1956 War

After WWII, renewed colonial domination of the new Arab states by France and Britain was impossible, and both held on dearly to whatever was left of their former colonial empire.

Britain and France, however, were determined not to lose control of the Suez Canal. A plan was devised at a secret meeting in Sevres, France, that involved Israel attacking Egypt and then Britain and France, after delivering a twelve-hour ultimatum to the two parties to end the fighting, occupying the Suez Canal. Britain and France were to invoke their rights under the 1888 Constantinople Convention, which established the inter­national right of freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal. Israel cooperated with the plan in part out of frustration over the blockade of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli and Israel-bound shipping and in part in response to Fedayeen attacks against Israeli citizens originating from the Gaza Strip. Palestinian Fedayeen incursions into Israeli territory had resulted in the killing of Israeli citizens in the Negev. These incursions started in the early 1950s, but it was only from 1955 that they had Egyptian support. In addition, Egypt had obtained arms from Czechoslovakia and Russia and could have soon been in a position to militarily overwhelm Israel. Considering the constant stream of bellicosity by the Nasser regime, Israel assessed the prospective threats to its security as real and their occurrence in the near future as likely. The international community did nothing to alleviate Israel’s legitimate concerns.

Israel launched the initial attack against Egypt on October 29, 1956, under the leadership of then Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan.

In a rare display of political unity, the United States and the Soviet Union condemned the attacks and demanded that Israel return to its previous borders. They also demanded that British and French forces withdraw from all Egyptian territory. After extensive negotiations, Israel complied with the demands, but only on the condition that the United Nations place a U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai and at Sharm el-Sheikh to guarantee the free passage of Israeli ships through the Gulf of Aqaba. Israeli withdrawal was carried out in phases from November 1956 to March 1957.

The unprecedented common stance of the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1956 war, at the height of the Cold War, happened due to President Eisenhower’s sense of betrayal at not having been informed by Britain or France of their planned joint attack and the Soviet Union’s ties to Egypt.

One of the simmering issues that remains from that conflict is Israel’s alleged killing Egyptian POW’s and Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip, which constitute war crimes under international humanitarian law. These facts are documented and deeply felt in Egypt but remain unaddressed by both the Israeli and Egyptian governments.

Between 1956 and 1967, Egypt replenished its Soviet-made military arsenal and continued its public bellicosity against Israel. Then, in 1967, Egypt provoked Israel by closing access to the Port of Eilat in the Red Sea and also preventing passage of any shipping headed toward Israel through the Suez Canal, as guaranteed by the 1956 war settlement. Egypt’s actions were publicly presented as a response to a Syrian request to discourage an Israeli attack on that country, but the justification lacked substance. The crisis escalated as the United States failed to respond to the situation and Egypt sought the withdrawal of UNEF, which had been posted on its borders since the 1956 war as part of the disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel. Regrettably, the United Nations did not hold fast to the maintenance of its peacekeeping forces, and Israel refused to have these forces on its side of the Sinai borders. These events made war imminent, though Nasser thought he could avert a war and achieve a major political victory, as in the aftermath of the 1956 war. But the circumstances of 1967 were different. Israel responded by attacking Egypt, an act of aggression under international law that defines pre-emptive attacks as outside the scope of self-defense.

D.