Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: 1982-2008

The eighty-seven documents in this section represent the many peace initiatives proposed since 1982 for resolving competing land claims and sovereignty disputes between Israel and the Palestinians.

The majority of initiatives are based on either the binational state model or the two-state solution. The binational model was first formally presented by the Anglo-American Commission in 1946.²⁷7 It envisioned a democratic one-state system open to members of both communities. This model was favored by the early Jewish political party Mapam²⁷⁸ and the Soviet Union, among others. It failed, however, to garner the support of the Palestinian leadership or Arab states. Since then, progressive thinkers and many among the Palestinian intelligentsia have called for a revival of the binational state model.²⁷⁹

The two-state solution, formally outlined in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (Partition Plan), called for the creation of two sovereign states in Palestine—one Jewish and one Arab.²⁸⁰ This proposal has become the prevailing model and serves as the basis for the present Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Thus far, no proposal based on either of these two models has been acceptable to both sides.

The fundamental issue of peace goes beyond the well-known issues of borders, security, arms control, right of return, compensation, Jerusalem, and water. Fundamentally, there can be no reasonable expectation of peace without reconciliation between the two communities. This in part may require the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission, payment of compensation, and other mechanisms that are usually addressed in the context of confidence-building measures.

²⁷⁷ See Doc. 47.

²⁷⁸ The socialist-Zionist party Mapam (United Workers’ Party) was the second largest political party in the early years of the State of Israel.

²⁷⁹ Modern proponents have included Meron Benvenisti, Noam Chomsky, Tony Judt, and Edward Said.

²⁸⁰ See Doc. 59.

Other documents on related subjects may be found in: Section 3, Arab-Israeli Wars; Section 4, Arab-Israeli Peace Process; Section 5, Arms Control and Regional Security; Section 6,Jerusalem and the Holy Sites; and Section 8, Status of the Palestinians.

Document 415: U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s Address to the Nation on U.S. Policy for Peace in the Middle East (Reagan Plan) (September 1, 1982) [reprinted in The Quest for Peace 180-21 (U.S. Dep’t of State ed., 1984)]. The Reagan administration prepared this diplomatic initiative for the Middle East to renew the peace process, deal with the Palestinian issue, improve Israel-Egypt relations, and provide an impetus for Jordan to join the peace process. President Reagan called his plan the next step in the process that was begun at Camp David to pave the way for autonomy for the Palestinian people. In this address, Reagan identifies the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements, proposing a five-year transition period for transfer of domestic authority from Israel to the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza and a freeze on newJewish settlements during that time.

Document416:LetterfromIsraeliPrimeMinisterMenachemBegintoUS. PresidentRonalriReagan (September5,1982) [availableathttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/ Israels%20Foreign%0Relations%20since%201947/1982-1984/71%20Letter%20f rom%20Prime% 20Minister% 20Begin%20 to%20President%20R]. In this letter, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin reacts very negatively to U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s September 1 Address, calling the plan “national suicide for Israel.” Israel had not been notified by the U.S. administration of the content of the address until just before the speech was delivered. Conversely, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the PLO had been consulted.

Document 417: Excerpts from the Final Declaration of the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference, Fez (Fez Arab Peace Plan) (September 9, 1982) [U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Agenda Items 31, 34, 58, and 134, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/37/696 (1982)]. The Fez Arab Peace Plan directly followed the public announcement of the Reagan Plan. Before the summit, the Reagan administration had asked Saudi Arabia to work for a final resolution at Fez that would endorse the plan, but leaders at the Fez summit did not give Jordan the needed mandate to negotiate over the future of the Occupied Territories. Israel rejected the plan because it did not provide enough security guarantees. However, the plan is historic in that it represents a dramatic shift in Arab policy with regard to Israel, providing for both the implicit recognition of Israel and the possibility of negotiating a peace agreement with Israel. Thus, the plan overturns the “Three No’s” of the Khartoum Resolution of 1967.

Document 418: Speech Given by Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, at a Kremlin Dinner (Brezhnev Plan) (September 15, 1982) [ available at http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/52795e073a5079568525628100745892? OpenDocument].

Document 419: Hussein-Arafat Accord (February 11, 1985) [reprinted in Arab-Israeli Conflict and Conciliation: A Documentary History (Bernard Reich ed., 1995)]. Working within the framework of the 1982 Fez Plan as well as United Nations Resolutions, King Hussein, of Jordan, met with Yasser Arafat and developed five points for what they deemed a comprehensive peace plan to bring an end to the Palestinian issue. These five points included calling for the Palestinian’s rights to self-determination, solving their refuge problem, and beginning peace negotiations in an international conference which would include the five U.N. Security Council permanent member states, all countries involved in the conflict, and ajointJordan- Palestinian delegation. However, one year later King Hussein decided to stop all ties with the PLo and closed all PLo offices in Jordan. King Hussein took this action as he disapproved of the PLO’s refusal to accept Resolutions 242 and 338 and its failure to truly progress towards a peaceful settlement. In April 1987 the PLo responded by renouncing their agreement.

Document 420: Statement Given by King Hussein of Jordan on Ending the Jordan-PLO Initiative (February 19, 1986) [reprinted in The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 2001)]. The Jordan-PLo initiative, formed only a year earlier, disintegrated with disputes over conflicting interests between the two parties. This was partially due to views on Resolution 242 and the PLO’s power in the West Bank.

Document 421: Letter from U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir (Shultz Initiative) (March 4, 1988) [N.Y. Times, Late City Final Edition, Mar. 10, 1988, at A10].

Document 422: Stockholm Declaration (December 7, 1988) [ reprinted in Arab-Israeli Conflict and Conciliation: A Documentary History (Bernard Reich ed., 1995)]. The Palestinian National Council held a meeting in Algiers from November 12 to November 15, 1988, after which it issued a political statement announcing the council’s Declaration of Independence. Through this ceclaration the Palestinian National Council agreed to enter peace negotiations according to U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 if the PLO was considered the legitimate representative for the Palestinian people. These negotiations should also include the Palestinian’s right to an independent state, while also accepting the existence of the State of Israel. The declaration also condemned terrorism. In a discussion organized in Stockholm by the Swedish foreign minister, Sten Anderson, representatives of the PLO gave an explanation of the Declaration of Independence to American Jews.

Document 423: Excerpts from Palestinian Chairman Yasser Arafat’s Speech to the United Nations General Assembly (December 13, 1988) [U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Agenda Item 37, U.N. Doc. A/43/PV.78 (1989)]. A special General Assembly was organized in Geneva to discuss Palestinian issues after the United States refused to grant PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat a visa to travel to the United Nations headquarters in New York to speak before the General Assembly. Arafat gave this speech in Geneva before the United Nations, in which he details the injustices suffered by Palestinians and the Lebanese due to Israel’s military policies. He offers a three-point Palestinian peace plan, which includes: (1) the formation of a preparatory commission of an international peace conference; (2) the United Nations’ assumption of temporary supervision of Palestinian land; and (3) a peace settlement in accordance with Resolutions 242 and 338.

Document 424: Letter from U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz to Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson and Attachments (December 3, 1988) [reprinted in George Schultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State 1028-29 (1993)]. In this letter to Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz presents the U.S. position on intended negotiations between the PLO and Israel. Shultz attached a Final Statement signed by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, which expresses the PLO’s willingness to negotiate a comprehensive peace settlement with Israel on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and to renounce terrorism.

Document 425: Israeli Peace Initiative (May 14, 1989) [available at http://www. usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/may89.htm]. Formulated by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli Peace Initiative of 1989 represents the consensus of Israeli policy in the National Unity government and attempts to resolve the final political status of the Palestinians within the framework of an overall Middle East peace settlement. This initiative is based on a proposal that was first presented by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin in the framework of the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty. The initiative calls for elections in the Occupied Territories to select a Palestinian representative that would conduct negotiations for a transitional period of self-rule to last five years. It also proposes the convening of an international peace conference. Israel also outlines its four non-negotiable premises for peace, which include: (1) continuation of the political process based on the Camp David Accords; (2) opposition to the establishment of an additional Palestinian state in the Gaza district and in the area between Israel and Jordan; (3) a refusal to conduct negotiations with the PLO; and (4) no change in the status ofJudea, Samaria, and Gaza that are not in accordance with Israeli designs. This initiative formed the basis of the Baker Plan, Iwhich led to the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference.

Document 426: Letter of Assurance from the United States to the Palestinians (October 18, 1991) [reprinted in The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 2001)]. In an attempt to bring Palestinian representatives to the table in a new round of peace negotiations, the United States expressed several assurances to ease Palestinians concerns regarding the talks. Chief among these were pledges that an agreement to talks would not prejudice Palestinians’ claims to East Jerusalem, the Palestinians were free to choose their own delegates, and Security Council Resolution 242 would be a basis of negotiations.

Document 427: U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s Letter of Assurance to the Palestinians (October 18, 1991) [ available at http://www.brook.edu/press/appendix/appen_m.htm]. In the months that followed the Persian Gulf War, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker carried out an intense round of “shuttle diplomacy,” making eight separate trips to the Middle East in eight months. In this letter of assurance to the Palestinians written in the weeks leading up to the Madrid Peace Conference, Baker restates the U.S. government’s commitment to peace on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the need for Palestinians to gain control over their political, economic, and other decisions, and the right of Palestinian negotiators to bring any issue to the table, including East Jerusalem.

Document 428: Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Palestinian Delegation Leader Haydar Abd al-Shafi: Speeches at the Madrid Peace Conference (October 21, 1991) [reprinted in The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 2001)]. The speeches of the Israeli and Palestinian representatives develop a narrative of each parties’ tribulations over the past sixty years in Israel. The speeches serve as condensed review of their arguments advocating their respective sides, accusations, aspirations for the conference, and hopes for peace.

Document 429: Letter of Invitation to the Madrid Peace Conference, Issued by the United States and the USSR (October 30, 1991) [reprinted in Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israel Conflict 455-56 (4th ed. 2001)]. With this letter of invitation to the Madrid Peace Conference, the United States and the Soviet Union initiated the first conference of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. one of the Madrid Conference’s stated aims is to reach an interim self-governing arrangement, followed by permanent status discussions based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 after two years.

Document 430: U.S. President George Bush's Opening Address to the Madrid Peace Conference (October 30, 1991) [available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ index.php?pid=20163&st=&st1=]. U.S. President George H.W. Bush’s address opened the historic Madrid Peace Conference, marking the first time in forty- three years that Israeli and Palestinian leaders met together to discuss a permanent settlement. In his address, Bush encourages Arabs and Israelis to lay down the past in favor of peace. The opening day of the conference was followed by one-on- one sessions between Israel and each of its neighbors and then wider discussions in the hope of finding a permanent solution.

Document 431: Letters Exchanged between PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin Concerning Israel-PLO Recognition (September 9, 1993) [available at http://www.state.gov/ p/nea/rls/22579.htm]. In this letter to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat confirms four basic principles to lay the groundwork for anticipated peace negotiations: (1) the PLO’s recognition of Israel’s right to exist in peace and security, (2) its acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338, (3) its commitment to the peace process, and (4) its renunciation of terror as a political tool. Rabin’s letter to Arafat confirms Israel’s commitment to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO.

Document 432: Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements between Israel and the PLO (September 13, 1993) [available at http://domino.un.org/unispal. nsf/0/71dc8c9d96d2fOff85256117007cb6ca?OpenDocument]. The historic Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government (Oslo Accords) set the framework for subsequent Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and agreements. It declares the aim of negotiations as the establishment of a Palestinian Interim Self­Government Authority and an elected council to stand for a transitional period of no more than five years, followed by a permanent settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338. It declares Israel’s intention to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, adding that later permanent status negotiations will decide the issues of Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation, and other issues.

Document 433: Joint Statement following the First Meeting of the Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee (November 17, 1993) [available athttp://www.mfa.gov. il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%201947/ 1992-1994/136%20Joint%20Statement%20Following%20the%20First%20Meeting %20of]. Recognizing the importance of a healthy economy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to the peace process, this joint statement of the Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee, expresses the agreement to accelerate efforts in the areas of trade and labor, fiscal matters, finance, and banking.

Document 434: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/58 (December 14, 1993) [reprinted in Arab-Israeli Conflict and Conciliation: A Documentary History (Bernard Reich ed., 1995)]. The United Nations General Assembly, on December 14, 1993, concluded that solving the issues in the Middle East would bring greater overall international peace and security. it therefore adopted a resolution supporting the peace process through the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles on the Interim Self-Government Arrangements. It encouraged the development of a United Nations task force to aid economic, social, and technical development for the Palestinian people, during the interim period, partially through advocating for the assistance from member states. This resolution emphasized the need for immediate and quick progression towards peace, and found a United Nations presence in the Middle East necessary to support this process and to assist with the implementation of the Declaration of Principles.

Document 435: Protocol on Economic Relations between the Government of Israel and the PLO (April 29, 1994) [available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/ Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Gaza-Jericho%20Agreement%20Ann ex%20IV%20-%20Economic%20Protocol]. The Protocol on Economic Relations between the government of israel and the PLo was to be instituted according to the timetable set out in the Declaration of Principles. It stipulates that initially the agreement will apply only in the Gaza strip and the Jericho area and then eventually to other areas. The protocol specifies which products can be imported into the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with the amounts being negotiable every six months. It also establishes a Palestinian Monetary Authority for areas under Palestinian sovereignty to act as the Palestinian Authority’s advisor and to put into force a joint system of taxation in the territories. In the area of labor, both sides pledge to “maintain the normality of movement of labor between them.” Finally, the protocol also provides for free movement of agricultural produce and industrial goods and cooperation in tourism.

Document 436: Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area between Israel and the PLO (May 4, 1994) [U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/49/180 (1994)]. The Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area between Israel and the PLO establishes the process by which the first Israeli redeployment from occupied Palestinian territory would take place. It provides for transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the new Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in the Jericho area of the West Bank and in Gaza and marks the beginning of the interim period as defined in the Declaration of Principles.

Document 437: Letters Exchanged between PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin following the Signing ofthe Gaza-Jericho Agreement (May 4, 1994) [available at http://www.pna.gov.ps/key_ decuments/ISRAEL_PLO_Rec.asp]. These two formal letters were exchanged between PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to confirm their commitments to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement.^{29 7} 0Arafat's letter to Rabin outlines the thirteen major points of the agreement. Rabin’s letter confirms receipt of Arafat’s letter and reiterates its contents. These letters were exchanged on the same day that the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area was signed.

Document 438: Law of the State of Israel: Implementing the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and IheJericho Area, Restriction on Activity (May 4, 1994) [available at http://www.mfa. gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1990_1999/1994/12/Law%20Implementing%20the% 20Agreement%20on%20the%20Gaza%20Strip%20a]. This Israeli law was passed on the same day that the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area was signed, formalizing Israel’s commitment to the plan.

Document 439: Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities between Israel. and thePLO (August 29, 1994) [available athttp://domino.un.org/UNISPAL. NSF/0/fd15eca93fd9af2785257000005a5810?0penDocument]. In the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities between Israel and the PLO, Israel agrees to transfer powers and responsibilities to the PNA in the spheres of education and culture, health, social welfare, tourism, direct taxation and value added tax on local production. The PNA is to assumejudicial power to appoint inspectors to ensure compliance in each of the spheres and to bring disciplinary proceedings against persons it employs.

Document 440: Oslo Declaration (September13, 1994) [reprinted in Arab-Israeli Conflict and Conciliation: A Documentary History (Bernard Reich ed., 1995)]. Norwegian Foreign Minister Bjorn Tore Godal, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, and PLO ChairmanYasser Arafat met on September 13, 1994, and issued the Oslo Declaration. Meeting on the first anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Principles, the leaders commended its gradual implementation. The Israeli and Palestinian sides further committed themselves to continue the peace process through fully executing the principles in the declaration, working harder to end acts of violence, and promoting their economic relationship and the economy of the Palestinian Authority.

Document 441: U.S. Executive Order 12947: Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process (January 23, 1995) [Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (1995)]. Finding that foreign terrorists who disrupt the Middle East peace process constitute a threat to American national security, foreign policy and the economy, U.S. President Bill Clinton issued this executive order, declaring a national emergency to deal with such threats. He prohibits transactions by and contributions to individuals who commit or assist in acts of violence that disrupt the peace process. Among the blacklisted organizations are the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Hezbollah, Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), Jihad, Kahane Chai, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

Document 442: Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip between Israel and the PLO (September 28, 1995) [U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 10, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/51/889 (1997)]. Also known as “Oslo II,” the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip between Israel and the PLO was signed at Washington,

D.C., on September 28, 1995, by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres for the government of the State of Israel and Chairman Yasser Arafat for the PLO. The ceremony was witnessed by the United States of America, the Russian Federation, Egypt, Jordan, Norway, and the European Union. The interim agreement outlines future relations between Israel and the Palestinians and includes seven annexes, which cover in detail: security arrangements, elections, civil affairs, legal matters, economic relations, Israeli- Palestinian cooperation, and the release of Palestinian prisoners. This agreement marks the conclusion of the first stage in negotiations between Israel and the PLO. The main object of the Interim Agreement was to broaden Palestinian self­government in the West Bank by means of an elected self-governing authority— the Palestinian Council—for an interim period, while protecting Israel’s security interests.

Document 443: Letter from Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres to His Counterparts on the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (September 28, 1995) [available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relati ons%20since%201947/1995-1996/Letter%20from%20Foreign%20Minister%20Per es%20to%20his%20counterp]. In this letter to his counterparts, Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres speaks of the need for both sides to prevent violence against the other, as well as the desirability of economic links between Israel and Palestinian institutions and individuals. He calls the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip “the result of a strategic decision taken by the Government of Israel to end its reluctant control of another people and further the opportunities for a lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.”²⁹⁹

Document 444: Framework for the Conclusion of a Final Status Agreement between Israel and the PLO (Beilin-Abu Mazen Document) (October 31, 1995) [available at http:// domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/7ba18696d92a8b6a85256cd3005a6e48?Open Document]. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Final Status Agreement between Israel and the PLO was negotiated in secret by a team of Palestinian and Israeli negotiators, under the supervision of Yossi Beilin for Israel and Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) for the Palestinians. Though it was never formally adopted by either side, many of the ideas on refugees, Jerusalem, settlements, and the principle of territorial exchange have been cited as potential solutions to outstanding issues.

Document 445: Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin: Speech at Peace Rally (November 4, 1995) [reprinted in The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 2001)]. The prime minister of Israel delivered a speech supporting the strides towards peace that Israel had been making with its neighbors and decrying the effect of violence on democracy. In a moment of tragedy following the speech, however, a Jewish man associated with right-wing extremist groups assassinated the prime minister.

Document 446: Barcelona Declaration, Adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference (November 27-28, 1995) [available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ euromed/bd.htm]. The ministers of foreign affairs of the fifteen member states of

the European Union and twelve Mediterranean countries, including the Palestinian Authority, met on November 27 and 28, 1995, in Barcelona at the Barcelona Conference to address: political partnership; economic partnership; and social, cultural and human partnership. Parties to the resultant declaration pledge to promote peace and stability in the region, to respect the right to self­determination, to settle their disputes by peaceful means, and to strengthen cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism.

Document 447: Presidential Determination Suspending Restrictions on U.S.-PLO Relations (January 4, 1996) [Pres. Determination No. 96-8, 3 C.F.R. pts. 100-102 (1996)]. In this memorandum, U.S. President Bill Clinton suspends restrictions on the United States’ engagement with the PLO—with the justification for this change that relations with the PLO are in the “national interest.” The implicit reason, however, is the perceived increased legitimacy of the PLO in view of its role as the official Palestinian representative in the peace process.

Document 448: Final Statement, Summit of the Peacemakers at Sharm el-Sheikh (March 13, 1996) [U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/51/91 (1996)]. In this final statement, participants of the Summit of the Peacemakers at Sharm el-Sheikh express support for the peace process and vow to work together to ensure security in the region.

Document 449: Joint Statement by Israel and the United States (April30, 1996) [available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1996/04/1996-04-30-us-israel-joint-statement.html]. On April 30, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and U.S. President Bill Clinton signed a cooperation accord in Washington, D.C., to enhance their capabilities to deter, prevent, respond to, and investigate international terrorist acts or threats of international terrorist acts against Israel or the United States. Following meetings, Israel and the United States issued this joint statement, in which the two leaders agree on the importance of implementing present agreements and the need to expand the orbit of Arab-Israeli peacemaking with a view toward achieving normal, peaceful relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. They also welcome the Palestinian National Council’s decision to cancel all the provisions of the Palestinian National Covenant that deny Israel’s right to exist. Peres also met with Palestinian President Yasser Arafat during his visit.

Document 450: Amendment to the PLO Charter (May 4, 1996) [ U.N. Division for Palestinian Rights, 7 Developments Related to the Middle East Peace Process 13 (1996)]. The Palestinian National Council—at its twenty-first session held in the city of Gaza—amended the Palestinian National Charter by canceling Articles 8­10, 15, and 19-23, which called for armed resistance against Israel. Article 15 of the charter, for example, had stated that the liberation of Palestine “aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine.” The amendment was passed with a vote of five hundred four to fifty-four, with fourteen abstentions.

Document 451: Agreement on Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron between Israel and the PLO (May 9, 1996) [7 Developments Related to the Middle East Peace Process 16 (1996)]. This agreement enabled the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) to immediately commence operation in the occupied territory. The TIPH continued its work until a new agreement superseded this one on January 17, 1997, as provided for in paragraph 1.

Document 452: Hebron Accords between Israel and Palestinian Authority (January 15,

1997) [reprinted in The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 2001)]. The long-awaited summit regarding the occupation of Hebron resulted in an agreement between Palestine and Israel in which the latter would redeploy its troops, thus transferring 80 percent of control to the Palestinians within a matter of days. The Hebron Accords also included a note for the records in which both parties agreed to additional terms that would prevent violence and facilitate future negotiations.

Document 453: Letter from U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (January 15, 1997) [reprinted in The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 2001)]. Christopher’s letter congratulates Netanyahu on the success of the Hebron Accords. It further emphasizes the United States’ commitment to supporting the agreement as well as for the defense of israel’s borders.

Document 454: Protocol Concerning Redeployment in Hebron between Israel and the PLO (January 17, 1997) [Isr.-PLO, 36 I.L.M. 650]. The Protocol Concerning Redeployment in Hebron between Israel and the PLO signed by Israel and the PLO fulfills the provisions outlined in Article VII of Annex I of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which called for the redeployment of Israeli military forces in the city of Hebron and provided for a TIPH. This agreement entered into force on February 1, 1997, and supersedes the Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron, dated May 9, 1996.³⁰⁴

Document 455: Doha Declaration of the Fourth Middle East North Africa Economic Conference (November 19, 1997) [available at http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/ publish∕peace∕archives∕1997∕me1119b.html]. The Doha Declaration, released at the conclusion of the fourth Middle East North Africa Economic Conference, expresses the participants’ strong commitment to the achievement of ajust, lasting, and comprehensive peace in the Middle East, on the basis of the Madrid Peace Conference formula, i.e., land for peace, and the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The participants call for broadening and deepening progress on all outstanding issues and reaffirm their commitment to uphold the agreements already reached among the parties.

Document 456: Letter from Palestinian President Yasser Arafat to U.S. President Bill Clinton Announcing the Amendment of the Palestine National Charter (January 13,

1998) [available at http://www.mideastweb.org/arafatwye1998.htm]. Palestinian President Yasser Arafat sent this letter to U.S. President Bill Clinton clarifying the effect of the amendment to the Palestinian National Charter, which was intended to fulfill the PLO’s commitments as outlined in the mutual recognition letters exchanged between Israel and the PLO of September 9-10, 1993.³⁰⁵ ∣Arafat wrote, “Articles 6-10, 15, 19-23, and 30 have been nullified, and the parts in Articles 1-5, 11-14, 16-l8, 25-27 and 29 that are inconsistent with [the Israel-PLO Letters of Recognition] have also been nullified. I can assure you on behalf of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority that all the provisions of the Covenant that were inconsistent with the commitments of September 9/10, 1993 to Prime Minister Rabin, have been nullified.”

Document 457: Council of Europe Resolution 1156 (1998), Concerning the Palestine Refugee Situation in the Context of the Middle East Peace Process (April 23, 1998) [Res. 1156, Eur. Parl. Ass. Deb. 14th Sess. (April 23, 1998)]. In this resolution, the Council of Europe addresses the issue of Palestinian refugees in the context of the Middle East peace process. It states that the refugee situation must be resolved by resettlement to permanent accommodation, not only for humanitarian reasons but also as an essential step towards ending a major source of insecurity and tension in the region. It recognizes that resettlement will not be possible without the establishment of a viable Palestinian state that can provide refugees with citizenship and internationally recognized passports.

Document 458: Wye River Memorandum (October 23, 1998) [Isr.-P.L.O., 37 I.L.M. 1251]. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian President Yasser Arafat met at the Wye River Plantation in Maryland in October 1998 to make progress toward compliance with signed agreements. The meeting resulted in the Wye River Memorandum, which details the steps needed to implement the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Oslo II) and other related agreements so that Israel and the Palestinian Authority could carry out their reciprocal responsibilities more effectively, including those relating to further redeployments and security. Steps were to be carried out in a parallel phased approach in accordance with a clear timeline.

Document 459: U.S. President Bill Clinton: Speech to the Palestinian Leadership (December 14, 1998) [reprinted in The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 2001)]. On December 13, 1998, the Palestine National Council unanimously voted to remove clauses from the PLO charter that call for the destruction of Israel. It was during Clinton’s trip to Israel and Gaza that this vote was made, as required by the Wye River accord. Clinton’s speech reflects on the progress that Israel and Palestine had made in the five years since the Oslo Accords and looks to further commitment towards peace.

Document 460: Joint Declaration by the United States and the European Community on the Middle East Peace Process (December 18, 1998) [available at http://www.eurunion. org∕partner∕summit∕Summit9812∕mideast.htm]. Thisjoint delcaration on the Middle East Peace Process was issued at the conclusion of the united States- European Union Summit, which took place December 18, 1998, at the White House. In noting the recent signature of the Wye River Memorandum—which broke a dangerous deadlock in the Peace Process—the United States and the European Community call on all parties to fully implement their remaining

obligations under existing agreements. They pledge to work together to help parties move forward to a successful conclusion.

Document 461: Letterfrom U.S. President Bill Clinton to Palestinian President Yasser Arafat (April 26, 1999) [28(4)J. Palestine Stud. 145-68 (Summer 1999)]. In anticipation of a Palestinian Central Council special session on Palestinian statehood, U.S. President Bill Clinton sent this letter to Palestinian President Yasser Arafat pledging U.S. assistance to conclude a Mid-East peace deal within one year. The letter urges both sides to refrain from unilateral acts and calls for a three-way summit between Israeli, Palestinian, and United States leaders within six months of Israel’s May 17 elections.

Document 462: Joint Statement by U.S. President BillClinton and Israeli Prime MinisterEhud Barak (July 19, 1999) [available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1990_ 1999∕1999∕7∕Joint+Statement+by+President+Clinton+and+Prime+Min.htm]. U.S. President Bill Clinton and newly elected Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak released this joint statement addressing: the Middle East peace process; the restructuring of U.S. bilateral assistance to Israel; terrorism; and scientific cooperation. The two leaders pledge to make the Middle East peace process a top priority and affirm that their meetings have laid the groundwork for a vigorous effort to bring an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Document 463: Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum (September 4, 1999) [available at http:// www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22696.htm]. The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum was signed in Egypt by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian President Yasser Arafat at a ceremony attended by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Jordan’s King Abdallah, and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. The memorandum was needed after the failure of both sides to comply with the obligations and timeline outlined in agreements reached since September 1993, particularly the Wye River Memorandum (1998). The memorandum reiterates these obligations and serves as a bridge between the completion of the interim period and the initiation of the permanent status.

Document 464: Protocol Concerning Safe Passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between Israel and the PLO (October 5, 1999) [available at http://www.state.gov/ p/nea/rls/22697.htm]. The Protocol Concerning Safe Passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between Israel and the PLO establishes modalities for the use of safe passage between various areas—the West Bank and Israel, the Gaza Strip and Israel, and the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—with a view to implementing Article X and other related provisions of Annex I to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II). The protocol was signed in Jerusalem by Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami from the Israeli side and Minister Gamil Tarifi from the Palestinian side.

Document 465: Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak : Leaving for the Camp David Talks (July 10, 2000) [reprinted in The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 2001)]. In anticipation of the Camp David Talks, Barak describes the challenges that he faces in continued negotiations for peace. Although he admits that there is no peace without a price, Barak maintains several principles from which he refuses to deviate.

Document 466: Trilateral Statement on the Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David (CampDavidII) (July 25, 2000) [available athttp://www.state.goV/p/nea/rls/22698. htm]. U.S. President Bill Clinton hosted Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat at Camp David July 11-24, 2000, in an effort to reach a permanent status agreement. While Barak and Arafat did not sign an agreement, the two parties did agree on five basic principles to guide their negotiations, among which was the assertion that negotiations should be based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Document 467: Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak: Statement After the Camp David Talks (July 25, 2000) [reprinted in The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 2001)]. Ehud Barak’s took a regretful tone following the conclusion of the Camp David Talks. He determined that the lack of success is due to Israel’s refusal to compromise its principles relating to israeli security.

Document 468: Speech by Israeli Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami at the General Debate of the 55th General Assembly of the United Nations (September 18, 2000) [On file with author]. Delivered one month after the Camp David Summit for an Israeli- Palestinian Peace, this a conciliatory speech aimed at defining Israel’s peace policy. The Israeli minister describes the historic relationship between Jews and the culture of Islam, and the respect that Israel has shown for the Holy Sites of Islam in Jerusalem, which he describes as “the very heart of the Jewish faith, identity and history.” The solution of the refugee problem will have to be found within the State of Palestine once it is established, but Israel would be ready to admit a limited number of refuges within a scheme of family reunification. The Israeli government understands that no peace agreement can satisfy all the dreams of the parties, but it is also convinced that unless the wounds of years of confrontation are healed there would be no real peace. The Camp David negotiations allowed the parties to turn the sea that separated them into a river, and it is now up to the leaders to muster the necessary courage for the inevitable compromises. Prime Minister Barak’s peace proposals so far have touched “the outer limits of his options as an Israeli and a Jew.” Pecae, however, would still require a robust American involvement. The speaker believes that peace will have to be accompanied by regional economic cooperation, and also by an effective system of arms control. The minister also calls upon the countries of the Middle East to engage in direct negotiations with Israel with the aim of establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region.

Document 469: Clinton Parameters to Palestinian and Israeli Negotiators (December 23, 2000) [available at http://www.peacelobby.org/clinton_parameters.htm]. In a last ditch effort to further the peace process before leaving office, U.S. President Bill Clinton offered these parameters to Israeli and Palestinian negotiators at a meeting in the White House. They are not the terms of a final deal, but guidelines for final accelerated negotiations that Clinton hoped would be concluded in the coming weeks. Clinton ended the parameters by warning the parties, “These are my ideas. If they are not accepted, they are not just off the table, they also go with me when I leave office.” Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, after a delay, accepted the Clinton parameters, but with questions and reservations that for all practical purposes vacated his acceptance of much of the substance of what he supposedly agreed to. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak accepted the parameters, but clearly intended to preserve elbow room whenever specific negotiations would take place. The parameters laid the foundation for the final negotiations that took place at Taba in January 2001.

Document 470: Official Palestinian Response to the Clinton Parameters (and Letter to the International Community) (January 1, 2001) [available at http://www.nad-plo.org/ nclinton2.php]. Yasser Abed Rabbo, the Head of the Palestinian Negotiating Team, submitted this official response to the Clinton parameters, Iwhich asserts that they fail to satisfy the conditions required for a permanent peace in their original state. Rabbo warns that the terms would divide a Palestinian state into three separate cantons connected and divided by Jewish-only and Arab-only roads and jeopardize the Palestinian state’s viability. They would also divide Palestinian Jerusalem into a number of unconnected islands separate from each other and from the rest of Palestine and force Palestinians to surrender the right of return of Palestinian refugees. The following day, Arafat and Clinton met for four and a half hours in Washington to settle discrepancies.

Document 471: Israeli-Palestinian Joint Statement of the Status Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority at Taba (January 27, 2001) [available at http:// domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/badaa58661cc084f85256e37006fc44d?OpenD ocument]. Soon-to-be-ousted Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat sent their respective delegations to major peace negotiations at Taba, Egypt, January 22-28, 2001. Following talks on contentious issues such as refugees, security, borders, and Jerusalem that fell short of a permanent agreement, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators, Shlomo Ben-Ami and Abu-Ala, released this joint statement in which the parties blame circumstances and time constraints for their failure to reach understandings on all issues, but note that foundations have been laid for a future agreement. Taba arguably marks the end of the Oslo peace process that started in Madrid in 1991.

Document 472: European Union Non-Paper on the Taba Conference (2001) [available at http://www.europarl.eu.int/meetdocs/delegations/plco/20020325/04_fr.pdf]. This European Union Non-Paper was prepared by European Union Special Representative to the Middle East Process Ambassador Miguel Moratinos and his team following consultations with Israeli and Palestinian parties present at Taba inJanuary 2001. Although the paper has no official status, it has been acknowledged by both parties as being a relatively fair description of the outcome of the negotiations.

Document 473: Jordanian-Egyptian Proposal (April 19, 2001) [available at http:// domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/b54aab90a80c526285256e370077a229?Ope nDocument]. Jordan and Egypt, as the only Arab nations to sign peace treaties with Israel, presented this proposal aimed at ending the increased violence between Israel and the Palestinians and resuming negotiations. It focuses on three objectives: (1) steps to end the current crisis between Israel and the Palestinian

Authority, (2) confidence-building measures, and (3) rebuilding the negotiating process on the Palestinian track.

Document 474: Report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact Finding Committee (Mitchell Report) (April 30, 2001) [Doc. SN 3552/01 (2001), available at http://www.state.gov/p/ nea/rls/rpt/3060.htm]. On October 17, 2000, at the conclusion of the Middle East Peace Summit at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, U.S. President Bill Clinton stated that the United States, in conjunction with the Israelis and the Palestinians and in consultation with the United Nations Secretary-General, would develop a fact­finding committee to investigate the recent escalation of violence and find ways to prevent its recurrence. In its final report—“The Mitchell Report,” named for Committee Chairman George J. Mitchell—the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee emphasizes that it was not a tribunal and so was not intended to determine the guilt or innocence of individuals or the various parties. However, it concludes that there was no evidence that the Palestinian Authority had made a consistent effort to contain demonstrations and control the violence once it began or that the government of Israel had made a consistent effort to use non- lethal means to control demonstrations of unarmed Palestinians. The committee concludes that Likud leader Ariel Sharon’s visit to al-Haram al-Sharif did not cause the “al-Aqsa Intifada” though it was “poorly timed and [its] provocative effect should have been foreseen.” Their recommendations prioritize the need to end the violence, rebuild confidence, and resume negotiations. The Israelis and Palestinians were given until May 15 to respond to the report. The committee consisted of Suleyman Demirel, ninth president of the Republic of Turkey; ThorbjoernJagland, minister of foreign affairs of Norway; Warren B. Rudman, former member of the U.S. Senate; and Javier Solana, high representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Union.

Document 475: Response of Israel to the Report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact FindingCommittee (May 15, 2001) [available athttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2001/5/Is raels+Comments+on+the+Mitchell+Committee+Report.htm]. In this official response to the Report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact Finding Committee, Israel welcomes the unqualified call for an unconditional cessation of violence, the establishment of a meaningful cooling-off period, and the resumption of negotiations. It also asserts that Israeli security personnel acted according to the highest ethical standards, military orders, and a well-defined chain of command, all in the most difficult conditions.

Document476: ResponseofthePLOtothe ReportoftheSharmel-SheikhFactFindingCommittee (May 23, 2001) [available at http://www.pmo.gov.ps/peace/responsetomitchell. asp]. In its delayed response to the Report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact Finding Committee, the PLO expresses its belief that the report provided a balanced assessment of the facts and gives its full support for the immediate implementation of all of the committee’s recommendations as a comprehensive package. The PLO identifies as issues for further attention the creation of an international protection force and Israel’s continuing assassination policy.

Document 477: Palestinian-Israeli Security Implementation Work Plan (Tenet Cease-Fire Plan) (June 14, 2001) [available at http://www.yale.edu/ awweb/avalon/mideast/ mid023.htm]. This work plan, advanced by U.S. Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, details five mutually reinforcing steps for improving security between the government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The Tenet Plan, scheduled to start onJune 13, 2001, was meant to lay the groundwork for the resumption of peace negotiations. At the request of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, it specifies a period of seven days without attacks as a precondition for implementation. As this did not materialize, it was left unimplemented.

Document478: United Nations Security CouncilResolution 1397, CallingforImplementation of the Tenet Work Plan and Mitchell Report Recommendations (March 12, 2002) [S.C. Res. 1397, U.N. SCOR, 4489th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1397 (2002)]. The Security Council in Resolution 1397 calls upon the Israeli and Palestinian sides and their leaders to cooperate in the implementation of the Tenet Cease-Fire Plan and recommendations of the Mitchell report with the aim of resuming negotiations on a political settlement. It also envisions a peaceful two-state solution.

Document 479: Arab Peace Initiative Established at the Arab League Summit (March 28, 2002) [available at http://saudiembassy.net/2002News/Statements/StateDetail. asp?cIndex=142]. This Saudi-initiated plan for a comprehensive peace calls for settlement of the Palestine-Israel conflict and other outstanding disputes that would be followed by a termination of the state of war between Israel and all Arab states and the formal recognition of Israel by those states. The plan calls for a solution to the refugees problem that is accepted by the parties, and it mentions U.N. Resolution 194 as a basis.

Document 480: Letter from the Secretary-General Containing a Joint Statement by the Quartet (April 10, 2002) [U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2002/369 (2002)]. After a meeting in Madrid, representatives of the Quartet issued thisjoint statement, calling on the leaders of Israel and the Palestinian Authority to act in the interests of their own people, the region, and the international community and immediately end the violence.

Document 481: Speech by U.S. President George W. Bush on Mid-East Peace (June 24, 2002) [available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624- 3.html]. In this speech, U.S. President George W. Bush disparages the existing Palestinian leadership for its alleged support of terrorism and its inability to participate with good faith in peace negotiations. Bush promises that when new leaders, new institutions, and new security arrangements are arranged, the United States will support the creation of a Palestinian state within the framework of a final settlement.

Document 482: Nusseibeh-Ayalon Agreement (August 6, 2002) [ available at http://www. mifkad.org.il/en/principles.asp]. Sari Nusseibeh, president of Al Quds University, and Ami Ayalon, the former director of Israel’s Domestic Security Service (Shin Beth) and the former admiral of the Israeli navy, released these principles for an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. Promoting a two-state solution and Jerusalem as the capital of both states, the plan is largely consistent with the more detailed 2003 Geneva Accord. Thus far, the agreement has not been accepted by official Israeli or Palestinian representatives.

Document 483: Communique Issued by the Quartet (September 17, 2002) [ available at http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/ 54c9e0a5f8ccbd2b85256c3700653ea4!OpenDocument]. Representatives of the Quartet (i.e., United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller, High Representative for European Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, and European Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten) released this joint Communique in New York, agreeing to intensify their efforts in support of achieving a final Israeli-Palestinian settlement based on the two-state solution.

Document 484: Elements of a Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Issued by the United States and Welcomed by the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations (October 15, 2002) [U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/2003/529 (2003)]. The Elements of a Performance-based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Issued by the United States and Welcomed by the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations (Road Map), now endorsed by the United Nations, is not a final status plan, but a series of steps designed to calm the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, create a provisional Palestinian state, and allow for negotiations of a final status agreement. It calls for a three-phased implementation of proposals as set out in U.S. President George W. Bush’s speech of June 24, 2002, making a two-state solution possible. It does not specify the final borders of Palestine and Israel or any other details of the solution.

Document 485: Israel’s Response to the Road Map (May 25, 2003) [available at http:// www.knesset.gov.il/process/ docs/roadmap_response_eng.htm]. The government of Israel presented this fourteen-point formal response to the Performance­based Road Map, which outlines conditions for progress, including the complete cessation of terror, violence, and incitement and the emergence of a new and different leadership in the Palestinian Authority.

Document 486: Statement by the Quartet, Jordan (June 22, 2003) [available at http:// www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/21808.htm]. Following their meeting at the Dead Sea in Jordan, representatives of the Quartet (i.e., United Nations Secretary­General Kofi Annan, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou, United States Secretary of State Colin Powell, High Representative for European Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, and European Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten) released this statement, welcoming U.S. President George W. Bush’s decision to send a mission to the area to coordinate, monitor, and promote implementation of the parties’ commitments and responsibilities as laid out in the Road Map. They detail progress made on Palestinian institutional reform and reaffirm their support for efforts to fulfill the reform goals set forth in the first phase of the Road Map.

Document 487: Statement by the Quartet, New York (September 26, 2003) [available at http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/a80bac3d1c9c285e85256db2004c77d6?Op enDocument]. After their meeting in New York, representatives of the Quartet released this statement, reminding all sides of their obligations and responsibilities to each other with regard to the Road Map.

Document 488: Geneva Accord, Draft Permanent Status Agreement (October 2003) [available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArtjhtml?itemNo=351461l]. A group of prominent Israelis and Palestinians initialed this final status peace agreement in Geneva, now called the Geneva Accord. It is based on the Clinton parameters of December 2000, which were accepted by Israel and the Palestinian Authority as a basis for negotiations.

Document 489: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1515, Endorsing the Road Map Unanimously (November 19, 2003) [S.C. Res. 1515, U.N. SCOR, 4862d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1515 (2003)]. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1515 welcomes the diplomatic efforts of the international Quartet and endorses the Quartet’s Performance-based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. It calls on the parties to fulfill their obligations under the Road Map in cooperation with the Quartet.

Document 490: Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's Speech at the Herzlia Conference, (December 18, 2003) [ available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/sharon_ 1203.html]. It was in this occasion that Prime Minister Sharon announced for the first time his plan for Israel’s unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip. He spells out Israel’s challenges in the field of economic and social improvement, education and science, and comes to the conclusion that Israel cannot wait for the Palestinians to be ripe for peace. Therefore, to be able to face its vital challenges, Israel must take unilateral steps. He reaffirms his commitment to the Road Map and to the principle of two states—Israel and Palestine—living side by side in peace and security. Yet, he insists that without security, on which the Palestinians are still incapable to deliver, there can be no peace. Hence, his Disengagement Plan, which would entail the evacuation of all the Jewish settlers in Gaza, is aimed at increasing security as a step towards peace. The Disengagement Plan is a security measure, not a political one. He pledges that concurrent with the demand from the Palestinians to eliminate the terror organizations, Israel will persist in its policy of improving the living conditions of the Palestinian population. The aim, he states unequivocally, is that of establishing a “democratic Palestinian state with territorial contiguity... and economic viability.”

Document491: Statementby UnitedNationsSecretary-GeneralKofiAnnan at the2004Session of the Committee of the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (March 12, 2004) [U.N. Press Release, U.N. Dep’t of Public Info., U.N. Doc. SG/SM/9194 (2004)]. In this public statement delivered at the 2004 Session of the Committee of the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan calls on both parties to take immediate and specific steps to implement the Road Map without preconditions and notes the civilian death toll owing to the failure to make discernable progress.

Document 492: Exchange of Letters between U.S. President George W. Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (April 14, 2004) [available at http://www.pmo.gov.il/nr/ exeres/D52EF985-40EE-4E58-8F6A-EBA088C917B7.htm,http://www.whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040414-3.html]. These letters exchanged by U.S. President George W. Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon form an integral part of Sharon’s Disengagement Plan. In Bush’s letter, the United States pledges support for the plan on the precondition that it is approved by the Israeli cabinet and the Knesset.

Document 493: Statement by U.S. President George W. Bush (April 14, 2004) [available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040414-2.html]. U.S. President George W. Bush issued this statement from the White House following a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. In it, Bush expresses support for Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s Disengagement Plan, under which Israel would remove its military installations and settlements from Gaza and portions of the West Bank. Bush affirms the U.S. government’s commitment to a two-state solution and the Road Map as the best means of realizing peace.

Document 494: Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's Disengagement Plan (April 18, 2004) [available at http://www.pmo.gov.il/nr/exeres/939E3D2E-1621-4AA9-A6DF-174AE 7441DA2.htm]. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon presented this plan that calls for a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from all of Gaza and four settlements in the West Bank to take place in four stages by the end 2005. According to the proposal, Israel would redeploy military forces along new security lines and relocate some settlements, including nearly all of the settlements in the Gaza Strip. The plan also calls for accelerating the completion of the “separation barrier” between Israel and the West Bank. Arafat’s top advisor, Nabil Abu Rudaina, stated that Sharon’s plan violated the Road Map. This Disengagement Plan was the first serious diplomatic initiative undertaken by Sharon since he took office in 2001.

Document 495: Letter from the Chief of the Israeli Prime Minister’s Bureau, Dov Weissglas, to the U.S. National Security Advisor, Dr. Condoleezza Rice (April 18, 2004) [available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Letter+ Weissglas-Rice+18-Apr-2004.htm]. The chief of Israeli Prime Minister’s Bureau, Dov Weissglas, sent this letter to the U.S. National Security Advisor, Dr. Condoleeza Rice, to clarify Sharon’s Disengagement Plan with regard to: (1) restrictions on settlement growth, (2) removal of unauthorized outposts, (3) mobility restrictions in Judea and Samaria,; and (4) legal attachments of Palestinian revenues. Weissglas presents strategies for resolving these issues and assures Rice that the Government of Israel remains committed to a two-state solution and to the Road Map—with the understanding that Sharon’s Disengagement Plan is consistent with the Road Map.

Document 496: Government Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan (June 6, 2004) [available at http://www.pmo.gov.il/nr/exeres/C5E1ACE3-9834-414E-9512- 8E5F509E9A4D.htm]. The Israeli cabinet approved this revised version of Sharon’s Disengagement Plan, which coordinates the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and areas in the West Bank. It allows for the preparatory work necessary to evacuate settlements from these areas; however, it does not allow for their removal without further government approval. The vote carried fourteen to seven in favor after two Ministers, Avigdor Liberman and Benny Elon, were fired by Prime Minister Sharon and a compromise offered by Likud was accepted. On October 26, 2004, the Israeli Knesset voted to adopt the plan.

Document 497: Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's Statement on the Day of the Implementation of the Disengagement Plan (August 15, 2005) [available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2005/PM+Sharon+addresses+the+ nation+15-Aug-2005.htm]. The prime minister expresses his sorrow at the mass evacuation of settlements he always believed should be part of the State of Israel. But, “the changing reality in this country, in this region, and in the world, required another assessment and changing of positions.” Now, after the disengagement, the Palestinians bear the burden of proof, and he expects them to fight terror, and show sincere intentions of peace. He also consoles the settlers of Gaza in their sorrow by saying that theirs was a glorious chapter in the history of Israel.

Document 498: U.S.-Vetoed Security Council Draft Resolution (July 13, 2006) [available at http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/22f431edb91c6f5 48525678a0051be1d/ 9d7e7d10afdd2a81852571ab004b106c!OpenDocument]. In response to rocket fire originating in Gaza and the abduction of Corporal Gilad Shalit, Israeli forces mobilized forces against Gaza. This proposed resolution called for immediate cessation of military action, as well as the release of Palestinian ministers and Shalit.

Document 499: Annapolis Summit Opening Remarks by Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert (November 27, 2007) [available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/928669.html]. The United States organized the Annapolis Summit in order to lay the foundation for a roadmap to peace between Palestine and Israel. The plan also included aspirations to develop a bilateral agreement to develop a two-state plan. The conference ended with an agreed upon joint statement by both parties involved.

Document 500: Annapolis Summit Opening Remarks by President Bush Including Joint Statement (Novemeber 27, 2007) [available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/ spages∕928652.html]. Following a welcome to the attendees of the Annapolis Summit at the U.S. Naval Academy, President Bush read the joint statement agreed upon by both parties. The agreement establishes a joint goal for two states, Israel and Palestine. The joint statement also institutes a plan for vigorous negotiation that would conclude in an agreement by the end of 2008.

Document 501: Trip Report by Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan (April 22, 2008) [available at http://www. cartercenter.org/news/trip_reports/middle_east_2008.html]. President Carter visited several Mid-East leaders, including those from Syria and Hamas, to discuss the challenges and options available in the ongoing peace process for the region. His synopsis recalls meetings with various leaders and organizations, discusses his role on the trip, and provides a summary of the results. The report’s most substantive elements include Carter’s reflection on his meetings with Syrian and Hamas leaders, specifically noting those states’ concerns and peace process options to which they are most receptive.

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