of the query (tamltu) by the command of your great divinity so that I may see them.” But this was not a straightforward way of communicating. The diviner had to perform an elaborate ritual in order to obtain the desired knowledge. The first-millennium rituals collected in Zimmern 1901: nos. 1-20, show that divination could be performed in the frame of a complex ritual lasting from sunset to sunrise, in which one or more sheep were sacrificed to Shamash, Adad, and other gods and other offerings were brought as well. Apart from the ram that was used for divination, other lambs were also slaughtered and sacrifices were made. The distinction between divination and magic rituals, that gifts go from man to god in the latter not the for- mer,37 does not hold for extispicy: “The diviner shall not approach the place of judgment, he should not lift the cedar, without present and gifts, they (the gods) will not reveal to him the secret answer to his question” (tamlt piristi) (Zimmern 1901: 118 [no. 24]).
Interestingly, the extispicy ritual has one important thing in common with namburbi-ritu- als, namely, that the ritual is metaphorically described as a judgment (Maul 1999: 126ff.). The answer the diviner established was commonly referred to as a divine judgment or a “decision” (purussu). Shamash was the “lord of verdict” (bel dini), the “Judge of Heaven and Earth.”38 In Zimmern 1901: no. 11 rev. line 1, the diviner is instructed to “perform a sacrifice, establish
a verdict” (dina eppus), and in one of the rituals of the diviner he is told to “sit on the seat of the judge” in front of Shamash and Adad (Zimmern 1901: 104 [nos. 1-20 line 122]). The ritual scene is called either “the place of decision by extispicy (barutu)” (Zimmern 1901: 96 [nos. 1-20 line 6]), or “the place of judgement” (Zimmern 1901: 96 [nos. 1-20 line 16]). In the Old Babylonian ritual of the diviner,39 the diviner prays to Shamash to “place a true verdict” in the sacrificial lamb, to judge the case in the divine assembly, and have the verdict recorded by the divine scribe Nisaba on the tablet of the gods. The terminology is the same as was used in connection with secular judgment: arkata parasu “investigate the circumstances,” dina danu “give a verdict,” or purussa parasu “make a decision,” and so on. Similar terminology is also found in other divinatory disciplines,40 indeed, the metaphor is a central part of the conceptual underpinnings of Mesopotamian divination. The casuistic structure itself, characteristic both of omina and the law codes, has often been commented upon. But within the divinatory disciplines the metaphor of the court of law is most consequently and consistently used in extispicy, and the extispicy ritual actually mise en scène.
According to the theory of conceptual blending,41 the cognitive process that attributes efficacy, authority, and credibility to a session of extispicy would be a cognitive integration of diverse conceptual spaces or domains. There are always at least four spaces at play which interact in a cognitive blend: two (or more) input spaces, a generic space which contains the elements common to the two input spaces, and the emerging blended space. In the case of the ritual of extispicy and the namburbis, a blend between at least five domains would be present: a “mythic/sacred space,” a “juridical space,” and a “present social space” would merge with the “generic space” to form the “ritual space.” During different phases of the ritual, different cognitive blendings would be viable and activated. In my opinion, the mapping of conceptual blendings can never be anything but a snapshot of one of many possible interpretations of the cognitive processes at play.
In order to enter the “ritual space” and through that be connected with the “sacred space” both the diviner and the client had to perform certain cleansing procedures. After the performance of the ritual the diviner probably also had to go through some steps to sever the connection to the sacred space, as is seen in other rituals, for example, the namburbis. We have no description of this procedure, however the ritual described in Zimmern 1901: nos. 1-20 lines 126-227 details how the altars and incense burners for various gods had to be dismantled in reverse order from how they had been set up, so at least it seems that the diviner had to retrace his steps in order to leave the “ritual space.” In the “ritual space” there are mappings between mythic and present space. The cultural hero Enmeduranki (the seventh antediluvian king) and the present-day diviner are linked by a metonymic link: blood, since ideally the diviner is a descendant of Enmeduranki.42 This establishes a generic link between them; they
partake of the same essence. The tools of the diviner — the stylus, the tablet, the bag, and the cedar wood — serve to reinforce this mapping, functioning as an iconic link between them. But though the person of the diviner is important for ritual efficacy (if anything is wrong with him, the ritual is a no-go) the primary source of ritual agency lies in the ritual action. The act of extispicy and the interpretation of the entrails were mapped by iconic identity connectors, since the art of extispicy itself, and certainly the code or technique applied in the interpretation of the entrails, were identical to the code given to mankind in mythic times by Enmeduranki. The implements again function as reinforcing iconic links. That the correct procedure was followed, the prayers pronounced clearly, and the diviner himself being in the right physical and mental state were of higher significance for giving the desired result — a reliable answer — than was the person of the diviner himself.
Just like a namburbi, the extispicy ritual activated a conceptual blending between the juridical domain and the sacred domain. A court case implies two intentional agents; and typically two parties will be represented at court: the accuser and the accused, or the victim and the culprit. Sometimes one party will not be present or may be represented by witnesses or symbolically by hem and hair or nail-imprint, just as in an extispicy ritual.[43] In a namburbi the ill-portending object would physically be present during the ritual. Even though the “attacker” is not physically present in an extispicy ritual, the blending with the juridical domain could suggest the existence of an opponent. The actions and intentions of the parties are laid open to judgment, and the divine judge is asked to rule in favor of the client. The transformation of the ominous sign from the physical to the social domain takes place in the ritual space through the cognitive blending with the judicial space.
I posit that the namburbis were primarily used in connection with the kind of divination where the presentation of intentional agents is the weakest. There the blending with the domain of the courtroom has a similar effect as in the case of the extispicy ritual, it serves to remove troubles from the uncontrollable physical world to the more manageable social world. In namburbis the signifier — the harbinger of the evil omen, whether this is a strange bird or seriously malformed entrails of the sacrificial lamb that renders it unsuitable for extispicy — is transformed into an intentional agent. The ritual is presented as a court of law with the signifier and the person to whom it occurred cast in the roles of the two contestants. As opposed to a performance of extispicy, in the context of a namburbi ritual, both suitors could be physically present. The metaphor of the court of law at the same time promotes the presentation of the omen as a communicative sign sent by an angry god whom the ritual serves to appease; in extispicy I suggest this is already inherent in the ritual with its many sacrifices and offerings.
Furthermore, according to McCauley and Lawson’s action theory system, any action, including ritual action, has a simple syntax consisting of three or four basic elements. According to their theory, a small number of basic cognitive functions account for the similarities found in rituals all over the world and allow people to make intuitive judgments about the proper
kept on doing it in the first millennium. In ancient Greece divination was also a topic that could be discussed and practiced by laymen, even though there were traditions concerning the special qualities and genealogies of diviners. Experts would be called upon depending on the circumstances; see Flower 2008: chapter 2, esp. pp. 53ff.
forms, relationships, and efficacy of religious rituals.44 This hinges on the understanding that religious rituals, though special actions, remain “actions” — people extend their skills for judging everyday actions to religious actions. What makes ritual action different from ordinary action they argue, is that it involves the “Principle of Superhuman Agency.”45 A “culturally postulated superhuman (CPS) agent.”46 of some kind plays a role as the source of efficacy. A CPS agent can and will always have a special connection with either of the elements involved.
In the case of extispicy these would be:
| Agent | Action / Instrument (Object) | Patient |
| Diviner | Extispicy involving sacrifice and offerings / cedar wood | Client (can be represented by hem of clothing or nail impression) |
According to one of the propositions of McCauley and Lawson’s action theory system, there is a direct connection between how people judge the reversibility and repeatability of rituals and which of the three elements the CPS agent is perceived as most closely connected with.47 The theory runs that if the CPS agent is involved most closely with the agent, the ritual is reversible but not repeatable: what god has done, god can undo, but god does not repeat himself. This would be true for initiation rites — a priest or diviner can only be initiated once, but it should be possible to throw him out of the community of people “in the know”48 if he seriously violates the trust and secrets confided to him. An initiation should be reversible. “Special action / instrument” rituals and “special patient” rituals are, on the other hand, generally judged to be repeatable but not reversible. McCauley and Lawrence (2002: 26) suggest that sacrifices and rituals of penance fall within the group “special patient” rituals, since the CPS agent affects the patient most directly. Rituals of divination and blessing, on the other hand, generally fall in the category “special instrument” rituals. I would suggest that extispicy rituals actually span both the “special instrument” and the “special patient” categories. The closest connection with the “superhuman agent” in the extispicy ritual lies in the ritual act and the objects involved in the ritual; it thus falls under the “special instrument” or “special action” category. The diviner uses his special implements (cedar wood and leather bag), he applies the code of extispicy (a divine revelation and a “secret of heaven and earth”), and he performs multiple sacrifices and slaughters a very special lamb in which the gods are expected to be present and use for writing
messages. At the same time it must fall in the same category as other kinds of sacrifice would, not only because of the very substantial sacrifices that could form part of a divinatory session, but also because the patient is put on trial before the divine judge. As mentioned, both “special patient” and “special action / instrument” rituals are, according to the theory, repeatable but not reversible.[49] Whether we interpret the extispicy ritual as a “special action/instrument” or a “special patient” ritual the same applies, you can not undo having performed extispicy, but you can repeat it. It is perhaps due to this dual function of extispicy that it could be used to inquire about unprovoked omens, for instance, the appearance of a lunar eclipse?[50]
The argument should not be pushed too far. I doubt that signs such as astrological omina should be seen as non-repeatable “special agent rituals.” But then again, perhaps they might. A case could be made that any kind of oblativa is less dependent on a “special instrument” or “special action” than an induced omen. An epiphany is totally dependant on there being an agent to hear it or observe it, thus strengthening the link between CPS agent and human agent. No point in burning a bush or going into eclipse if there is nobody around to see it. However this may be, I do believe it is reasonable to accept that extispicy in itself provided a setting that transformed intangible threats to “strategic information” and acted upon it. The extispicy ritual spanned both parts of the event frame into which any divinatory practice normally falls: that of information-gathering on the one hand and that of sacrifices/aversive rituals on the other; performing further apotropaia just would not make sense.
ABBREVIATIONS
CT Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets in the British Museum (London 1896—)
K Tablets in the collections of the British Museum
KAR Keilschrifttexte aus Assur religiosen Inhalts
W field numbers of tablets excavated at Warka/Uruk
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Boyer, Pascal
1990 Tradition as Truth and Communication: A Cognitive Description of Traditional
Discourse. Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology 68. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1994 The Naturalness of Religious Ideas: A Cognitive Theory of Religion. Berkeley; Los
Angeles; London: University of California Press.
1999 “Cognitive Aspects of Religious Ontologies: How the Brain Processes Constrain
Religious Concepts.” In Approaching Religion 1, edited by Tore Ahlbäck, pp. 53-72. Turku: Abo Akademi University Printing Press.
2001Religion Explained: The Human Instincts that Fashion Gods, Spirits and Ancestors. London: Heinemann.
2003 “Religious Thought and Behaviour as By-Products of Brain Function.” Trends in
Cognitive Sciences 7: 119-24.
2005 ”A Reductionistic Model of Distinct Modes of Religious Transmission.” In Mind
and Religion: Psychological and Cognitive Foundations of Religiosity, edited by H. Whitehouse and R. N. McCauley, pp. 3-30. Walnut Creek: Altamira.
Burkert, Walter
1992The Orientalizing Revolution: Near Eastern Influence on Greek Culture in the Early Archaic Age. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Caplice, Richard I.
1974The Akkadian namburbi Texts: An Introduction. Sources from the Ancient Near East 1/1. Los Angeles: Undena.
Chomsky, Noam
1975 Reflections on Language. New York: Plenum Press.
Cryer, Frederick H.
1994 Divination in Ancient Israel and Its Near Eastern Environment: A Socio-Historical
Investigation. Journal for the Study of the Old Testament, Supplement Series 142. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press.
Durand, Jean-Marie
1993“Le mythologeme du combat entre le dieu de l'orage et la mer en Mesopotamie.” Mari: Annales de recherches interdisciplinaires 7: 41-61.
Durkheim, Emile, and M. Mauss
1903 “De quelques formes primitives de classification: Contribution a l'etude des repre
sentations collectives.” L’annee sociologique 6: 1-72. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Egense, Ebbe
2002“Divinatoriske Ofringer i Xenofon's Anabasis.” In AIGIS 2.1. University of Copenhagen online journal: http://www.igl.ku.dk/~aigis/
Farber, Walter F.
1987 “Rituale und Beschworungen in akkadischer Sprache.” In Texte aus der Umwelt des
alten Testaments II/2: Rituale und Beschworungen I, edited by O. Kaiser, pp. 212-81. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus.
Fauconnier, Gilles, and Mark Turner
2002 The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities. New
York: Basic Books.
Flower, Michael Attyah
2008 The Seer in Ancient Greece. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Gadd, C. J.
1948 Ideas of Divine Rule in the Ancient East. The Schweich Lectures of the British
Academy. London: Oxford University Press.
Goetze, Albrecht
1939 “Cuneiform Inscriptions from Tarsus.” Journal of the American Oriental Society 59:
1-16.
Goffman, Erving
1974 Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. New York: Harper &
Row.
Guinan, Ann K.
2002 “A Severed Head Laughed: Stories of Divinatory Interpretation.” In Magic and
Divination in the Ancient World, edited by L. Ciraolo and J. Seidel, pp. 7-40. Ancient Magic and Divination 2. Leiden: Brill; Boston: Styx.
Jameson, Michael H.
1991 “Sacrifice before Battle.” In Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience, edited
by V. D. Hanson, pp. 197-227. London: Routledge.
Jeyes, Ulla
1980 “The Act of Extispicy in Ancient Mesopotamia: An Outline.” Assyriological
Miscellanies 1: 13-32.
1991-92 “Divination as a Science in Ancient Mesopotamia.” Ex Oriente Lux 32: 23-41. Koch, Ulla
2005 Secrets of Extispicy: The Chapter Multäbiltu of the Babylonian Extispicy Series
and Nisirti bäruti Texts mainly from Assurbanipal’s Library. Alter Orient und Altes Testament 326. Münster: Ugarit-Verlag.
Koch-Westenholz, Ulla
1995 Mesopotamian Astrology: An Introduction to Babylonian and Assyrian Celestial
Divination. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press.
2000 Babylonian Liver Omens: The Chapters Manzäzu, Padänu and Pän täkalti of the
Babylonian Extispicy Series Mainly from the Assurbanipal’s Library. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press.
2002 “Old Babylonian Extispicy Reports.” In Mining the Archives: Festschrift for
Christopher Walker on the Occasion of his 60th Birthday, 4 October 2002, edited by C. Wunsch, pp. 131-45. Babylonische Archive 1. Dresden: ISLET.
Lambert, Wilfred G.
1962 “A Catalogue of Texts and Authors.” Journal of Cuneiform Studies 16: 59-77.
1967 “Enmeduranki and Related Matters.” Journal of Cuneiform Studies 21: 126-38.
1998 “The Qualifications of Babylonian Diviners.” In Festschrift für Rykle Borger zu sei
nem 65. Geburtstag am 24. Mai 1994: tikip santakki mala basmu..., edited by S. M. Maul, pp. 141-58. Cuneiform Monographs 10. Groningen: Styx.
2007 Babylonian Oracle Questions. Mesopotamian Civilizations 13. Winona Lake:
Eisenbrauns.
Lawson, Jack N.
1994 The Concept of Fate in Ancient Mesopotamia of the First Millennium: Toward
an Understanding of “Simtu.” Orientalia Biblica et Christiana 7. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
Lisdorf, Anders
2007 The Dissemination of Divination in Roman Republican Times: A Cognitive Approach.
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Copenhagen.
Maul, Stefan Μ.
1994Zukunftsbewältigung: Eine Untersuchung altorientalischen Denkens anhand der babylonisch-assyrischen Loserituale (Namburbi). Mainz am Rhein: Philipp von Zabern.
1999 “How the Babylonians Protected Themselves against Calamities Announced
by Omens.” In Mesopotamian Magic: Textual, Historical, and Interpretative Perspectives, edited by T. Abusch and K. van der Toorn, pp. 123-48. Ancient Magic and Divination 1. Groningen: Styx.
McCauley, Robert N., and E. Thomas Lawson
2002 Bringing Ritual to Mind: Psychological Foundations of Cultural Forms. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Oppenheim, A. Leo
1974 “A Babylonian Diviner's Manual.” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 33: 197-220.
Parpola, Simo
1993 Letters from Assyrian and Babylonian Scholars. State Archives of Assyria 10.
Helsinki: Helsinki University Press.
Peek, Philip M., editor
1991 African Divination Systems: Ways of Knowing. Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press.
Poebel, Arno
1914 Historical and Grammatical Texts. Publications of the Babylonian Section 5.
Philadelphia: University Museum.
Reiner, Erica
1995Astral Magic in Babylonia. Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 85/4. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society.
Rochberg, Francesca
2004 The Heavenly Writing: Divination, Horoscopy, and Astronomy in Mesopotamian
Culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rosenberger, Veit
2001 Griechische Orakel: Eine Kulturgeschichte. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliches Buchge
sellschaft.
Sprensen, Jesper
2007 A Cognitive Theory of Magic. Walnut Creek: Altamira.
in press “Cognitive Underpinnings of Divinatory Practices.” In Unveiling the Hidden: Contemporary Approaches to the Study of Divination, edited by A. Lisdorf and K. Munk. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Pre-print from conference is cited.
Sprensen, Jprgen Podemann
1999 “On Divination: An Exercise in Comparative Method.” In Approaching Religion,
Part 1, edited by T. Ahlbäck, pp. 181-88. Turku: Abo Akademi University Printing Press.
Spiro, M. E.
1966 “Religion: Problems of Definition and Explanation.” In Anthropological Approaches
to the Study of Religion, edited by M. Banton, pp. 85-126. Association of Social Anthropologists of the Commonwealth, Monograph 3. London: Tavistock
Starr, Ivan
1983 The Rituals of the Diviner. Bibliotheca Mesopotamica 12. Malibu: Undena.
1990Queries to the Sungod: Divination and Politics in Sargonid Assyria. State Archives of Assyria 4. Helsinki: Helsinki University Press.
Sweek, Joel
2000Review of Divination in Ancient Israel and Its Near Eastern Environment: A Socio- Historical Investigation, by Frederick H. Cryer. In Review of Biblical Literature 07/31/2000. http://www.bookreviews.org/pdf/2389_1622.pdf
Tedlock, Barbara
2001“Divination as a Way of Knowing: Embodiment, Visualisation, Narrative, and Interpretation.” Folklore 112: 189-97.
Tremlin, Todd
2006 Minds and Gods: The Cognitive Foundations of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Turner, Victor
1961 Ndembu Divination: Its Symbolism and Techniques. Manchester: Manchester
University Press.
1968 The Drums of Affliction. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
1975 Revelation and Divination in Ndembu Ritual. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Weidner, Ernst F.
1967 Gestirn-Darstellungen auf babylonischen Tontafeln. Sitzungsberichte Osterreichischer
Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-Historische Klasse 254. Vienna: Bohlau in Kommission.
Whitehouse, Harvey
2004 Modes of Religiosity: A Cognitive Theory of Religious Transmission. Walnut Creek:
Altamira.
Whyte, Susan Reynolds
1991“Knowledge and Power in Nyole Divination.” In African Divination Systems: Ways of Knowing, edited by P. M. Peek, pp. 153-72. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Zimmern, Heinrich
1901 Beiträge zur Kenntnis der Babylonischen Religion: Die Beschworungstafeln Surpu,
Ritualtafeln für den Wahrsager, Beschworer und Sänger. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs.
oi.uchicago.edu